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Abstract
This report covers regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2005. Its submission to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is 
stipulated in section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. Nuclear safety regulation focused 
on the design, construction and operation of Finnish nuclear facilities as well as on nuclear 
waste management and nuclear materials.
No events endangering the safety of the use of nuclear power occurred at the Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa nuclear power plants. The doses of all nuclear power plant workers were below the 
individual dose limit. The collective occupational dose at the Olkiluoto plant was above 
normal due to the modernisation work done at the Olkiluoto 2 turbine plant and exceeded 
the average dose measured at BWRs in the OECD countries. At Loviisa 1, the collective 
dose threshold per one gigawatt of net electrical power, calculated according to STUK’s gui-
delines, was exceeded due to the extended 2004 outage. Radioactive releases were low and 
the dose calculated on their basis for the most exposed individual in the vicinity of Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants was well below the limit established by Government 
Resolution.
STUK’s safety performance indicators for nuclear power plants, which describe the effecti-
veness of STUK’s activities, did not indicate changes requiring STUK’s immediate reaction.
STUK assessed the safety of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit when preparing its 
statement to the Ministry of Trade and Industry on the construction licence application of 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy. In addition to the assessment of safety, oversight focused on the 
design of the plant unit’s systems, the manufacturing of its main components and construc-
tion work onsite. In addition, STUK assessed the activities of the licence applicant, vendor 
and subcontractors.
No events endangering safety occurred at the FiR 1 research reactor. The radiation doses of 
those working at the research reactor and radioactive releases into the environment were 
clearly below set limits.
No events endangering safety occurred in nuclear waste management. In the ﬁeld of 
nuclear material safeguards, the use of nuclear materials in accordance with current regu-
lations and the completeness and correctness of nuclear material accounting were veriﬁed.
STUK veriﬁed that nuclear liability in the event of nuclear damage has been taken care of 
according to legislation.
The total costs of nuclear safety regulation were €10.6 million. The total costs of operations 
subject to a charge were €9.3 million, the full amount of which was charged to the licensees 
and licence-applicants.
KAINULAINEN Erja (ed.). Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 2005.  
STUK-B-YTO 249. Helsinki 2006. 60 pp. + Appendices 60 pp.
Keywords: nuclear energy, nuclear facility, nuclear waste, nuclear safeguards, regulatory control, 
safety indicators
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1 Preface
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) regulates the use of nuclear energy in 
Finland as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act 
(990/1987). STUK’s responsibilities also include 
control of physical protection and emergency plan-
ning as well as control of the use of nuclear ener-
gy necessary to prevent nuclear proliferation. This 
is a report on regulatory control in the ﬁeld of 
nuclear energy submitted by STUK to the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry as stipulated in section 121 
of the Nuclear Energy Decree.
It covers the regulatory oversight of nuclear 
facilities, nuclear waste management and nuclear 
materials, which is the task of two STUK depart-
ments: Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Nuclear 
Waste and Materials Regulation.
Nuclear safety regulation focused on the 
Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units owned by 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy and the Olkiluoto 1 ja 
2 units owned by Teollisuuden Voima Oy as well as 
their nuclear waste management and nuclear ma-
terials. The Olkiluoto 3 plant unit of Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy, which is under construction, was also 
subject to control. Fortum Power and Heat Oy and 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy are later in the text also 
referred to as licensee, licence applicant or utility. 
The planning and later implementation of the ﬁnal 
disposal of nuclear fuel is taken care of by Posiva 
Oy. Subject to regulatory control were also the 
research reactor operated by the VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland, small-scale users of 
nuclear materials as well as the transport of radio-
active materials.
Loviisa 1 began generating electricity to the 
national grid in 1977 ja Loviisa 2 in 1981. Their 
operating licences were renewed in 1998 and will 
expire at the end of 2007. The Loviisa plant units 
are light-water PWRs. The highest allowable reac-
tor nominal thermal power for each unit, accor-
ding to the licence granted by the Government, is 
1500 MW. The nominal values for electrical power 
510 MW (gross) and 488 MW (net) correspond to 
this reactor power.
Olkiluoto 1 began generating electricity to the 
national grid in 1979 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1982. 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are light-water BWRs. The ope-
rating licences of the Olkiluoto plant units 1 and 
2 were renewed in 1998. They will expire at the 
end of 2018 and cover also spent fuel intermediate 
storage as well as low and intermediate level reac-
tor waste storage. According to the licences, the 
highest allowable reactor nominal thermal power 
for each Olkiluoto plant unit is 2500 MW. A corres-
ponding nominal gross electrical power is 870 MW 
and net electrical power 840 MW for Olkiluoto 1. 
Corresponding values for Olkiluoto 2 are 890 MW 
and 860 MW. The licence conditions require that 
the licensee makes, by the end of 2008, an extensi-
ve periodic safety review for the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant. The requirements for the contents of 
the assessment are set by STUK.
Upon the application of Teollisuuden Voima Oy, 
the Government on 17 February 2005 granted a 
construction licence for Olkiluoto 3 in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act. The new plant unit 
is a light-water PWR with a reactor thermal power 
of 4300 MW and a net electrical power of approx. 
1600 MW.
This report’s section on nuclear reactor regu-
lation describes the assessment of safety analyses 
for the Loviisa plant units and the operating units 
of the Olkiluoto plant; oversight of plant modiﬁca-
tions, of availability of the plant units and of the 
operation of organisations. The implementation of 
new or revised YVL guides on operating nuclear po-
wer plants is described. The efﬁciency and effective-
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ness of nuclear safety regulation is analysed using 
STUK’s Safety Performance Indicator System. The 
report’s supplements include a detailed explanation 
of the Safety Performance Indicators (Appendix 1), 
of completed safety improvements (Appendix 2) 
and of signiﬁcant operational events (Appendix 3). 
Radiation safety at the plants is analysed by loo-
king at occupational and collective doses at the 
facilities as well as the outcome of monitoring for 
radiation in releases and the environment.
The report discusses the assessment of safety 
analyses for Olkiluoto 3, which is under construc-
tion, the oversight of the plant project and of the 
operation of organisations participating in the 
construction project.
The chapter on nuclear waste management 
deals with spent nuclear fuel intermediate stora-
ge, preparation for ﬁnal disposal and treatment 
of low and intermediate level waste. The volumes 
of nuclear fuel as well as low and intermediate 
level waste stored onsite at the end of the year are 
given.
The chapter on nuclear non-proliferation descri-
bes nuclear material control at the Finnish nuclear 
facilities and safeguards for the ﬁnal disposal of 
spent fuel as well as activities in accordance with 
the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. Regulation of ra-
dioactive materials transport and implementation 
of the CTBT are included.
The report discusses the development of re-
gulatory guides and nuclear safety regulation as 
well as functions in support of nuclear safety 
regulation such as safety research, emergency res-
ponse, communications and development projects. 
Participation in international co-operation in the 
ﬁeld of nuclear safety is described.
STUK-B-YTO 249
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2 Legislation and regulations
Pekka Salminen
The revision and updating of YVL guides conti-
nued. The guides are detailed safety regulations 
for nuclear facilities issued by STUK on the ba-
sis of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) and the 
Government Resolution (395/1991) on the general 
safety regulations for nuclear power plants. The 
guides describe STUK’s regulatory procedures as 
well. STUK decides, case by case, how new guides 
apply to and obligate facilities already in operati-
on. Such decisions made in 2005 are discussed in 
subsections 3.1.1, 3.2.1 and 3.3.2.
A total of about 23 guides were prepared or 
reviewed in YVL guide working groups, with four 
guides completed by the end of the year. The num-
ber of Finnish language YVL guides published in 
2001–2005 is given in Fig. 1. The number of guides 
published in English was 13 and those in Swedish 
two. The guides were available in print and on 
STUK’s web site (www.stuk.ﬁ/julkaisut_maarayk-
set/viranomaisohjeet/en_GB/yvl/) and on the 
Finlex portal (www.ﬁnlex.ﬁ). Swedish language 
translations were published only as online-ver-
sions.
A preparatory working group started work on 
a project to revise the structure of the YVL guide 
collection. Representatives of the Finnish utilities 
were invited to participate. The working group 
gave STUK it’s expert opinion on i.a. the structu-
re of the new guidelines system and the internal 
structure of individual guides. The project will 
span over several years.
No amendments to the general regulations on 
nuclear safety, issued in the form of Government 
Resolutions, were prepared. The revision of the 
resolutions was started however. The ﬁrst internal 
draft on the Government Resolution (395/1991) was 
completed. By virtue of Finland’s new Constitution, 
it will become necessary to consider next on what 
regulatory level various requirements will be pre-
sented.
The Atomic Questions Group of the Commission 
discussed the draft directive on the supervision 
and control of shipments of radioactive waste and 
spent nuclear fuel, which is intended to replace 
Directive 92/3. STUK participated actively in the 
handling of the matter in Finland.
In a working group of the Western European 
Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) STUK’s 
experts participated in the drawing up of reference 
levels for European safety requirements. WENRA’s 
work aims at the harmonisation of safety require-
ments in the EU countries. The experience gained 
in WENRA work was utilised in the then-ongoing 
work on YVL guides.
Nuclear safety recommendations are given by 
international organisations, such as the IAEA and 
the OECD/NEA. On various forums of co-operation 
STUK follows the work of other countries’ national 
authorities in the ﬁeld of rule-making. This did not 
result in any need to update the Finnish nuclear 
legislation. STUK prepared and delivered to the 
IAEA statements on 13 draft safety guides.
Figure 1. Number of yearly published YVL guides.
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3 Nuclear facilities regulation
Kirsi Alm-Lytz, Timo Eurasto, Juhani Hinttala, Juhani Hyvärinen, Tarja 
K. Ikäheimonen, Ari Julin, Marja-Leena Järvinen, Seppo Klemola, Tapani 
Koljander, Jukka Kupila, Nina Lahtinen, Jouko Mononen, Matti Ojanen, 
Rainer Rantala, Suvi Ristonmaa, Vesa Ruuska, Pekka Salminen, Seija Suksi, 
Heimo Takala, Petteri Tiippana, Keijo Valtonen, Vesa-Pekka Vartti, Olli 
Vilkamo, Reino Virolainen, Tapani Virolainen
Guides YVL 6.4 and YVL 6.5 at their nuclear facili-
ty and in their operation.
Prior to the implementation of Guide YVL 5.6, 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy gave an assessment of 
the fulﬁlment of the guide’s requirements. STUK 
found it insufﬁcient and called for a clariﬁcation of 
the actions planned to fulﬁl the requirements set 
for the detection of concentrations of radioactive 
and toxic substances. The licensee has presented 
STUK with a more speciﬁed plan for action.
In its decision enforcing Guide YVL 5.2, STUK 
made remarks and presented further requirements 
pertaining to the overcurrent protection of the 
110 kV back-up plant transformer, the offsite alter-
nating current supply to the plant, the feasibility 
assessment of cabling and the updating of plant 
procedures to comply with the revised guide.
3.1.2 Assessment of safety analyses
Deterministic safety analyses
The licensees update the nuclear power plants’ de-
terministic safety analyses in connection with the 
renewal of operating licences. The analyses are up-
dated also in connection with plant modiﬁcations, 
or whenever operational events warrant it. STUK 
reviews the licensee’s analyses and conducts, or 
contracts out where necessary, its own reference 
analyses.
The emergency operating procedures of Loviisa 
nuclear power plant were revised in the HOKE 
project, launched in 2000. The project encompassed 
the drawing up of diagnosis procedures for tran-
sients and emergencies arising from primary and 
secondary leaks as well as procedures for operators 
and safety engineer, as well as action sheets for 
3.1 Loviisa 1 and 2
3.1.1 Implementation of regulations
STUK has introduced a procedure for application 
of new or revised YVL guides to operating nuclear 
facilities. According to it, the publication of a YVL 
guide does not, as such, change STUK’s previous 
decisions. It is only after having heard those con-
cerned that STUK will give a separate decision on 
the application of a new or revised YVL guide to an 
operating nuclear facility, or to one under construc-
tion as well as to a licensee’s operation. The guides 
apply as such to new nuclear power plants.
In considering the application of new safe-
ty requirements given in YVL guides to opera-
ting nuclear facilities, or those under construction, 
STUK takes into account the principle stipula-
ted in section 27 of the Government Resolution 
(395/1991). It prescribes that, to further improve 
safety, measures shall be implemented that are 
justiﬁable considering operating experience, sa-
fety research and the development of science and 
technology.
Decisions to implement the below YVL guides 
were made in accordance with the new procedure
• Guide YVL 5.6, Ventilation systems and compo-
nents of nuclear facilities, 25 November 2004
• Guide YVL 6.4, Transport packages and packa-
gings for radioactive material, 4 April 2005
• Guide YVL 6.5, Transport of nuclear material 
and nuclear waste, 4 April 2005.
• Guide YVL 5.2, Electrical power systems and 
components at nuclear facilities, 6 April 2005
STUK had no remarks to make on the licensee’s 
assessment of the fulﬁlment of the requirements of 
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onsite measures. The project’s aim has been to de-
velop extensive and uniform emergency operating 
procedures, to provide support for the forthcoming 
I&C and control room upgrading as well as to pass 
on information to a new generation. The revised 
procedures consist of guidelines and instructions 
presented as ﬂow charts. The guidelines deﬁne 
strategy and give grounds for operator actions du-
ring emergencies and transients. STUK reviewed 
the analyses justifying the procedures, which were 
supplied by the utility, and authorised their taking 
into use.
The emergency operating procedure for a steam 
generator heat exchanger tube break was revised 
as regards pressuriser injection and the operation 
of pressure relief valves to manage the situation. 
STUK reviewed the analyses justifying the mo-
diﬁcation. Other deterministic safety analyses of 
the Loviisa plant were not submitted to STUK for 
review.
Probabilistic safety analyses
STUK continued to work with questions relating to 
the weather risk analysis for Loviisa plant’s shut-
down states. A general review of the analysis data 
was made in 2004. The licensee’s analysis assessed 
the risks of a normal month-long annual main-
tenance outage. According to the analysis, weat-
her and other environmental phenomena during 
a shutdown constituted a large part of the core 
damage probability for the Loviisa plant. The most 
risk-important environmental phenomena include 
simultaneous high air and sea water temperatu-
res, large oil spills or chemicals releases (at least 
hundreds of tons of oil in seawater), which could be 
transported to the sea water channel and prevent 
the plant’s sea water intake.
For a more exact risk assessment, the utility 
carried out further analyses and follow-up measu-
rements. They show that the risk arising from si-
multaneously high air and sea water temperatures 
is considerably smaller than previously assessed, 
which makes oil and chemical spills into the sea 
the single most important risk factor relating to 
weather and environmental phenomena.
The risk from oil spills at the sea for Loviisa 
power plant while on power operation has been 
assessed at 4·10–9/year and at 8.5·10–6/year during 
an outage, which accounts for approx. 10 per cent 
of the total core damage frequency for the Loviisa 
plant units (power operation and outages together 
account for approx. 10–4/year).
Oil spills could endanger plant safety since oil 
possibly ending up in the plant sea water intake 
could clog up service water systems (band screens 
or heat exchangers). The risk from oil spills is at its 
highest during annual maintenance outages when 
the primary circuit is open and the back-up emer-
gency feed water system, which does not require 
sea water, and the steam blow-down function to the 
atmosphere are unavailable for decay heat removal 
via the secondary circuit.
The operational procedures of Loviisa power 
plant prevent the entrance of oil in the service 
water systems i.a. by oil booms and stopping of the 
main service water pumps in case of an oil hazard. 
The Finnish Maritime Administration notiﬁes the 
main control room of Loviisa 1 of any oil hazards.
The utility is developing its own solutions to 
reduce the risk of oil and chemical spills. After the 
completion of the ongoing plant modiﬁcations, the 
sea water required by the cooling systems can be 
drawn from the sea water discharge channel in 
case of an oil hazard. Most of the modiﬁcations 
have been implemented at Loviisa 1 and will be 
implemented at Loviisa 2 in 2006.
The utility has commissioned more exact analy-
ses of oil spill frequencies and the spreading of oil. 
According to preliminary data, the spreading of oil 
simultaneously to the intake and discharge sides of 
the sea water channel is highly unlikely. Therefore, 
the risk assessed will probably be reduced.
The Loviisa power plant has plans to modify the 
coarse bar screen (for ﬁltering of marine growth as 
well as ﬂotsam and jetsam) in connection of which 
hatches are planned to isolate the sea water inlet 
channel. The hatches would also prevent the access 
of oil into the inlet channel in case of an oil hazard 
when cooling water intake is taking place from the 
discharge side.
3.1.3 Oversight of plant modiﬁcations
The most signiﬁcant safety improvement under 
way at the Loviisa plant is the upgrading of the 
I&C systems of the plant units. The project started 
with the construction of a new I&C building and is 
due for completion in 2014. The upgrading takes 
place phase by phase such that upgraded system 
12
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sections are available for commissioning during 
annual maintenances. At the beginning of 2004 
an oversight project was set up at STUK to co-
ordinate document review and other regulatory 
activities, such as onsite inspection, pertaining to 
the I&C upgrading. STUK has reviewed among 
other things plans for operational modiﬁcations 
due for implementation during the I&C upgrading 
and plans relating to compliance with the diversity 
principle. STUK has reviewed the detailed plans 
for the buildings to be constructed for the new 
plant I&C systems. The utility continued construc-
tion of the buildings based on the approved plans. 
The construction of Loviisa 1 advanced well and 
that of Loviisa 2 was started. STUK monitors work 
progress.
Plant life management includes the replace-
ment of devices in operation with new technology. 
In 2004 and 2005 the utility replaced the personnel 
monitors of the Loviisa plant units, which measure 
all workers exiting the controlled area for possible 
contamination. STUK approved the conceptual 
design plan for the renewal of the monitors in June 
2004, supervised their commissioning onsite and 
reviewed their test-run documentation and re-
sults.
A solidiﬁcation facility for liquid radioactive 
waste is under construction and the ﬁnal reposi-
tory for low and intermediate level waste is being 
extended at the Loviisa plant site. The construction 
of the solidiﬁcation facility began in 2004 and it is 
due for commissioning towards the end of 2006. 
The overview project set up in STUK in 2004 
continued. STUK reviewed i.a. the pre-inspecti-
on documents of the systems in the solidiﬁcation 
facility and documents on the construction of the 
ﬁnal disposal facility for solidiﬁed waste. The com-
missioning inspection of section 2 of the low level 
maintenance waste disposal facility of the ﬁnal 
repository was in May.
During the annual maintenance outage, the 
testing of the back-up systems of the decay heat 
removal system of the Loviisa plant units was 
completed. This modiﬁcation was described in the 
2004 Annual Report (STUK-B-YTO 241).
In consequence of the plant modiﬁcations, se-
veral documents describing plant operation and 
layout, such as the Technical Speciﬁcations, the 
Final Safety Analysis Report and the operating 
and maintenance procedures, changed. STUK su-
pervised the revision of these documents and 
followed the updating of the plant documentation 
after the modiﬁcations. The results are given in 
Appendix 1 (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.6).
3.1.4 Oversight of plant operability
Compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations
Compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations at the 
Loviisa power plant was controlled by reviewing 
regular and topical reports on plant operation and 
by witnessing operations onsite. Subject to over-
sight were in particular the testing and repair of 
components subject to the Technical Speciﬁcations. 
After completion of the annual maintenance outa-
ges, the plant unit’s compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations was veriﬁed before startup. The li-
censee is obliged to immediately report to STUK 
all plant situations in non-compliance with the 
Technical Speciﬁcations.
No events occurred at the Loviisa plant due 
to which the plant units would have been in 
non-compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations 
(Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2).
The Technical Speciﬁcations were deviated 
from by applying in advance for STUK’s appro-
val of a non-compliance. The licensee applied for 
approval of seven deviations from the Technical 
Speciﬁcations (Appendix 1, indicator A.I.2). After 
an analysis of the deviations’ safety signiﬁcance, 
STUK approved the applications. Four exemp-
tions pertained to deviations from the Technical 
Speciﬁcations due to plant modiﬁcations or moder-
nisation.
Operation and operational events
The Loviisa plant units operated reliably. The load 
factor of Loviisa 1 was 95.4 % and that of Loviisa 2 
was 95.7 %. Fig. 2 gives the plant units’ load factors 
for 1996−2005. The durations of the annual main-
tenance outages were 17 days at Loviisa 1 and 15 
days at Loviisa 2. In addition, brief reductions in 
output capacity occurred at both plant units due 
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to technical failures. The most signiﬁcant of these 
was the the tripping of one Loviisa 1 turbine on 16 
to 17 April from a generator stator earth fault.
Production losses in nominal output caused by 
component malfunctions were 0.27 % at Loviisa 
1 and 0.15% at Loviisa 2. Production losses from 
component malfunctions in a longer time period 
are depicted by the indicators in Appendix 1 (indi-
cator A.I.1g). Figure 3 gives the daily average gross 
powers of the plant units.
At the Loviisa plant units, one event warranted 
a special report and eight operational transients 
were reported to STUK. (Appendix 1, indicator 
A.II.1). The event subject to a special report was an 
increase in sea water level in January. The event’s 
INES classiﬁcation was Level 0.
The event is explained in more detail in 
Appendix 3. Figure 4 gives the number of INES 
Level 1 events in 1996–2005. No events exceeding 
INES Level 1 occurred at the Loviisa plant during 
this time period.
A small primary circuit leak in the steam gene-
rator was detected at Loviisa 2 in the autumn of 
2004. The locating of the leak was among the most 
signiﬁcant tasks during this annual maintenance 
outage. The leak was very small and had no bea-
ring on plant operation.
In addition to event reports, the Loviisa power 
plant submitted to STUK daily reports, monthly 
reports, annual reports, outage reports, annual 
environmental safety reports, monthly individual 
dose reports, annual operational feed back reports 
and nuclear safeguards reports.
Annual maintenance outages
The annual maintenance outages of both plant 
units were refueling outages.
Loviisa 1 was shut down for annual mainte-
nance on 30 July. The annual maintenance took 
17 days and ended on 16 August, approx. 21 hours 
behind from planned schedule. The outage was 
extended mostly due to the washing of the reactor 
pit, which took longer than planned, carried out 
towards the end of the outage.
Loviisa 2 was shut down on 20 August for an-
nual maintenance, which ended on 5 September, 
approx. 20 hours later than planned. The extension 
Figure 2. Load factors of the Loviisa plant units.
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Figure 3. Daily average gross power of the Loviisa 
plant units in 2005.
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Figure 4. Loviisa plant’s INES classiﬁed events (INES 
Level 1 and higher).
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of the Loviisa 2 annual maintenance was due to 
the grinding, welding and machining of a crack in 
the inner sealing groove of the ﬂange of the reactor 
pressure vessel upper edge.
The locating of a leaking steam generator pipe, 
which was detected in the Loviisa 2 annual main-
tenance, was attempted but, due to the leak’s small 
size, this failed. The utility continued follow-up of 
the leak during the new operating cycle. It has no 
bearing on the radiation safety of the plant and the 
environment. The leak and its locating is described 
in more detail in Appendix 3.
The collective radiation dose incurred in ou-
tage work was 0.403 manSv at Loviisa 1 and 
0.300 manSv at Loviisa 2. Occupational radiation 
doses are examined in more detail under “Radiation 
Safety” and in Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.4).
STUK’s oversight activities focused, among ot-
hers, on the administrative arrangements of outa-
ge work, the work of the operating and maintenan-
ce personnel, refueling as well as inspections and 
tests by the licensee and contractors. Attention was 
paid to the implementation of radiation protection, 
control room operations and housekeeping. Prior to 
the start of the new fuel cycle, safety analyses for 
the new fuel charge were reviewed. The loading of 
the fuel assemblies into the reactor according to 
plan was ascertained. The nuclear material inven-
tory was veriﬁed prior to the closing of the reactor 
pressure vessel. STUK controlled the placement of 
the plant units into shutdown state and their post-
outage start-up.
STUK paid attention to housekeeping in gene-
ral and to control room operations during outages. 
The plant premises were mostly in good order with 
cleanliness and order improved from that observed 
in the 2004 annual maintenances. Work loads du-
ring the annual maintenances were signiﬁcantly 
less intense than in 2004, which essentially affects 
the upkeep of cleanliness and order.
The actions to make working in the plant’s main 
control room hassle-free went ahead reasonably 
well. As in previous years, the handling of work 
orders had been moved mostly to a room beside the 
main control room. During its inspections, STUK 
regularly observed working in the control room du-
ring plant rounds and found it to be matter-of-fact 
and undisturbed.
STUK found several shortcomings in the use 
of the personnel’s personal protective equipment. 
Those responsible for radiation protection and in-
dustrial safety at the Loviisa plant were informed 
and the matter was brought up i.a. at the meetings 
of work supervisors and the personnel.
The regulatory oversight of the Loviisa facility’s 
annual maintenance outages took 98 working days. 
A resident inspector worked regularly at the site. 
In addition, a total of 117 days outside normal wor-
king hours was spent in inspection work to oversee 
annual maintenances.
Repairs and maintenance
Both Loviisa plant units underwent brief refueling 
outages involving no extensive maintenance and 
repair work.
The most important Loviisa 1 work were the 
maintenance and inspection of the pressuriser 
main relief valves and their pilot valves, the an-
nual testing of the steam generator relief valves, 
the maintenance and inspection of two primary 
coolant pumps and the maintenance of control rod 
drive mechanisms. In addition, three heat exchan-
ger tubes of one steam generator were plugged 
using new plugging equipment.
Similar maintenance and inspections were car-
ried out at Loviisa 2 with the exception of steam 
generator tube plugging. A crack in the sealing 
groove of the reactor pressure vessel was repai-
red by surface welding. In addition, the tightness 
of two protective sleeves of the reactor pressure 
vessel control rod drive mechanisms were checked 
since water had been found in them in the previous 
outage. The situation was found not to have chan-
ged between inspections. The utility prepares for 
repairs in the 2006 outage. Leak detection on the 
heat exchanger tubes of one steam generator was 
carried out but unsuccessfully.
Periodic inspection of the reactor pressure ves-
sel and piping in accordance with Guide YVL 3.8, 
which is the responsibility of the licensee, was car-
ried out at both plant units.
STUK’s overview included approval of inspecti-
on programmes prior to the start of inspections as 
well as inspection supervision and review of the re-
sults at the plant. The ﬁnal results reports will be 
submitted to STUK for approval after the annual 
maintenance. STUK reviewed onsite the results 
of condition monitoring inspections of secondary 
piping made by the licensee.
There were no periodic inspections of pressure 
STUK-B-YTO 249
15
equipment in STUK’s inspection area at either 
plant unit. STUK supervised at both plant units 
inspections of Safety Class 3 and 4 as well as Class 
EYT (non-nuclear) pressure equipment made by 
inspection organisations.
STUK carried out 163 construction inspections, 
inspections of repairs and modiﬁcations at the 
plant as well as commissioning inspections. Ten 
electrical and I&C system related inspections were 
made.
Ageing management
Technical analyses relating to the extension of the 
lifetime of both plant units were started at Loviisa 
power plant. Current operating licences will ex-
pire in 2007 and the utility plans to apply for an 
extension of 20 years and 23 years for Loviisa 1 
and Loviisa 2 respectively. The 30-year technical 
lifetime of the plant units, the planned basis for 
commercial agreements, will then be exceeded by 
20 years.
Technical analyses relating to the renewal 
of the operating licences are divided into seven 
subprojects for whose implementation a project or-
ganisation was set up. A report will be drawn up on 
the principles and implementation of lifetime ma-
nagement as well as on the state of systems, struc-
tures and components and on the justiﬁcation for 
lifetime extension. Speciﬁcally analysed will be the 
justiﬁcation for the design for adequate strength as 
regards lifetime extension and the justiﬁcation for 
the lifetime extension of components restricting li-
fetime as well as of electrical and I&C components. 
A pressure equipment periodic inspection summa-
ry programme shall be drawn up.
The analyses for the design for adequate st-
rength update component fatigue analyses by con-
sidering the corrosion effect of the operating envi-
ronment on the components in the way required in 
Guide YVL 3.5 “Ensuring the strength of pressure 
equipment at nuclear power plants”.
A strength analysis register will be set up to 
improve the data management of the strength ana-
lyses and the design bases of the most important 
components. The ageing of components restricting 
plant lifetime will be analysed, their most signi-
ﬁcant parts included, considering those ageing 
phenomena that could become a hinderance to at-
taining a 50 years lifetime. Plans are to revise the 
in-service inspection programme to make it a risk-
informed programme covering the entire plant.
STUK evaluated the lifetime management pro-
gramme during the annual inspections made at 
the Loviisa plant and also by reviewing annual 
reports on component ageing. An important object 
in the ageing of I&C systems and components are 
protection system relays, which have to be regular-
ly replaced or repaired and for which replacement 
parts are hard to obtain. The availability of repla-
cement parts for old computer-based I&C systems 
has proved problematic as well. Subsection 3.1.3 
describes the project to upgrade the I&C systems 
of the Loviisa plant units and STUK’s regulatory 
work. Owing to high containment temperatures, 
special attention is paid to the ageing follow-up of 
the cabling of electrical systems. The utility said in 
its report on the condition monitoring of cabling in 
late 2005 that the ageing phenomena will remain 
under control in case condition monitoring and the 
necessary replacements of the cables remain at the 
present level.
As regards mechanical components, the inspec-
tion objects were pressure and temperature tran-
sients, piping vibrations and erosion corrosion. 
Attention was paid to the correlation of stress fac-
tors occurring each year with observations made 
of the various ageing phenomena. Local stress 
points were identiﬁed in the primary circuit whe-
re measurement-based intensiﬁed monitoring is 
necessary. STUK called for the development of a 
systematic monitoring programme for secondary 
circuit vibrations whose level has increased after 
the power upratings made in connection with ope-
rating licence renewal in 1998.
In-service inspection with non-destructive tes-
ting methods plays a signiﬁcant role in the li-
fetime management of primary circuit pressure 
equipment, piping in particular. These inspection 
methods have to be qualiﬁed in accordance with 
Guide YVL 3.8. The organisation responsible for 
their qualiﬁcation, which had signed an agreement 
with the utilities, continued implementation of the 
qualiﬁcations. STUK oversaw planning and imple-
mentation on the basis of the documents submitted 
by the licensee and approved the qualiﬁcation 
organisation’s assessment reports submitted by 
the licensee.
STUK reviewed documents on ageing-related 
modiﬁcations and participated in the supervision 
of research relating to the ageing of power plants.
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Radiation safety
Occupational radiation doses
The radiation doses of all those who worked at 
Loviisa nuclear power plant were below the 50 mSv 
annual limit. The distribution of individual doses is 
given in Table I. The highest individual dose to a 
Finnish nuclear power plant worker was 13.5 mSv. 
It accumulated at Loviisa nuclear power plant du-
ring annual maintenances. Individual radiation 
doses did not exceed the dose limit of 100 mSv 
deﬁned for any period of ﬁve years. The highest 
individual dose to a Finnish nuclear power plant 
worker in the 5-year period 2001–2005, 69.2 mSv, 
was received at Loviisa, Olkiluoto and Swedish 
nuclear power plants.
The collective occupational radiation dose was 
0.47 manSv at Loviisa 1 and 0.34 manSv at Loviisa 
2, i.e. totalling in 0.81 manSv for both plant units. 
The collective occupational dose is mostly incurred 
in outage work. The collective occupational dose 
that accumulated in annual maintenance outage 
work is 0.40 manSv and 0.30 manSv for Loviisa 1 
and 2 respectively. According to STUK guidelines, 
the threshold for one plant unit’s collective dose 
averaged over two successive years is 2.5 manSv 
per one gigawatt of net electrical power. This me-
ans a radiation dose of 1.22 manSv per one Loviisa 
plant unit. It was exceeded at Loviisa 1 (1.24 
manSv). The licensee has reported to STUK the 
causes for this and the measures necessary to imp-
rove radiation safety. The collective occupational 
dose (1.93 manSv) that accumulated in the exten-
ded 2004 annual maintenance outage of Loviisa 1 
contributed to it. Collective occupational radiation 
doses over the past years are given in Appendix 1 
(indicator A.I.4).
Radioactive releases
Radioactive releases from Loviisa nuclear power 
plant were well below authorised limits. Releases 
of radioactive noble gases were approx. 6.6 TBq, 
i.e. about 0.03% of authorised limit. The releases of 
radioactive noble gases were dominated by argon-
41, i.e. the activation product of argon-40, origina-
ting in the air space between the reactor pressure 
vessel and the main biological shield. The releases 
of radioactive iodine isotopes were about 0.06MBq, 
which is less than a millionth of authorised limit. 
Aerosol releases were approx. 0.1 GBq, tritium re-
leases approx. 0.2 TBq and carbon-14 releases ap-
prox. 0.3 TBq.
The tritium content of liquid efﬂuents was ap-
prox. 14 TBq, i.e. approx. 9% of the release limit. 
The total activity of other nuclides released into 
the sea was approx. 0.9 GBq, i.e. about 0.1% of the 
release limit. The release limits are intended to 
maintain the annual individual radiation exposure 
of the population surrounding the plants clearly 
below the threshold value (100 microSv) determin-
ed by the Government Resolution (395/1991).
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of the plant was 
approx. 0.06 microSv, i.e. 0.1 % of the set limit. 
Table I. Occupational radiation dose distribution at 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units in 2005.
Dose range 
(msv)
Number of persons by dose
Loviisa Olkiluoto total*
< 0,1 635 1162 1662
0.1–0.5 171 592 656
0.5–1 106 266 340
1–2 80 294 336
2–3 43 171 206
3–4 30 86 130
4–5 22 66 95
5–6 23 41 64
6–7 8 17 29
7–8 – 11 21
8–9 2 8 12
9–10 2 4 8
10–11 – 1 2
11–12 4 4 8
12–13 – – 6
13–14 1 – 2
14–15 – – 3
15–16 – – 1
16–17 – – –
17–18 – – 1
18–19 – – 1
19–20 – – –
20–21 – – –
21–25 – – –
> 25 – – –
* The data in this column include Finnish workers who have received 
doses also at Swedish nuclear power plants. The same person may 
have worked at both Finnish nuclear power plants and in Sweden.
 Source: STUK’s dose register
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Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.5) gives radioactive re-
leases and calculated radiation doses to the most 
exposed individual in the plant’s vicinity over the 
past years.
Environmental radiation monitoring
Environmental radiation monitoring around a 
nuclear power plant comprises on- and off-site ra-
diation measurements as well as determination of 
radioactive substances to establish public exposure 
and radioactive substances in the environment.
In the environment of Loviisa nuclear power 
plant, 310 samples were analysed in accordan-
ce with the monitoring programme. Radioactive 
substances originating in the Loviisa plant were 
measured in nine samples of sinking matter, eight 
samples of aquatic plants, ﬁve samples of deposi-
tion, three samples of sea water and one sample of 
bottom fauna.
Cobalt-60, the dominating radioactive substan-
ce originating in power plants, was measured in 21 
samples. Silver-110m (17 observations), cobalt-58 
(5 observations), antimonium-124 (5 observations), 
tritium (3 observations) and manganese-54 (2 ob-
servations) were measured as well. Iron-59, zir-
conium-95, niobium- 95 and tellurium-123m were 
detected in one sample of aquatic plants.
All the detected concentrations were low and 
had no bearing on radiation exposure.
Radioactive strontium, caesium and plutoni-
um isotopes (strontium-90, caesium-134 and -137, 
plutonium 238, 239 and 240) originating from the 
Chernobyl accident and the fallout from nuclear 
weapons tests are still measurable in environ-
mental samples. Natural radioactive substances 
(i.a. beryllium-7, potassium-40 as well as uranium 
and thorium with their decay products) are also 
detected. Their concentrations usually exceed tho-
se of nuclides originating from the power plant or 
fallout.
External radiation is monitored by 15 automa-
tic radiation measuring stations at a radius of two 
and ﬁve kilometres from the plant. The measu-
rement data are transferred to the power plants’ 
control rooms and to the national radiation-mo-
nitoring system. In addition, there are dosimeters 
for external radiation measurement in about ten 
locations around the nuclear power plants.
3.1.5 Organisational operation
Safety management
Information accumulated during document review 
and other inspection activity at the Loviisa plant 
was examined with a view to plant safety.
The current operating licence of Loviisa power 
plant expires on 31 December 2007 and Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy intends to submit an applica-
tion for its extension to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry in late 2006. The utility has set up the 
KLUPA project to prepare for the application. In 
addition to licence extension, the project’s aim is to 
deepen Loviisa power plant and Fortum Nuclear 
Service’s expertise and strategic partnership and to 
transfer plant related information and skills from 
old to new generation. Essential project sectors are 
lifetime management, plant safety, deterministic 
and probabilistic safety analyses, plant operation 
as well as matters relating to the environment, 
nuclear waste and nuclear fuel. As part of the 
subproject on plant operation, descriptions of the 
plant’s operating organisation and safety culture 
will be drawn up.
STUK has set up its own project to monitor the 
renewal of Loviisa’s operating licence. Before the 
application proper will be submitted, STUK and 
the utility have been discussing the project’s imple-
mentation plans at regular project level meetings 
and technical-ﬁeld speciﬁc meetings.
Deﬁcient personnel resources in some areas of 
activity have been identiﬁed as the most important 
improvement area in safety management at the 
Loviisa plant. This has been due to retirement, 
change of duties or workplace. The Loviisa plant 
has recognised the problem and taken action to 
remedy the situation i.a. by recruiting new per-
sonnel. STUK follows the situation during perio-
dic inspection. Other than this, the organisation’s 
resources and competences are adequate to safely 
operate the plant units.
Quality management
Loviisa nuclear power plant has systematically 
maintained and developed its quality management 
system according to own plans. In 2002 and 2003, 
the system was updated to correspond to the orga-
nisational and procedural changes implemented at 
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the plant. It has been routinely updated since in 
accordance with agreed practices. Fortum Power 
and Heat Oy updated the guidelines describing the 
quality management system for the nuclear energy 
sector of Fortum corporation.
The licensee has earlier compared the quality 
management system of the Loviisa plant with, 
among others, the standard ISO 9001 and the safe-
ty requirements and guidelines of the IAEA. Based 
on this, the system has been further developed 
by, among others, management reviews and self-
assessment to improve the management system 
and the organisation’s operation. The Loviisa plant 
regularly evaluates the functionality of its quality 
management system by means of an internal audit 
programme and a separate, independent inspecti-
on procedure.
STUK oversaw quality management by docu-
ment reviews and by an inspection of its periodic 
inspection programme, which dealt with quality 
assurance resources, internal inspection, vendor 
evaluation and approval as well as actions to imp-
rove the management system and quality manage-
ment.
STUK established that the licensee and 
Loviisa power plant’s quality management was 
acceptable. However, the need was identiﬁed in the 
organisation’s operation to improve the procedures 
for evaluation and approval of the sub-contractors 
used by the Loviisa plant.
Personnel qualiﬁcations and training
The organisation of the Loviisa plant was rearran-
ged in 2002. This was in preparation for, among 
others, change of generation and it was done by 
offering the chance to transfer knowledge from se-
nior to junior personnel in expert tasks and by 
assigning junior personnel to managerial tasks in 
the line organisation. Several persons, who had 
worked for a relatively short time for the Loviisa 
plant, participated in a 5-week basic professional 
training course on nuclear safety in Finland.
Within the framework of the periodic inspection 
programme, STUK oversaw the appropriateness 
and adequacy of Loviisa nuclear power plant’s 
organisation and its personnel training. No signi-
ﬁcant changes took place in the plant’s operating 
organisation or procedures. Personnel changed 
more than normally owing to change of generation, 
duties and workplace.
Upon application by the licensee, STUK autho-
rised persons in the licensee’s employ to work as 
shift managers, operators or operator trainees at 
the power plant. Authorisations were granted to 
32 persons employed by the Loviisa plant, seven of 
which are operator trainees.
Operational experience feedback
In its operational experience feedback work, the 
licensee reviewed events at own and other plants. 
Events at plants abroad were dealt with in special 
operational feedback working groups. The objective 
of operational experience feedback work is to pre-
vent recurrence of events endangering plant safe-
ty. Based on the operational experience feedback, 
minor improvements were carried out at the plant 
units relating to methods of action and guidelines 
for the most part but including component inspec-
tions and additional analyses. Operational expe-
rience feedback information was passed on to the 
personnel in the form of reports and training.
STUK’s oversight of operational feedback activi-
ties was by review of event reports and the annual 
operational feedback report submitted by the licen-
see. The Loviisa plant has systematic guidelines 
for event investigation, assessment and corrective 
action. Deﬁcient personnel resources have been 
the most signiﬁcant problem in operational feed-
back assessment at the plant and has presented 
itself in the form of delayed reporting and lesser 
report quality. Attention has been paid to the prob-
lem and the increase in resources planned at the 
Loviisa plant is expected to improve the situation 
in early 2006.
STUK evaluated the feasibility of experien-
ces learned from events abroad for consideration 
at Finnish plants. Event information was recei-
ved through the IAEA/OECD Incident Reporting 
System (IRS). The increase in sea water level in 
January at the Loviisa plant was reported to the 
IRS system.
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Event investigation
STUK started no event investigations. An event 
investigation team is appointed when the licensee’s 
own organisation has not operated as planned in 
connection with an event or when the event is 
estimated to lead to signiﬁcant modiﬁcations in 
the plant technical layout or procedures. A STUK 
investigation team is set up if the licensee has not 
adequately clariﬁed the root causes of an event.
Pressure equipment manufacturers as well 
as inspection and testing organisations
Upon application by Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s 
Loviisa power plant1, and in accordance with the 
Nuclear Energy Act, STUK authorised two manu-
facturers of nuclear pressure equipment. STUK ex-
tended the manufacturer approval of Loviisa power 
plant by approving a new manufacturing method.
Upon application by Fortum Power and Heat 
Oy and in accordance with the Nuclear Energy 
Act, STUK authorised testing personnel from three 
different testing organisations to carry out non-
destructive testing of mechanical components and 
structures of the Loviisa plant units. Previous 
decisions on manufacturers and testing organi-
sations are valid, as mentioned in the decisions. 
Loviisa power plant’s inspection unit “Inspection 
Organisation Loviisa YVL”, authorised in 2002, 
continued in operation. By its decision STUK ex-
panded the scope of the inspection organisation’s 
inspection area.
STUK oversaw the inspection of Safety Class 
3 and 4 as well as Class EYT mechanical compo-
nents by the utility’s own inspection organisation 
by reviewing the inspection protocols during the 
commissioning inspections. Safety Classiﬁcation is 
based on STUK’s Guide YVL 2.1 according to which 
components are divided into the Safety Classes 
1, 2, 3 and 4 as well Class EYT (non-nuclear). 
Components of the highest safety importance be-
long to Safety Class 1.
STUK oversaw the operation of manufacturers 
as well as testing and inspection organisations it 
had approved. Their operation was established 
as being in accordance with the requirements of 
Guides YVL 3.4 and YVL 1.3.
STUK oversaw the operation of the “Inspection 
Organisation Loviisa YVL, Electrical engineering 
and I&C Technology” it has approved as well as the 
electrotechnical commissioning inspections made 
by its inspectors. Its operation was established as 
being in accordance with Guide YVL 5.2.
Nuclear liability
The users of nuclear energy must have acquired 
liability as stipulated in the Nuclear Liability Act 
(484/1972), or other ﬁnancial guarantee, for a pos-
sible accident at a nuclear facility that would harm 
the environment, population and property. Fortum 
Power and Heat Oy has provided for damage from 
a nuclear accident as prescribed by law by taking 
out an insurance policy for this purpose mainly in 
the Finnish Nuclear Insurance Pool.
In case of accident, funds for compensation are 
available through three sources: the licensee, the 
facility’s country of location and the international 
liability community. About €425 milloin was avai-
lable for compensation from all these sources. An 
increase in the sum is expected in the near future 
as international negotiations about the revision of 
the Paris/Brussels agreements on nuclear liability 
were completed in 2004. The funds available for 
compensation will more than triple in the near fu-
ture compared with the current situation. Finland 
has decided to enact unlimited licensee liability by 
law. The law amendment has not taken effect as 
yet but is pending the entry into force of the afore-
mentioned international agreements.
The ascertaining of the contents and conditions 
of a licensee’s insurance policy in Finland belongs 
to the Insurance Supervisory Authority. It has 
approved Fortum Power and Heat Oy’s liability in-
surance and STUK has veriﬁed the existence of the 
policy in accordance with section 55 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (990/1987).
The Nuclear Liability Act covers the transport 
of nuclear materials. STUK has ascertained that 
all nuclear material transport has had liability 
insurance approved by the Insurance Supervisory 
Authority.
3.1.6 Nuclear safety indicators
The requirements set for the safety indicators of 
the effectiveness of STUK’s operations were ful-
ﬁlled at Loviisa power plant as regards indivi-
dual occupational doses, radioactive releases and 
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population exposure. The calculational reporting 
threshold per one gigawatt of net electrical power 
in relation to the collective dose, as established in 
Guide YVL 7.9, was exceeded at Loviisa 1, and was 
affected by the dose incurred during the extended 
2004 annual maintenance outage.
Judged by the safety indicators, the operation 
of the Loviisa plant showed no signiﬁcant deﬁ-
ciencies. Operational events were mostly caused 
by technical malfunctions. Judged by the mal-
functions of components subject to the Technical 
Speciﬁcations and the indicators for maintenance, 
the maintenance function at the plant was reliable 
and indicated no signs of weakening in quality. 
The total annual maintenance volume of compo-
nents subject to the Technical Speciﬁcations at the 
Loviisa plant, including fault repairs and preventi-
ve maintenance, was on the increase owing to the 
slightly growing trend in fault repairs. The number 
of preventive maintenance jobs was lower than 
in 2004, and the preventive maintenance/fault 
repairs ratio at Loviisa 2 was remarkably low. The 
volume of the plant’s preventive maintenance work 
is affected by preventive maintenance work dicta-
ted by the length of annual maintenance outages. 
The preventive maintenance volume has decreased 
in the long run as planned. The assessment and de-
velopment of preventive maintenance programmes 
will continue in the future. Changes will take place 
i.a. due to the condition monitoring measurement 
methods taken into use. The average repair time of 
components subject to the Technical Speciﬁcations 
at the Loviisa plant was on the decrease for a 
second year in succession, which could indica-
te an improvement in the maintenance function. 
However, long-term conclusions can only be made 
after the dominant failure types are known.
The number of operational events at Loviisa 
power plants was about the same as in the previo-
us years. Nine events occurred of which an opera-
tional report was written. Operational transients 
were typically caused by malfunctioning primary 
coolant pumps. A special report was written on one 
event pertaining to an emergency standby from 
high sea water level.
The safety indicator system looks also at the 
risk-importance of operational events. Events are 
divided into three categories according to their 
risk-importance, the indicator in each category 
being the number of events. No signiﬁcant safety-
endangering events occurred at the Loviisa plant. 
The most signiﬁcant event was the moving of an air 
condenser of the air cooling system of the control 
building instrumentation room and main control 
room required during the construction of the I&C 
buildings from beside the turbine hall wall to its 
roof. Other events related to latent failures in the 
auxiliary service water system (Loviisa 1) and the 
auxiliary feed water system (Loviisa 2). The events 
in 2005, which were analysed, are considered part 
of normal operation and called for no additional 
measures by STUK. The differences in the number 
of events, as compared to 2004, are normal statisti-
cal ﬂuctuation.
Judged by the safety indicators, the limits set 
for barriers containing radioactive releases were 
not exceeded. The number of fuel leaks at the 
Loviisa plant units has been nil for several years.
The results of STUK’s safety performance in-
dicators for nuclear power plants are given in 
Appendix 1.
3.1.7 Overall safety assessment
The annual safety assessment for Loviisa nuclear 
power plant looks at the enforcement of YVL gui-
des at the plant as well as observations on plant 
safety analyses, modiﬁcations, availability and 
organisational operation made during regulatory 
work. The assessment is discussed in more detail 
in sub-sections 3.1.1−3.1.6 and in the appendices 
of this report. STUK did not detect any signiﬁcant 
nuclear safety related shortcomings.
It was established during the implementation 
of new YVL guides on nuclear facility air conditio-
ning systems and equipment, radioactive materials 
transport packages, nuclear materials and waste 
transport as well as nuclear facility electrical 
systems and components that introduction of the 
new technical safety requirements and procedures 
can be done as planned. The utility was required 
to complement its plans for the detection of con-
centrations of radioactive and toxic substances, to 
improve the plant’s power supply and intensify the 
updating of its electrical engineering procedures.
Loviisa nuclear power plant completed the pro-
ject, which started in 2000, to revise the plant’s 
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emergency operating procedures and to establish 
extensive, uniform procedures with relevant backg-
round data. The introduction of new event and 
symptom based procedures in 2006 provides for the 
arrival of new digital control room technology.
According to Loviisa nuclear power plant’s up-
dated shutdown risk analysis, weather and other 
environmental phenomena account for a major 
part of the plant’s estimated core damage proba-
bility. According to more detailed analysis, oil and 
chemicals spills are the most important risk rela-
ting to weather and environmental phenomena. 
The risk from oil spills at sea for Loviisa power 
plant has been assessed at 4·10–9/year during 
power operation and 8.5·10–6/year during annual 
maintenance, i.e. approx. 10 per cent of the total 
core damage frequency of the Loviisa plant units 
(power operation and outage account for approx. 
10–4/year). Loviisa power plant has initiated me-
asures to further reduce the risk.
Loviisa power plant has implemented modiﬁ-
cations by introducing new systems or by substi-
tuting new technology for that removed from ser-
vice. The trial run of the new decay heat removal 
system shared by the plant units was completed. 
New personnel monitors to detect possible conta-
mination of workers exiting the controlled area 
have been taken into service at both plant units. 
A signiﬁcant project, which is due to the ageing 
of technology, is the upgrading of I&C systems at 
Loviisa whose conceptual design planning moved 
ahead. The project started with the construction 
of a new I&C building due for completion in 2014. 
Implementation is planned to take place phase–
by–phase such that modiﬁed sections of the I&C 
system can be commissioned during annual main-
tenances. The different phases of the modiﬁcation 
are implemented ﬁrst at Loviisa 1 and then at 
Loviisa 2 every two years later. The construction of 
the new I&C building at Loviisa 1 progressed well 
and the construction of the Loviisa 2 I&C building 
began.
No signiﬁcant safety-related shortcomings were 
detected during plant operability oversight. No 
signiﬁcant disturbances occurred during the ope-
ration of the plant units, which complied with 
the Technical Speciﬁcations, with the exception of 
seven deviations authorised by STUK. One ope-
rational event – high sea water level in January 
– warranted a special report. The Loviisa 1 and 2 
annual maintenance outages were short refueling 
outages with no extensive maintenance, repair or 
inspection work. The plugging of steam generator 
heat exchanger tubes continued at Loviisa 1 and 
2. No signiﬁcant observations were made during 
inspection.
The doses of all nuclear power plant workers 
were below the individual dose limit. The collective 
occupational dose was low by international compa-
rison. However, the threshold for one plant unit’s 
collective dose per one gigawatt of net electrical 
power, calculated in accordance with STUK guide-
lines, was slightly exceeded at Loviisa 1 owing to 
safety modiﬁcations made in the steam generator 
room in 2004. Radioactive releases were low and 
the dose calculated on their basis for the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of Loviisa nuclear 
power plant was well below the limit established 
by Government Resolution.
The current operating licences expire in 2007 
and the utility plans to apply for an extension of 
20 and 23 years for Loviisa 1 and 2 respectively. 
The 30-year technical lifetime of the plant units, 
the planned basis for commercial agreements, will 
then be exceeded by 20 years. The utility has set up 
a licence renewal project. Apart from licence rene-
wal, the aim is to deepen Loviisa power plant and 
Fortum Nuclear Service’s expertise and strategic 
partnership and transfer plant related information 
and skills from old to new generation. As part of a 
subproject relating to plant operation, descriptions 
of the plant’s operating organisation and safety 
culture will be drawn up.
The section of the licence renewal project dea-
ling with ageing management speciﬁcally analy-
ses the justiﬁcation for the design for adequate 
strength as regards lifetime extension and that 
for the lifetime extension of electrical and I&C 
components and systems as well as of components 
restricting lifetime. The ageing-related inspections 
of mechanical equipment, electrical and I&C sys-
tems and structures revealed no signiﬁcant safety 
deﬁciencies. Secondary circuit oscillations have 
increased in consequence of past power upratings 
and have to be systematically monitored. The im-
pact of the ageing of safety signiﬁcant cabling can 
22
STUK-B-YTO 249
be managed by the condition monitoring program-
me currently in use and by a timely replacement of 
cables. The structural integrity of multiple barriers 
containing plant releases has been good.
The plant’s operating organisation or procedu-
res did not signiﬁcantly change. A temporary deﬁ-
ciency in resources has been caused by retirement, 
change of duties or workplace. The Loviisa plant 
has recognised the problem and taken action to 
remedy the situation i.a. by recruiting new person-
nel.
The periodic inspection programme of Loviisa 
power plant, implemented by STUK, revealed no 
signiﬁcant safety defects.
STUK did not start any new investigations into 
the plant’s operation.
3.2 Olkiluoto 1 and 2
3.2.1 Implementation of regulations
STUK has introduced a procedure for application 
of new or revised YVL guides to operating nuclear 
facilities. According to it, the publication of a YVL 
guide does not, as such, change STUK’s previous 
decisions. It is only after having heard those con-
cerned that STUK will give a separate decision on 
the application of a new or revised YVL guide to an 
operating nuclear facility, or to one under construc-
tion as well as to a licensee’s operation. The guides 
apply as such to new nuclear power plants.
In considering the application of new safe-
ty requirements given in YVL guides to opera-
ting nuclear facilities, or those under constructi-
on, STUK takes into account a principle stipula-
ted in section 27 of the Government Resolution 
(395/1991). It prescribes that, to further improve 
safety, measures shall be implemented that are 
justiﬁable considering operating experience, safety 
research and development of science and techno-
logy.
Decisions to implement the below YVL guides 
were made in accordance with the new procedure
• Guide YVL 5.6, Air conditioning systems and 
components of nuclear facilities, 25 November 
2004
• Guide YVL 6.4, Transport packages and packa-
gings for radioactive materials, 4 April 2005
• Guide YVL 6.5, Transport of nuclear material 
and waste, 4 April 2005.
• Guide YVL 5.2, Electrical power systems and 
components at nuclear facilities, 6 April 2005
STUK had no remarks to make on the utility’s 
description of the fulﬁlment of the requirements of 
Guides YVL 6.4 and YVL 6.5 at their nuclear facili-
ty and in their operation.
Prior to the decision to implement Guide YVL 
5.6, Teollisuuden Voima Oy gave an assessment of 
the fulﬁlment of the guide’s requirements. STUK 
considered it insufﬁcient and called for an addi-
tional description by 30 June 2006 of the actions 
planned to fulﬁl the requirements set for the de-
tection of concentrations of radioactive and toxic 
substances.
In its decision implementing Guide YVL 5.2 
STUK brought forth the additional requirement of 
a quality plan to be drawn up by the utility with 
an eye to its own and contracted design and imple-
mentation.
3.2.2 Assessment of safety analyses
Deterministic safety analyses
The licensees update the nuclear power plants’ de-
terministic safety analyses in connection with the 
renewal of operating licences. The analyses are up-
dated also in connection with plant modiﬁcations, 
or whenever operational events warrant it. STUK 
reviews the licensee’s analyses and conducts, or 
contracts out where necessary, its own reference 
analyses. No deterministic safety analyses on the 
Olkiluoto plant were submitted to STUK for re-
view.
Probabilistic safety analyses
STUK reviewed the weather risk analysis update 
for the Olkiluoto plant and provided Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy with its remarks and requests for analy-
sis. The utility submitted the required analyses to 
STUK in October. In co-operation with the Swedish 
BWR plants, Teollisuuden Voima Oy analysed the 
effects of the loss of reactor building heating du-
ring a heavy cold on i.a. the impulse lines of the 
instrumentation area. Analyses show that the 
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instrumentation area cools to 0°C in about two 
hours with an external temperature of –20°C, with 
the reactor building heating lost and the air condi-
tioning remaining in operation. This could result 
in the freezing of the reactor level measurement 
impulse lines and further in the loss of the control 
of safety systems. According to the utility’s updated 
heating and air conditioning procedures, excessi-
ve cooling is prevented by closing down reactor 
building normal air conditioning and starting up 
low capacity emergency air conditioning. In spite 
of the updating of the procedure, this phenome-
non has considerable risk signiﬁcance. The core 
damage risk assessment of 1.7·10–5/year increases 
to 3.4·10–5/year. The utility is investigating the pos-
sibility of automatically shutting down the air con-
ditioning to reduce the risk. STUK set a time limit 
for the submission of a plan of action.
An update of the weather risk analysis had 
considered the remarks made in the review report 
of the previous version; other than that, only mi-
nor updates were made. No remarks were made 
about the update of the weather risk analysis 
proper, with the exception of the aforementioned 
risk of cooling of the reactor level measurement 
function, for which corrective action is under way. 
STUK analyses the assessed occurrence frequen-
cies of extreme weather phenomena etc external 
phenomena during the risk analysis of Olkiluoto 
3 external events. Should any new information of 
fundamental importance emerge then, STUK will 
present possible remarks on the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
risk analyses as well.
3.2.3 Oversight of plant modiﬁcations
The Olkiluoto plant is undergoing turbine plant 
upgrading, including the replacement of steam 
driers in the reactor pressure vessel. These mo-
diﬁcations were implemented at Olkiluoto 2. The 
safety improvements completed at the plant units 
are described in Appendix 2.
Plant modiﬁcations oversight consisted of the 
deﬁnition of regulatory scope, the handling of do-
cuments pertaining to the modiﬁcations as well 
as the supervision of their implementation and 
commissioning. STUK supervised the carrying 
out of component and structural modiﬁcations by 
inspections at the plant sites and the manufactu-
rers’ premises as well as by reviewing documents 
submitted by the licensees. Modiﬁcations oversight 
included STUK/licensee meetings and STUK inter-
nal meetings.
Plant lifetime management includes the repla-
cement of the devices and equipment in use with 
new technology. The radiation monitoring systems 
of the Olkiluoto plant units are due for upgrading 
in 2007 and 2008. At the end of the year, the utili-
ty submitted the modiﬁcation’s conceptual design 
plan to STUK for approval.
In consequence of the modiﬁcations imple-
mented at the plant, several documents changed 
that describe the plants’ operation and structure 
- such as the Technical Speciﬁcations, the Final 
Safety Analysis Report and the operating and 
maintenance procedures. STUK reviewed the docu-
ment revisions and generally followed the updating 
of plant documentation after the modiﬁcations. The 
results of the follow-up are given in Appendix 1 
(indicator A.I.6).
3.2.4 Oversight of plant operability
Compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations
Compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations at 
the Olkiluoto power plant was controlled by wit-
nessing operations onsite. The testing and repair of 
components subject to the Technical Speciﬁcations 
in particular were subject to oversight. After the 
completion of the annual maintenance outages, 
the plant unit’s compliance with the Technical 
Speciﬁcations was ascertained before startup. The 
licensee is obliged to immediately report to STUK 
all plant situations in non-compliance with the 
Technical Speciﬁcations.
Four events occurred at the Olkiluoto plant 
during which the plant unit was in non-conformity 
with the Technical Speciﬁcations (Appendix 1, indi-
cator A.I.2). They were as follows
• Maximum lifting height for reactor pressure 
vessel head was exceeded at Olkiluoto 1 and 2
• A power failure occurred at Olkiluoto 2 during 
the annual maintenance outage
• Alarm testing of the carbon-dioxide ﬁre sup-
pression system for diesel generator rooms was 
not done at Olkiluoto 1 and 2
• Back-up diesel generator air intake opening 
was closed at Olkiluoto 2.
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The events are described in more detail in Appendix 
3, which also explains the actions planned and car-
ried out by the licensee to prevent recurrence.
The Technical Speciﬁcations were deviated from 
by applying in advance for STUK’s approval of 
non-compliances. The licensee applied for appro-
val of nine situations in non-compliance with the 
Technical Speciﬁcations. (Appendix 1, indicator 
A.I.2). After an analysis of the safety signiﬁcance of 
the events, STUK approved the applications. Four 
exemptions pertained to deviations made from the 
Technical Speciﬁcations owing to plant modiﬁca-
tions or modernisation and two were in preparati-
on for the construction of the new plant.
Operation and operational events
Both Olkiluoto plant units operated reliably. The 
load factor of Olkiluoto 1 was 98.3% and that of 
Olkiluoto 2 was 94.0%. Figure 5 gives the load fac-
tors of the plant units in 1996−2005. The annual 
maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 1 was seven days 
and that of Olkiluoto 2 was 22 days. The progress 
of the outages and the activities carried out are 
separately described in this chapter.
In addition to the annual maintenance outages 
no breaks in power generation or signiﬁcant power 
losses occurred at Olkiluoto 1 and 2.
Losses in nominal output from component mal-
functions were 0.02% and 0.05% at Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 respectively. Appendix 1 looks at production 
losses from component malfunctions for a longer 
period (indicator A.1.1.g). Figure 6 gives the daily 
average gross powers of the plant units.
Six events warranting a special report and six 
operational events reported to STUK occurred at 
the Olkiluoto plant units (Appendix 1, indicator 
A.II.1).
A special report was written of the below events 
at the Olkiluoto plant:
• A setting error in electrical power supply circuit 
breakers shared by the Olkiluoto plant units 
(INES Level 1)
• Maximum lifting height for reactor pressure 
vessel head was exceeded at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
(INES Level 0)
• A power failure occurred at Olkiluoto 2 during 
the annual maintenance outage (INES Level 1)
Figure 5. Load factors of the Olkiluoto plant units.
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Figure 6. Daily average gross power of the Olkiluoto 
plant units in 2005.
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Figure 7. INES classiﬁed events at Olkiluoto plant (INES 
Level 1 and higher).
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• Alarm testing of the carbon-dioxide ﬁre sup-
pression system for diesel generator rooms was 
not done at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 (INES Level 1)
• Fuel cladding leaks at Olkiluoto 2 (INES Level 
0)
• Back-up diesel generator air intake opening 
was closed at Olkiluoto 2 (INES Level 0)
The events are described in Appendix 3.
In addition to event reports, Olkiluoto plant 
submitted to STUK daily reports, quarterly re-
ports, annual reports, outage reports, annual en-
vironmental safety reports, monthly individual ra-
diation dose reports, annual operational feedback 
reports and safeguards reports.
Figure 7 gives the number of INES Level 1 
events in 1996–2005. No events exceeding INES 
Level 1 occurred.
Annual maintenance outages
The Olkiluoto 1 refueling outage was on 5 to 12 
June and the Olkiluoto 2 maintenance outage on 8 
to 30 May. Olkiluoto 1 stopped electricity genera-
tion for about 7 and Olkiluoto 2 for about 21 days. 
The Olkiluoto 1 outage went almost according to 
plan, that of Olkiluoto 2 was about two days longer 
than planned.
The Olkiluoto 2 annual maintenance was an ex-
tended maintenance outage during which, in addi-
tion to the refueling outage programme, extensive 
maintenance work, modiﬁcations and modernisati-
on were carried out. The most signiﬁcant of them 
were modernisation of the turbine plant, replace-
ment of the switchgear of the 6.6 kV switchplant, 
replacement of the reactor steam dryer, renovation 
of the containment intermediate level sealing and 
replacement of the supports of the main steam 
pipes.
After the synchronisation of Olkiluoto 2, trial 
runs following the turbine plant modernisation 
work began, which included system and plant 
speciﬁc testing. The most important test from the 
nuclear safety point of view was a load reduction 
test completing the trial runs. After it, a long-term 
test was started to ensure the plant unit’s operati-
on after the modiﬁcations. Preliminary measure-
ments showed the power of Olkiluoto 2 having in-
creased by approx. 18 MW after the turbine plant 
modernisation.
In addition to reactor refueling, the licensee 
carried out maintenance and inspection of compo-
nents, structures and systems during the annual 
maintenances. The inspections are described in 
more detail later under “Maintenance and repairs”. 
The safety modiﬁcations made are described in 
Appendix 2.
During the annual maintenance two events 
warranting a special report occurred and a fuel 
assembly, which had been found leaking during the 
operating cycle, was found to have become so bad-
ly damaged that a special report was made of it. 
Another event warranting a special report related 
to switchgear modernisation work and the related 
deﬁciencies in work planning. The utility disconti-
nued the work for some time to ensure its safe and 
correct carrying out.
A third special report is about an event during 
which, in connection with modiﬁcations, a setting 
error was found in the relay protection of a supply 
circuit breaker of a system having to do with the 
power supply between the plant units. In inspec-
tions the same error was found in all correspon-
ding supply circuit breakers i.e. it was a common 
cause failure. It could have weakened power supply 
from one plant unit to the other in the event of an 
accident.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy applied STUK for two 
exemptions from the requirements of the Technical 
Speciﬁcations for work arrangements during the 
annual maintenance. The utility let STUK know 
prior to the start of the modernisation of the 
Olkiluoto 2 switchgear that some of the necessa-
ry work had not been included in the plans. The 
exemption granted made it possible for the utility 
to continue work according to the main schedule. 
The other deviation pertained to the lifting of the 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor vessel head more than allowed 
in the Technical Speciﬁcations. The utility had es-
tablished between annual maintenances that the 
Technical Speciﬁcations have been violated for yea-
rs by exceeding the highest allowable lifting height 
for the reactor head. This was because a steam 
separator removed from service was stored in the 
fuel pool and the reactor head had to be lifted over 
it. This had no bearing on safety. The signiﬁcance 
of the event was in that the utility failed to recog-
nise a requirement of the Technical Speciﬁcations, 
which had not been properly included in the pro-
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cedures and brought to the knowledge of the per-
sonnel. Corresponding information management 
problems have occurred at Olkiluoto power plant 
before this. A special report was written of the 
event. The need to exceed the allowable lifting 
height will be no more in 2006 when the old steam 
dryer will be removed from the pool. The exemp-
tions granted did not endanger plant safety.
Regulatory oversight of the annual mainte-
nance outages of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
focused, among others, on the administrative ar-
rangements of outage work, the activities of the 
operating and maintenance personnel, refueling as 
well as inspections and tests by the licensee and 
contractors. Of speciﬁc interest were the trial runs 
of the Olkiluoto 2 turbine plant and switchgear 
after their modernisation, the most important of 
the trial runs being the generator load reduction 
test. It was performed in accordance with a STUK-
approved test programme. The plant went to in-
ternal power supply mode in a controlled way and 
was resynchronised with the national grid. Based 
on the approved results of the tests, STUK gave 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy the permit to start long-
term testing.
Attention was paid to the implementation of 
radiation protection, control room operations and 
housekeeping. Prior to the start of the new opera-
ting cycle, safety analyses for the new fuel charge 
were reviewed. In addition, the loading of fuel 
assemblies into the reactor according to plan was 
ascertained. The nuclear material inventory was 
inspected prior to the closing of the reactor pressu-
re vessel head. STUK controlled the placement of 
the plant units into shutdown state and their post-
outage start-up.
The collective radiation dose incurred in ou-
tage work was 0.360 manSv and 1.74 manSv at 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 respectively. Occupational radia-
tion doses are discussed in more detail later in the 
report under “Radiation safety” and in Appendix 1 
(indicator A.I.4).
The regulatory oversight of Olkiluoto facility’s 
annual maintenance outages onsite took 138 wor-
king days. Two resident inspectors were regularly 
working at the site. In addition, a total of 126 
inspection days outside normal working hours 
were spent in outage oversight work.
Repairs and maintenance
Olkiluoto 1 underwent a brief refueling ou-
tage with no signiﬁcant work done on mechani-
cal components. The inspection of the feedwater 
distributors installed in 2004 and the servicing 
and inspection of inner main steam valves and two 
primary coolant pumps were the most important 
pieces of work done.
Steam reheaters and a high pressure turbine 
were renewed in the extended Olkiluoto 2 annual 
maintenance. A steam drier in the reactor pressure 
vessel was replaced. The feed water distributors 
removed from service in 2004 due to cracking 
were reinstalled after the repair of supporting 
plates of their lugs. The modiﬁcations made in 
the annual maintenance outage are described in 
Appendix 2. Main steam valves and primary coo-
lant pumps were serviced and inspected and cont-
rol rod mechanisms serviced.
In-service inspection of the reactor pressure 
vessel and piping, which is the duty of the licensee, 
was carried out at both plant units in accordance 
with Guide YVL 3.8. STUK’s control included the 
approval of inspection programmes prior to the 
start of inspection as well as inspection oversight 
and results review onsite. Final results reports 
are submitted to STUK for approval after annual 
maintenance. STUK reviewed onsite the results of 
the condition monitoring inspections of secondary 
piping made by the licensee.
STUK made 19 periodic inspections of Safety 
Class 1 and 2 pressure equipment at Olkiluoto 
2 and 214 construction inspections and inspec-
tions of repairs and modiﬁcations that hade been 
made at the plant. At Olkiluoto 2, the commissi-
oning inspections of 12 new pressure equipment 
were carried out to deﬁnitively approve each item 
of equipment for service. An item of pressure 
equipment’s commissioning inspection veriﬁes the 
acceptability of its structure, installation and pla-
cement and includes the functional testing of its 
safety-signiﬁcant accessories. Four inspections of 
electrical and I&C systems were made as well.
Ageing management
Ageing management at the Olkiluoto plant is ta-
ken care of by a lifetime management team set 
up in early 1990s. The team has preliminarily 
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identiﬁed plant sections which could restrict plant 
lifetime or which require, due to various ageing 
phenomena, replacement of large parts of a whole, 
a complete overhaul, or speciﬁc condition monito-
ring. Based on this, the utility has planned the ne-
cessary actions for about ten years ahead. After the 
transfer to the system of equipment responsibility 
and maintenance planning speciﬁc to component 
location, the plant’s operating and maintenance or-
ganisations, too, signiﬁcantly contribute to ageing 
management.
STUK assessed the ageing management pro-
gramme for the plant units by its periodic inspec-
tion programme. The assessment was based on in-
ternational guidelines on ageing management (the 
IAEA, WENRA, the IEC). Special emphasis was 
placed on the monitoring of the ageing of electrical 
and I&C systems.
In its assessment STUK wrote that the utility’s 
ageing management consists of separate routines 
of action and that the related distribution of res-
ponsibilities between functional units as well as 
the means of identifying and managing ageing 
phenomena have not been described as a program-
me entity in the plant documents. The most conc-
rete objective in the utility’s ageing management 
has been the planning of the plants’ modernisation 
programmes, which has gone ahead well.
STUK assesses the lifetime management pro-
gramme of the Olkiluoto plant by reviewing yearly 
reports on component ageing. The reports describe 
essential ageing phenomena from the preceding 
year and the actions taken thereupon. STUK over-
sees the ageing of mechanical components, pressu-
re equipment in particular, by several inspection 
procedures based on legislation and regulations. 
An example of an inspection procedure is in-service 
inspection in accordance with Guide YVL 3.8.
In addition to plant ageing management inspec-
tion, which is part of the periodic inspection pro-
gramme, STUK oversaw the ageing management 
of electrical and I&C systems and components by 
reviewing the utility’s report on ageing follow-up 
and the documents pertaining to modiﬁcations. 
Components replacements carried out earlier were 
continued in the annual maintenances in particu-
lar due to the ageing of a speciﬁc relay comb ma-
terial and the occurrence of whisker growth in the 
zinc coated parts of relays. Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
has participated in the national WHISKE research 
of the national SAFIR research programme, which 
has yielded signiﬁcant new data on the occurrence 
and nature of whisker growth.
An important modernisation project at Olkiluoto 
2 included the high pressure turbine and steam re-
heater systems as well as the turbine plant process 
automation with its control console in the plant 
unit’s control room. In addition, the plant unit’s 6.6 
kV switchgears were renewed. The modiﬁcations 
made in the annual maintenance are described in 
Appendix 2. Similar measures are due for imple-
mentation at Olkiluoto 1 in 2006.
A precondition for the granting of an operating 
licence for the Olkiluoto plants is that the licensee 
makes an periodic safety review by the end of 2008. 
Ageing management is an essential theme in it. 
STUK will review more extensively the ageing 
management programme and the status of obser-
vations made during the approval procedure of the 
periodic safety review.
Radiation safety
Occupational radiation safety
The radiation doses of all those who worked at 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2005 were below 
the 50 mSv annual limit. The distribution of indi-
vidual doses is given in Table I. The highest occu-
pational dose to an individual at Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant was 11.9 mSv. In 2001–2005 indivi-
dual radiation doses did not exceed the dose limit 
of 100 mSv deﬁned for any period of ﬁve years.
The collective occupational dose was 0.46 manSv 
at Olkiluoto 1 and 1.83 manSv at Olkiluoto 2, the 
total for both plant units being 2.29 manSv. The 
collective occupational dose from outage work at 
Olkiluoto 1 was 0.36 manSv and at Olkiluoto 2 
it was 1.74 manSv. Olkiluoto 2 underwent an ex-
ceptionally extensive annual maintenance outage 
as regards the number of personnel involved and 
the amount of work done. STUK guidelines state 
that the threshold for one Olkiluoto plant unit’s 
collective dose averaged over two successive yea-
rs is 2.10 manSv. This was not exceeded in either 
plant unit. The collective occupational dose at the 
Olkiluoto plant was above normal, exceeding the 
average dose for BWRs in the OECD countries. The 
collective occupational radiation doses incurred 
over the past years are given in Appendix 1 (indi-
cator A.I.4).
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Radioactive releases
Radioactive releases into the environment from 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were well below aut-
horised limits. The releases of noble gases into the 
atmosphere were approx. 0.2 TBq, i.e. approx. a 
hundred thousandth part of the set limit. Iodine 
releases into the atmosphere were approx. 69 MBq, 
i.e. approx. 0.06% of the set limit. Aerosol, triti-
um and carbon-14 releases into the atmosphere 
were approx. 38 MBq, approx. 0.3 TBq and approx. 
0.7 TBq respectively.
The tritium content of liquid efﬂuents released 
into the sea was 2 TBq, i.e. approx. 11% of the an-
nual release limit. The total activity of other radio-
nuclides released into the sea was 0.7 GBq, i.e. ap-
prox. 0.2% of the plant-site speciﬁc release limit.
The calculated radiation dose of the most expo-
sed individual in the environment of the Olkiluoto 
plant was approx 0.06 microSv, i.e. less than 0.1% 
of the limit prescribed by Government Resolution 
(100 microSv). Appendix 1 (indicator A.I.5) pre-
sents radioactive releases and the radiation doses 
calculated for the most exposed individual in the 
plant’s environment over the past years.
Environmental radiation monitoring
Radiation monitoring in the environment of a 
nuclear power plant encompasses on- and off-site 
radiation measurements and determination of ra-
dioactive substances to establish population radia-
tion exposure and radioactive substances in the 
environment.
In the environment of Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant, 298 samples were analysed in accordan-
ce with the monitoring programme. Radioactive 
substances originating in Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant were measured in 12 samples of aquatic 
plants, 11 samples of sinking matter, two sample of 
air, two samples of bottom fauna, and two samples 
of sea water. The dominating power-plant based ra-
dioactive substance, cobalt-60, was measured in 27 
samples. Apart from cobalt, manganese-54 (4 ob-
servations), tritium (2 observations) and cobalt-58 
(1 observation) and were measured. The caesium-
137 concentration of one sample of milk was above 
normal, which was probably due to fallout from the 
Chernobyl accident.
All the detected concentrations were low and 
had no bearing on radiation exposure.
For external radiation measurement, 10 auto-
matic radiation measuring stations have been pla-
ced at a distance of about ﬁve kilometres from the 
plants. The measurement data from these stations 
are transferred to the power plants’ control rooms 
and to the national radiation-monitoring system. 
There are 11 dosimeters in the environment of the 
nuclear power plants.
3.2.5 Oversight of organisational operation
Safety management
The information accumulated during document re-
view and other inspection activity at the Olkiluoto 
plant was examined with a view to plant safety 
management.
In the autumn of 2003 the Olkiluoto plant ini-
tiated several measures to improve the operation 
of its organisation. The licensee set up a working 
group to develop operations, recruited more person-
nel for tasks pertaining to operational experience 
feedback and commissioned analyses and training 
to external consultants, among others. The licen-
see conducted a self-assessment of safety culture 
within its organisation based on IAEA guidelines. 
As a result, development programmes were started 
at the plant in the autumn with themes such as 
“zero tolerance” and “a learning organisation”. The 
self-assessment and its results were presented at 
STUK in the autumn.
Matters and deﬁciencies emerged similar to 
those encountered in 2003 before the starting of 
the development programme. In the background 
of the events common factors could be seen that 
the utility has been unable to resolve. STUK and 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy have agreed upon a mee-
ting in early 2006 to discuss the utility’s procedu-
res in making observations as well as its resources 
and ability to resolve problems.
No signiﬁcant changes have taken place in the 
plant’s operating organisation or procedures. The 
construction of the new plant unit has considerably 
increased the number of Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s 
personnel and their rotation of duties. Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy’s organisation has adequate resources 
and competence to safely operate the plant units.
Quality management system
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has systematically main-
tained and improved the quality management 
system of the Olkiluoto plant according to own 
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plans. The licensee has regularly evaluated the 
functionality of its quality management system by 
an internal follow-up programme and a separate, 
independent inspection procedure.
STUK oversaw quality management and its 
functionality by document reviews and inspections 
of its periodic inspection programme. The quality 
management system of the licensee was found ac-
ceptable. The operation of Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
was found to be in compliance with the plant’s own 
quality management system. The remarks made 
during the inspections were mostly about further 
improvement of the system and deﬁnition of detail. 
In the quality assurance inspections a remark was 
made about the vendor evaluation procedure of 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy, urging the utility to consi-
der the requirements for vendor quality manage-
ment systems in the relevant IAEA standard.
Personnel qualiﬁcations, 
training and resources
Personnel recruitment by Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
continued, mostly for the new nuclear power plant 
unit. Experienced operating personnel from the 
operating plant units have moved to tasks per-
taining to the new plant unit and new employees 
have been recruited in their place. Several persons 
recently employed by Teollisuuden Voima Oy par-
ticipated in a 5-week basic professional training 
course on nuclear safety in Finland.
STUK oversaw the appropriateness and ade-
quacy of Olkiluoto power plant’s organisation and 
its personnel training within the framework of its 
periodic inspection programme. The plant’s trai-
ning guidelines and resources as well as the use of 
outside training resources plus the training of shift 
workers, simulator training on control room modi-
ﬁcations and the development of expertise in I&C 
technology were evaluated in a separate training 
inspection.
Upon licensee application, several employees 
were authorised to act as shift managers or ope-
rators at the nuclear power plant. A total of 32 
Olkiluoto personnel were authorised, most of them 
for a new 3-year period.
Operational experience feedback
STUK oversaw operational feedback activities by 
reviewing the event reports and the annual ope-
rational experience feedback report submitted by 
the licensee. The Olkiluoto plant has systematic 
procedures for event investigation, assessment and 
corrective action.
The licensee’s operational experience feedback 
consisted of the handling of events at own and ot-
her plants. Events at plants abroad were dealt with 
in a special operational feedback working group. 
The objective is to prevent recurrence of events en-
dangering plant safety. The development measures 
carried out at the plant units based on operational 
experience feedback were minor improvements to 
mostly methods of action and guidelines but also 
component inspections and additional analyses. 
Operational experience feedback information was 
distributed to the personnel in the form of reports 
and training.
The Olkiluoto plant continued improvements 
made due to the higher-than-usual number of 
plant conditions in non-conformance with the 
Technical Speciﬁcations in 2003. Factors common 
to the events included insufﬁcient compliance with 
guidelines and deﬁciencies in the administration 
of periodic testing, follow-up of plant states and 
recognition of the requirements of the Technical 
Speciﬁcations. The events were thoroughly revie-
wed at the plant. Teollisuuden Voima Oy commis-
sioned an analysis of the events to an external ex-
pert. The conclusions were discussed in the various 
organisational units of the licensee as well as in a 
STUK/licensee seminar. Observations relating to 
the effectiveness of operational experience feed-
back are discussed above in connection with safety 
management.
STUK evaluated the feasiblity of the lessons 
learned from events abroad for taking into account 
at Finnish plants. Data on the events was ob-
tained through the IAEA and the OECD’s Incident 
Reporting System (IRS).
Event investigation
STUK started no event investigations. A team is 
set up to investigate an event whenever the licen-
see organisation has not functioned as planned 
in connection with an event or when an event is 
assessed to lead to signiﬁcant modiﬁcations in the 
plant technical layout or procedures. A STUK in-
vestigation team is set up also in case the licensee 
has not sufﬁciently analysed the root causes of an 
event.
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Pressure equipment manufacturers, and 
inspection and testing organisations
Upon application by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, and 
in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK 
authorised eight manufacturers of nuclear pressu-
re equipment.
In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, 
STUK authorised six testing organisations to con-
duct nondestructive testing relating to the manu-
facturing of mechanical components and structures 
for the Olkiluoto plant units. Testers employed by 
ﬁve separate testing organisations were authorised 
to carry out the in-service inspection of mechanical 
components and structures of the Olkiluoto plant 
units. Previous decisions pertaining to manufactu-
rers and testing organisations are valid as mentio-
ned in the decisions.
The inspection unit of the Olkiluoto plant, 
“Teollisuuden Voima Oy inspection organisation”, 
authorised in 2002, continued in operation.
STUK authorised two other inspection organisa-
tions to carry out duties relating to the assessment 
and approval of the compliance with requirements 
of the design and manufacturing of Safety Class 3 
and 4 mechanical components and structures for 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2.
STUK oversaw at both plant units the inspec-
tions of Safety Class 3 and 4 as well as Class 
EYT (non-nuclear) pressure equipment carried 
out by the inspection organisations. STUK control-
led also the inspection of mechanical components 
in Safety Classes 3 and 4 and Class EYT (non-
nuclear) by the utility’s own inspection unit. Safety 
Classiﬁcation is based on STUK’s Guide YVL 2.1, 
according to which components are assigned to the 
Safety Classes 1, 2, 3 and 4 as well as Class EYT 
(non-nuclear). Items with the highest safety signi-
ﬁcance belong to Safety Class 1.
The manufacturers as well as testing and 
inspection organisations authorised by STUK were 
subject to regulatory oversight. Their operation 
was established to comply with the requirements 
of Guides YVL 3.4 and YVL 1.3.
STUK oversaw the operation of Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy’s inspection unit “Teollisuuden Voima Oy, 
Inspection, electrical and I&C inspection”, authori-
sed by STUK, and the electrotechnical commissio-
ning inspections made by its inspectors. These were 
found to be in compliance with Guide YVL 5.2.
Nuclear liability
The users of nuclear energy must have acquired 
liability, or other ﬁnancial guarantee, as stipula-
ted in the Nuclear Liability Act (484/1972) for a 
possible accident at a nuclear facility that would 
harm the environment, population and property. 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has provided for damage 
from a nuclear accident as prescribed by law by 
taking out an insurance policy for this purpose 
mainly in the Finnish Nuclear Insurance Pool.
In the case of an accident, the funds available 
for compensation come from three sources: the 
licensee, the facility’s country of location and the 
international liability community. About €425 mil-
lion was available for compensation from all these 
sources. An increase in the sum is expected in the 
near future since international negotiations about 
the revision of the Paris/Brussels agreements on 
nuclear liability were completed in 2004. The funds 
available for compensation will more than triple 
in the coming years compared with the current 
situation. Finland has decided to enact unlimited 
licensee liability by law. The law amendment has 
not taken effect yet but is pending the coming into 
force of the aforementioned international agree-
ments.
The ascertaining of the contents and conditions 
of a licensee’s insurance policy in Finland belongs 
to the Insurance Supervisory Authority. It has ap-
proved Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s liability insurance 
and STUK has veriﬁed the existence of the poli-
cy in accordance with section 55 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (990/1987).
The transport of nuclear materials is subject 
to the Nuclear Liability Act. STUK has seen to 
it that all nuclear material transport has had 
liability insurance approved by the Insurance 
Supervisory Authority, or in accordance with the 
Paris Convention, and approved by the authorities 
of the sending country.
3.2.6 Nuclear safety indicators
The requirements for the indicators on the ef-
fectiveness of STUK’s activities were fulﬁlled at 
Olkiluoto power plant as regards individual occu-
pational radiation doses, collective radiation doses, 
radioactive releases and population exposure.
Judged by the safety indicators, operational 
experience feedback at the Olkiluoto plant is deﬁ-
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cient. STUK has paid attention to its efﬁciency and 
non-conformances have been discussed at a STUK/
utility meeting. Based on the safety indicators on 
the failure and maintenance of components subject 
to the Technical Speciﬁcations, the maintenance 
function at the Olkiluoto plant was reliable and 
showed no signs of weakening in quality. It was 
more proactive in nature than in 2004. The indi-
cators on safety system unavailability indicated 
weakening however: the inoperability of the con-
tainment spray system increased signiﬁcantly at 
one unit and the unavailability index of the auxi-
liary feedwater system increased slightly at both 
plant units. For the time being, the factors contri-
buting to the growth in the unavailability of safety 
systems are not known to STUK. Latent failures 
affecting safety system unavailability dominated 
in events classiﬁed in the risk-importance medium 
category. This could indicate possible deﬁciencies 
in the maintenance strategy or in the evaluation 
of the safety signiﬁcance of failures. Fuel integrity 
problems occur every year at the Olkiluoto plants; 
however, measured by the indicators, radiation 
protection has attained its set objectives and relea-
ses have been small.
The deﬁciencies in the operation of the Olkiluoto 
plant are evident in the root causes of events war-
ranting a special report, six of which occurred at 
the plant. An operational transient report was 
written on six events. The immediate causes of the 
12 events that occurred at the plant have emphasis 
on errors made in own operation. Only one event 
was attributed to a technical failure.
The indicator system looks also at the risk-
importance of operational events. Based on their 
risk-signiﬁcance, events are divided into three ca-
tegories, the indicator being the number of events 
in each category. No event at the plant signiﬁcantly 
endangered safety. The most signiﬁcant events 
at both plant units related to the repair of the 
pump sumps of the service water system under an 
exemption granted by STUK. Other events had to 
do with latent failures in the containment spray 
system, the auxiliary feedwater system and the 
back-up diesel generator system. The events ana-
lysed for 2005 are part of a nuclear power plant’s 
normal operation and required no further action 
by STUK.
The effect on annual accident risk of the peri-
ods of unavailability at both Olkiluoto plant units, 
which arise from signiﬁcant events such as compo-
nent failures, preventive maintenance and devia-
tions from the Technical Speciﬁcations, exceeded 
the STUK-established 5% target value. This was 
due, in part, to planned one-off repairs performed 
under exemption granted by STUK as well as to la-
tent component failures in safety systems and the 
back-up diesel generator system. No speciﬁc action 
by STUK was required.
The structural integrity of multiple barriers 
containing radioactive releases has been most-
ly good. Small fuel leaks have occurred at the 
Olkiluoto plant units annually. An Olkiluoto 2 fuel 
leak, which started in late August 2004, lasted until 
the 2005 annual maintenance outage. Inspections 
attributed the cause of the leak to a thin metal 
strip. Another fuel leak was detected at Olkiluoto 
2 towards the end of July. After the ﬁnding of the 
above foreign material and the detection of the new 
fuel leak, STUK called for the utility to evaluate 
its guidelines on the cleanliness of installation and 
procedures for work done on an open reactor and 
the primary circuit.
The results of STUK indicators depicting plant 
safety are given in Appendix 1.
3.2.7 Overall safety assessment
The annual safety assessment for the operating 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 units looks at the implementa-
tion of new YVL guides at the plant as well as the 
observations made in the regulatory oversight of 
plant safety analyses, modiﬁcations, availability 
and organisational operation. These are discussed 
in more detail in subsections 3.2.1−3.2.6 and in the 
appendices of this report. No signiﬁcant nuclear sa-
fety related shortcomings surfaced during STUK’s 
oversight activities.
During the implementation of YVL guides 
on nuclear power plant air conditioning systems 
and components, radioactive materials transport 
packages, transport of nuclear material and was-
te as well as nuclear facility electrical systems 
and components, it was established that the new 
technical safety requirements and procedures can 
be introduced by taking the actions planned. The 
utility was required to complement its plans for 
32
STUK-B-YTO 249
the detection of concentrations of radioactive and 
toxic substances and to improve procedures ensu-
ring the quality of design of electrical systems and 
components.
Severe accident probability at the Olkiluoto 
plant is approx. 1.7 10–5. It increased some from 
2004 in consequence of the taking into considerati-
on of a previously unidentiﬁed risk factor. Had this 
been included in the 2004 risk assessment, acci-
dent risk would have remained unchanged or been 
smaller. A weather risk from a very cold period has 
been identiﬁed at the plant, which affects the reli-
ability of the reactor level measurement. A plan to 
eliminate the risk is due for implementation in the 
2007 annual maintenance outage.
Signiﬁcant from the viewpoint of the lifetime 
of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is the turbine 
plant upgrading project that was continued and 
includes the replacement of steam driers inside 
the reactor pressure vessels. The modiﬁcations 
were implemented in the Olkiluoto 2 maintenance 
outage and will be implemented at the Olkiluoto 1 
annual maintenance outage of 2006. After the tur-
bine automation modiﬁcation the plant underwent 
a load reduction test important to nuclear safety in 
which it operated as planned. Turbine automation 
is implemented using processor-based technology. 
The turbine plant modiﬁcation has enabled opera-
tional experiences with user interfaces that emp-
loy new computer-based technology in the control 
room. Other important modiﬁcations implemented 
at Olkiluoto 2 were the replacements of the 6.6 kV 
switchgear, the renovation of the intermediate le-
vel sealing of the containment and the replacement 
of the supports of the main steam pipes.
No signiﬁcant disturbances occurred during 
the operation of the plant units, which was in 
compliance with the Technical Speciﬁcations, with 
the exception of 13 deviations. Six events, three 
of which were INES Level 1, warranted a special 
report.
The Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance outage 
was a brief refueling outage and that of Olkiluoto 
2 an extended maintenance outage. During main-
tenance and repairs carried out during the annual 
maintenances, no signiﬁcant safety-related obser-
vations surfaced.
Radiation doses to all nuclear power plant wor-
kers were below the individual dose limit. The total 
occupational dose incurred at the Olkiluoto plant 
was above normal, exceeding the average for BWRs 
in OECD countries, due to the modernisation of 
the Olkiluoto 2 turbine plant. Radioactive releases 
were small and the dose calculated on their basis 
to the most exposed individual in the vicinity of 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was clearly below 
the limit established by Government Resolution.
In consequence of an organisational renewal 
in 2004, a task important for the plant’s ageing 
management, i.e. lifetime follow-up, rests with the 
new department of power plant engineering. In 
inspections relating to the ageing management of 
mechancial components, electrical and I&C sys-
tems and structures it was required that the 
ageing management procedures be further impro-
ved. Whisker growth in the zinc coatings of relays 
of the reactor protection system, due to which more 
relays were replaced, has been of signiﬁcance in 
the ageing of I&C systems. The structural integrity 
of multiple barriers containing radioactive releases 
has been good, although there have been problems 
in fuel integrity almost every year.
The plant’s operating organisation or procedu-
res did not signiﬁcantly change. Development pro-
grammes with themes such as “zero tolerance” and 
“a learning organisation”, initiated at the plant in 
the autumn as a result of a self-assessment, will 
have an effect in the years to come. Matters or 
deﬁciencies emerged similar to those prevalent in 
2003 prior to the start of the organisational deve-
lopment programme. Common factors can be seen 
in the background of the events that the utility has 
been unable to eliminate. Special attention is still 
required to remedy the matter.
The construction of the plant unit has con-
siderably increased the number of Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy’s personnel and the rotation of their 
duties. The utility’s organisation has adequate 
resources and competence to safely run the plant 
units.
The periodic inspection programme of Olkiluoto 
power plant, implemented by STUK, revealed no 
signiﬁcant safety defects.
STUK did not start any new investigations into 
the plant’s operation.
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3.3 Olkiluoto 3
The Olkiluoto 3 nuclear power plant unit is based on 
the Franco-German pressurised water reactor con-
cept EPR (European Pressurised Water Reactor). 
The reactor, with a thermal power of 4300 MW 
and a plant unit net electrical output of approx. 
1600 MW, is based on the German Konvoi and the 
French N4 concepts, with net electrical outputs of 
the order of 1300 - 1450 MW. Compared with the 
aforementioned plants, the safety of the Olkiluoto 3 
EPR is improved by the application of the principle 
of defence-in-depth even more systematically than 
before. Signiﬁcant safety modiﬁcations include, i.a. 
the making of provision for a severe accident and 
a large aircraft impact speciﬁcally in containment 
design. A careful application of the redundancy, se-
paration and diversity principles in safety systems 
design and implementation ensure the accomplish-
ment, with a good certainty, of the most important 
safety functions. Emergency coolant recirculation 
has been simpliﬁed and the strainers are dimensio-
ned to handle heaviest estimated loading. They are 
equipped with a ﬂushing function to ensure their 
operation in the long term. Safety analyses show 
that, instead of the upper limit for the burn-up of 
the most burned up fuel assembly, 50 MWd/kgU, 
given in the Probabilistic Safety Analysis Report 
(PSAR), the upper limit of 45 MWd/kgU is to be 
used, unless experimentally proven that the target 
value meets all safety requirements.
3.3.1 Construction licence
STUK forwarded its statement on the construction 
licence application for Olkiluoto 3 and the related 
safety assessment to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry on 21 January. According to the safety as-
sessment, it is possible to construct the new nuclear 
power plant such that its operation will not cause a 
radiation hazard to the personnel or the population 
or harm the environment or property.
STUK required in its statement that, since the 
design of the plant unit’s details continues during 
its construction, STUK’s continued inspection and 
control must be ensured, with sufﬁcient time reser-
ved for it. STUK made a remark on the plant’s was-
te management function, saying that plans more 
detailed than the present ones are needed and that 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy must be able to ensure ade-
quate expertise. STUK noted that, in the long run, 
the use of nuclear energy is in the overall interest 
of society only in case Finns pledge to keep up safe-
ty-relevant societal structures.
Before issuing the statement, STUK requested 
the opinion of the Advisory Committee for Nuclear 
Safety for inclusion in the safety assessment. 
STUK requested the Ministry for the Interior for 
statements on the new plant’s preliminary physi-
cal protection and emergency response plan.
3.3.2 Implementation of regulations
STUK has introduced a procedure for the appli-
cation of new or revised YVL guides to operating 
nuclear facilities. According to it, the publication 
of a YVL guide does not, as such, change STUK’s 
previous decisions. It is only after having heard 
those concerned that STUK will give a separate 
decision on the application of a new or revised 
YVL guide to an operating nuclear facility, or to 
one under construction as well as to a licensee’s 
operation. The guides apply as such to new nuclear 
power plants. In considering the application of new 
safety requirements given in YVL guides to ope-
rating nuclear facilities, or those under construc-
tion, STUK takes into account the principle stipu-
lated in section 27 of the Government Resolution 
(395/1991). It prescribes that, to further improve 
safety, measures shall be implemented that are 
justiﬁable considering operating experience, safety 
research and development of science and techno-
logy.
No implementation decisions as regards 
Olkiluoto 3 were made.
3.3.3 Assessment of safety analyses
Deterministic safety analyses 
During the construction licence phase STUK revie-
wed the Olkiluoto 3 safety analyses provided with 
the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report to assess 
the fulﬁlment of safety requirements in design. 
The safety analyses include transient and accident 
analyses and severe accidents.
During the review process it was ascertained 
that the safety analyses have included all essen-
tial initiating events and that these have been 
correctly classiﬁed; that the calculation models 
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contain sufﬁcient physical models which have been 
adequately validated; and that the correct initial 
values have been used in the calculations. As part 
of the review, STUK commissioned reference ana-
lyses to the VTT and the German ISaR (Institute 
for Safety and Reliability GmbH) for independent 
assessment of the most important transients and 
accidents. Based on the analyses delivered by 
the utility, the initiating events most signiﬁcantly 
affecting the plant design were chosen as the re-
ference analyses: primary circuit leaks of varying 
sizes, a primary-to-secondary leak in consequence 
of a steam generator failure, a steam tube rupture, 
certain disturbances relating to a diluted primary 
circuit boron concentration, the tripping of reactor 
coolant pumps and erroneous control rod operati-
on.
As regards severe accidents, the functionality 
of the severe accident management strategy was 
evaluated. It was ascertained by the review that 
the functionality of systems and structures related 
to strategy has been adequately veriﬁed experi-
mentally in severe accident conditions. In relation 
to the matter, STUK ordered tests related to coola-
bility of core debris from Lappeenranta Technical 
University.
In the construction licence phase, the plant’s de-
sign is incomplete in several respects and analyses 
are partly based on preliminary plant data, which 
will become more speciﬁc when design progresses.
In summary, the analyses and experimental re-
sults delivered by the utility during the constructi-
on phase and those commissioned by STUK provi-
ded adequate conﬁdence of the Olkiluoto 3 nuclear 
power plant unit meeting the requirements of the 
Government Resolution (395/191) and of the YVL 
guides.
Probabilistic safety analysis
STUK reviewed the Probabilistic Safety Analysis 
(PSA) for the Olkiluoto 3 design phase, which was 
submitted in connection with the construction li-
cence application, and the related parts of construc-
tion licence documentation. Owing to the inaccura-
cies found in the PSA model, STUK made its own 
calculations during the PSA review to ascertain 
that the plant can be designed and constructed to 
meet the design objectives. The design basis core 
damage frequency (CDF) target value for the new 
nuclear power plant is 10–5/year and the target va-
lue for severe accident releases is 5·10-7/year. The 
design phase PSA must demonstrate that the plant 
meets the probabilistic design objectives. Since the 
plant’s design is still incomplete in several res-
pects, the PSA is complemented during constructi-
on when the plant’s detailed design is ﬁnalised.
According to the Olkiluoto 3 design phase PSA, 
the CDF estimate is approx. 1.8·10–6 /year (power 
operation and shutdown states).The most impor-
tant intiating event groups contributing to the 
CDF are operational transients (45%), of which 
loss of feedwater and component cooling system 
disturbances are dominating, and the loss-of-coo-
lant accidents (24%). Other initiating events cont-
ribute to the CDF as follows: loss of off-site power 
5%, ﬁres 2%, ﬂooding 2%, external events 16% and 
initiating events during shutdown states 6%. The 
vendor’s preliminary assesssment of the frequency 
of exceeding the severe accident release limit is 
1·10–7/year. STUK has reviewed the assessment 
and considers it acceptable.
In summary STUK established that the Olki-
luoto 3 construction phase plans have been ade-
quately analysed, by PSA to demonstrate the 
fulﬁlment of the safety requirements prescribed in 
section 6 of the Government Resolution (395/1991) 
and Guide YVL 2.8.
3.3.4 Oversight of plant project
Conceptual design planning
The acceptability of the plant’s conceptual design 
planning was assessed during the review of the 
construction licence application. It is included in 
the plant’s Preliminary Safety Analysis Report 
(PSAR), which was approved by STUK with some 
remarks. Prior to the approval, several correctives 
and additions were to be made to the PSAR as 
well as some revisions to increase the reliability of 
the operation of safety systems. Added redundancy 
was required speciﬁcally in systems relating to se-
vere accident management.
Radiation safety
STUK assessed the plant’s radiation-safety prin-
ciples during the review of the construction licence 
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application. Included in the PSAR were, among 
others, a description of the plant site, an estima-
te of the plant’s radiation sources, the design of 
radiation shields, an estimate of the occupational 
radiation dose, design bases for the plant’s radiati-
on measurement systems as well as environmental 
analyses for the radiological consequences of nor-
mal operation and accidents. The design bases of 
systems and components as well as their location, 
radiation shields and accessibility are reviewed 
in more detail during the review of systems pre-
inspection documents.
Ageing management
The plant’s design bases and principles are pre-
sented in the PSAR and in more detail in the 
systems pre-inspections documents and the Final 
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The basis for the 
ageing management of main components is that 
leading edge technology is used for their mate-
rials and in their manufacturing. Attention has 
been paid to the matter during the review of the 
construction plans and the supervision of the ma-
nufacturing of main components.
The basic inspections of the in-service inspec-
tion programme relating to the commissioning of 
mechanical components at Olkiluoto 3 are to be 
conducted using methods qualiﬁed in accordance 
with Guide YVL 3.8. The vendor and Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy are negotiating an agreement to imple-
ment the qualiﬁcations.
The PSAR dealt little with the ageing of electri-
cal and I&C components since the types of compo-
nent to be used and thus their characteristics are 
unknown. Only a few components preinspection 
documents have been submitted as yet. In futu-
re, ageing management will be assessed during 
component-level review as design becomes more 
detailed. During the review of the PSAR, STUK 
required that a preliminary ageing management 
programme be set up for the electrical and I&C 
systems and components during the construction 
of the new plant unit.
Systems planning
STUK began to review the details of process sys-
tems design early in the year. Its approval is a 
prerequisite for the design and approval of the 
systems’ process equipment. The design review will 
continue in 2006. STUK has reviewed the plans for 
the most essential power supply systems and the 
related concept plans, i.a. as regards lightning pro-
tection systems and cabling. A review of the I&C 
systems design has been started as regards the 
details of design of the most essential systems.
STUK required modiﬁcation to the original 
design to improve the reliability of systems impor-
tant to safety by the application of the diversity 
and redundancy principles as well as by improved 
systems separation. Analyses of the effects of a 
large primary circuit pipe break on core and reac-
tivity control were required. STUK required that 
the primary circuit depressurisation valves needed 
in the management of severe accidents be provided 
with redundancy. STUK required improvements in 
the structure of the core damage spreading area, 
in hydrogen management within the containment 
during accidents and in the management of steam 
generator tube breaks. In the review special atten-
tion was paid to the ensuring of emergency coolant 
recirculation; veriﬁcation tests were also required.
Component and structural design
Main emphasis in the review of detailed component 
design was on the construction plans of the main 
components. STUK has reviewed the construction 
and manufacturing plans of the reactor pressure 
vessel, the steam generators, the pressuriser, the 
primary coolant pumps, primary circulation piping 
and the control rod drives prior to the start of ma-
nufacturing. The construction and manufacturing 
plans of the internals of the main components were 
reviewed as well.
As regards the design of concrete and steel 
structures, STUK has reviewed the Safety Class 
2 pre-inspection documents of the containment 
and safeguard buildings as well as their strength 
analyses. STUK has reviewed the detailed plans 
for the base plate beneath the containment and the 
safeguard buildings prior to the starting of concre-
te casting. The review of steel structures focused on 
the construction and manufacturing plans of the 
steel liner of the inner containment.
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Manufacturing and construction
STUK supervised the manufacturing of the for-
gings of the reactor pressure vessel and the steam 
generators at the factory of Japan Steel Works 
(JSW) and conducted structural inspection of the 
completed forgings, authorising their shipment to 
the factory of Chalon in France and the factory of 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) in Japan. The 
last forgings were manufactured at and shipped 
from the JSW factory in spring. The manufactu-
ring of steam generators continued in Chalon. MHI 
began manufacturing of the reactor pressure ves-
sel in January after having received authorisation 
from STUK. STUK’s inspectors have overseen the 
manufacturing of the reactor pressure vessel as 
well as the steam generators and their internals 
by regular inspections at the places of manufac-
ture. STUK has overseen the manufacture of ot-
her main components (pressuriser, reactor coolant 
pumps, primary coolant piping and control rod dri-
ves) at their places of manufacture. The number of 
Olkiluoto 3 inspections was 278.
STUK has overseen the plant’s construction by 
undetaking regular inspections at the plant site. 
STUK has ensured readiness for all of the concrete 
castings essential for safety and authorised the 
starting of concreting. Four inspections were made 
prior to the starting of concreting. As regards steel 
structures, STUK has speciﬁcally overseen the ma-
nufacturing of the steel liner.
Qualiﬁcation and veriﬁcation of applicability
Teollisuuden Voima Oy presented the general pro-
cedures and conditions for the qualiﬁcation of sys-
tems, structures and components in the PSAR, the 
related topical reports and systems pre-inspection 
documents. The utility presented system-speci-
ﬁc plans for the qualiﬁcation of the I&C systems, 
which STUK approved with remarks. The accep-
tability and suitability of mechanical components 
and certain electrical devices to their intended use 
has been dealt with in the construction plans.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy will further specify its 
procedures speciﬁcally as regards the qualiﬁcation 
of electrical and I&C components to environmental 
conditions. A more extensive evaluation of their 
suitability will start in 2006 in connection with 
qualiﬁcation plans and the assessment of their 
results as well as the review of suitability assess-
ments.
Modiﬁcations and repairs
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has submitted to STUK 
for approval detailed Olkiluoto 3 plans during 
construction. With the plant’s design having be-
come more detailed the utility has presented some 
design modiﬁcations, which STUK has reviewed. 
STUK has approved the modiﬁcations after having 
ﬁrst assessed their safety signiﬁcance. The most 
signiﬁcant design modiﬁcation was a change in 
the air conditioning of the containment interme-
diate space. STUK approved it after having recei-
ved from TVO sufﬁcient justiﬁcation of and data on 
its cause as well as its effects on the plant overall 
safety.
3.3.5 Oversight of the operation 
of organisations participating 
in plant construction
Safety management
Early in the year STUK started a construction 
inspection programme with the objective of spe-
ciﬁcally inspecting and assessing the operation of 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy in ascertaining the high-
quality implementation of the new nuclear power 
plant. The programme includes inspection of the 
project’s main activities such as management, qua-
lity and project management as well as handling of 
safety-related matters and of other functions such 
as quality assurance, training and radiation safe-
ty plus technical-ﬁeld speciﬁc inspections. STUK 
draws up a bi-annual plan of the inspections.
STUK reviewed the vendor’s design activity in 
the autumn to ﬁnd out about their requirements 
management, handling of design modiﬁcations, ma-
nagement of interfaces between multiple technical 
ﬁelds as well as room layout and radiation safety 
planning and the utilisation of PSA in support of 
detailed design. Improvement areas were identiﬁed 
due to which Teollisuuden Voima Oy has started 
corrective actions together with the vendor.
To ascertain adequate vendor competence for 
the plant project, STUK has participated as an 
observer in 28 of Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s vendor 
audits. Improvement needs have been identiﬁed in 
the operation of many vendors for the correction of 
which i.a. special Olkiluoto 3 speciﬁc quality plans 
have been required.
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Management and quality 
management system
The management system of Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
presents procedures and responsibilities for project 
management and implementation. The quality ma-
nagement system, which is based on processes, is 
integrated with the operating management system 
of the operating Olkiluoto plant units. The project’s 
quality assurance covers the evaluation and cont-
rol of the project itself, its subcontractors, the con-
sortium and vendors.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has maintained and 
improved the project’s management and quality 
management system based on i.a. internal audits 
and the results of STUK’s inspections. The re-
marks included in STUK’s inspection results have 
required, among others, that the project’s internal 
auditing is to be further improved and that defects 
detected in operation are to be put right by the 
deadline given. STUK has called for the project to 
ascertain that the quality systems of subcontrac-
tors who manufacture components important to 
safety meet the quality management requirements 
of the respective IAEA standard. In the inspection 
of the management system, it has been required 
that the utility improves i.a. the handling of safety 
matters and the procedures to control construction 
as well as initiates actions to improve the project 
organisation.
The personnel resources of the project’s quality 
assurance unit have been increased as planned. In 
2006 the project will recruit quality control experts 
in the ﬁelds of i.a. electrical engineering and I&C 
technology.
Inspection and testing organisations as well 
as vendors of nucler pressure equipment
Upon application by Teollisuuden Voima Oy, and 
in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, STUK 
authorised 39 manufacturers of nuclear pressure 
equipment for Olkiluoto 3.
In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, 
STUK authorised 27 testing organisations to con-
duct destructive and nondestructive testing of 
mechanical components and structures at Olki-
luoto 3. Upon application by Teollisuuden Voima 
Oy, STUK approved three inspection organisations 
to carry out tasks relating to the assessment and 
approval of the compliance with requirements of 
the design and manufacturing of Safety Class 3 
and 4 mechanical components and structures.
The manufacturers as well as testing and 
inspection organisations authorised by STUK were 
subject to regulatory oversight. Their operation 
was established to comply with the requirements 
of Guides YVL 3.4 and YVL 1.3.
3.3.6 Overall safety assessment
The overall safety assessment of the new plant 
project looks at observations made based on data 
and experiences gained from the review of detailed 
plans, oversight of manufacturing and constructi-
on, the results of the construction inspection pro-
gramme, oversight of the vendor and their subcont-
ractors, and the communication between STUK, 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy and the vendor. Based on 
oversight, prerequisites exist for the high quality 
implementation of the project to construct the new 
nuclear power plant.
Based on the review of detailed plans, the plant 
design is established to have continuously become 
more speciﬁc but the vendor and utility have left 
much to be desired in the drawing up of adequately 
detailed design documents. During the work done 
on review, the various project participants have 
learned to better understand the requirements 
presented by each others’ operations. No essential 
defects in design-related operation have surfaced 
that would render unacceptable the plant’s detai-
led design.
Based on STUK’s oversight of manufacturing 
and construction, both the vendor and Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy have sufﬁciently well attended to their 
supervisory obligations. The supervision of the 
manufacturing of the main components in par-
ticular revealed non-conformances and defects, 
which the vendor and utility have began to put 
right. These observations show there is a need for 
comprehensive manufacturing supervision. No sig-
niﬁcant defects were revealed during construction 
supervision.
The results of manufacturer and vendor audits 
have shown that many have failed to take into ac-
count the quality requirements of the nuclear ﬁeld 
in their operation. Where necessary, manufacturers 
have been required to submit Olkiluoto 3 speciﬁc 
quality plans to complement their quality system 
such that it encompasses the speciﬁc requirements 
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of the nuclear ﬁeld as regards the components to be 
manufactured.
As a result of the construction inspection pro-
gramme, STUK has gained an understanding of 
how Teollisuuden Voima Oy manages the project, 
of the resources, of the handling of safety matters 
and of quality management as well as of the fun-
ctions supporting these main functions. Judged 
by the results of the inspection programme, the 
utility’s operations are advanced as regards the 
management and construction planning and ma-
nagement. Teollisuuden Voima Oy has presented 
an action plan as regards the improvement areas 
identiﬁed in its operation.
Evaluation of the vendor’s operations is based 
on intercommunication with them at meetings, re-
view of the documents they have drawn up, review 
of their quality management system and plans, 
review of the project manuals, and audits of the 
vendor’s operation. Based on all the above, it has 
been established that the vendor has adequate 
expertise to accomplish the plant project. However, 
the need exists to improve design process, speciﬁ-
cally to ascertain the fulﬁlment of safety require-
ments.
3.4 FiR 1 research reactor
In addition to the electricity-generating nuclear 
power plants, STUK regulates the FiR 1 research 
reactor operated by the VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland. The reactor is located in 
Otaniemi, Espoo, and its maximum thermal po-
wer is 250 kW. The reactor is used for production 
of radioactive tracers, activation analysis, student 
training and for BNCT (Boron Neutron Capture 
Therapy) treatment of brain tumors and BNCT 
reseach.
STUK’s oversight focused on i.a. the reactor’s 
operation, radiation protection, nuclear waste and 
safeguards. Upon application by VTT Processes 
STUK in December approved four reactor opera-
tors and one foreman. No signiﬁcant problems were 
observed in the reactor’s operation. Occupational 
radiation doses and radioactive releases into the 
environment were clearly below set limits.
3.5 Other nuclear facilities
The regulatory control of nuclear facilities relating 
to nuclear waste management, such as storage spa-
ce, is dealt with in Chapter 4.
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4 Nuclear waste management regulation
Esko Ruokola
4.1 Nuclear waste 
management programmes
In accordance with the policy lined out in the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry letter of 3 
November 2002, Posiva Oy, Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
and Fortum Power and Heat Oy in 2004 publis-
hed the report TKS-2003, Nuclear waste manage-
ment of the Olkiluoto and Loviisa power plants, 
Programme for research, development and techni-
cal design for 2004–2006. It is an overview of the 
R&D and technical design in the ﬁeld of nuclear 
waste management by Posiva and its owners in the 
recent years and also a plan for future activities. It 
is focused on the years 2004–2006. The report on 
nuclear waste management, put out by the utilities 
in 2005, was largely based on the above TKS-2003 
report. STUK reviewed the utilities’ nuclear waste 
management related documents and drew up a 
statement on them in accordance with section 78 of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree.
STUK reviewed updated documents on the 
ﬁnancial provision made for the costs of nuclear 
waste management referred to in section 90 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree and gave statements on 
them to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In its 
statements STUK addressed the technical plans on 
which ﬁnancial provision is based.
4.2 Spent nuclear fuel
4.2.1 Intermediate storage
STUK’s regulatory control of spent nuclear fuel 
storage included regular inspections and review 
of plans for storage systems and practices. No sa-
fety-endangering events occurred in the operation 
of the storage facilities. The volume of spent fuel 
onsite the Olkiluoto plant at the end of 2005 was 
6284 assemblies (1106 tU, tonnes of original urani-
um), with an increase of 234 assemblies (41 tU) in 
2005. Corresponding accumulation at the Loviisa 
plant was 3157 assemblies (376 tU) with an in-
crease of 210 assemblies (25 tU). A decision has 
been made to increase the storage capacity of the 
Loviisa plant by the introduction of fuel racks that 
can take more fuel assemblies. Detailed planning 
relating to this is under way. STUK will review and 
oversee the relevant documents and actions.
4.2.2 Final disposal
Posiva Oy’s operations most important from the 
nuclear safety regulatory point of view were as 
follows:
The planning of Posiva’s encapsulation and 
ﬁnal disposal facilities has progressed based on 
long-term planning and the next main objective is 
the publication of preliminary design phase plans 
towards the end of 2006. A new report on the de-
sign bases of the waste canister was published, ac-
cording to which the design of the Posiva canister 
is alike to that of the Swedish SKB.
Posiva, in co-operation with SKB, continues to 
develop the manufacturing, closing and inspecti-
on techniques of the iron-copper canister. Posiva 
is responsible for the pierce and draw method in 
particular whereas SKB develops the forging and 
extrusion method. Both develop the manufacturing 
method for the waste canister’s iron insert. Posiva 
continued copper canister manufacturing tests in 
Germany. No cast-iron insert manufacturing tests 
took place but the testing programme is due to re-
sume in 2006. Although progress was made in the 
manufacturing technology, method development is 
required to attain the desired material characteris-
tics in the canister components.
Of the canister closing methods, the develop-
ment of the electron beam welding method is 
Posiva’s responsibility. In co-operation with Patria 
Aviation, Posiva started copper capsule head wel-
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ding tests using the electron beam welding equip-
ment in Linnavuori factory in Central Finland. 
Progress has been made in welding technology 
such that preliminary welding speciﬁcations are 
intended to be drawn up during 2006.
The most signiﬁcant design and development 
projects in ﬁnal disposal relate to the horizontal 
disposal of waster canisters (the so called KBS-3H 
concept). Posiva has signed a development pro-
gramme on this concept with SKB, which extends 
until 2007. The preparatory work for full-scale 
demonstration tests has been launched at the hard 
rock laboratory at Äspö Sweden.
Posiva continued research programmes in 
Olkiluoto to conﬁrm the suitability of the repository 
site, the construction of the underground research 
facility ONKALO included. Excavation has not pro-
ceeded according to schedule, which has postponed 
some planned investigations. Posiva cancelled its 
4-year contract agreement with Kalliorakennus Oy, 
signed in 2004, on ONKALO’s ﬁrst phase construc-
tion. Posiva acts now as construction developer and 
oversees the construction works and their quality. 
Posiva has set up a project for the construction of 
ONKALO.
Posiva will carry out production-outcome in-
vestigations in connection with the construction of 
ONKALO’s access tunnel. The ﬁrst annual reports 
on ONKALO’s monitoring programme are nearing 
completion. The construction of ONKALO has not 
essentially affected rock mechanics or geochemical 
monitoring results and even its geohydrological 
effects have been relatively insigniﬁcant.
Posiva has developed its management system 
by incorporating in it quality and environmental 
management procedures for the ONKALO project. 
They concentrate on the safety critical activities 
of the construction of ONKALO, i.a. surface-dril-
led boreholes, groundwater inﬂow management, 
use of rock-injection materials and limiting the 
excavation damaged zones. A special process of 
co-ordinated engineering, design and construction 
activities (the CEIC process) has been created for 
the management of modiﬁcations.
Five new deep holes were drilled in the inves-
tigation area to verify the location of rock structu-
res and to characterise the western section of the 
ONKALO region. A new rock lineament analysis 
for the Olkiluoto region was completed and the 
corresponding sea area analysis was revised in 
accordance with new sounding data. Posiva deve-
loped the Olkiluoto region rock model into a geolo-
gical model, which comprises rock deformation and 
fracturing models as well as lithological and rock 
transformation models.
The Olkiluoto Site Description 2004 was pub-
lished in early 2005. STUK will present an assess-
ment of it in 2006. At the same time, an assessment 
of the ﬁnal report on the third phase of Posiva’s 
Host Rock Classiﬁcation will be given.
STUK oversaw the conﬁrming repository site in-
vestigations at Olkiluoto according to an oversight 
plan. The number of inspections to the constructi-
on site was 26, with nine follow-up meetings with 
Posiva. The list of open issues pertaining to the 
Olkiluoto repository site investigations was upda-
ted twice with the assistance of an international 
team of experts.
Posiva’s safety research is mostly based on long-
term bi- or multilateral collaboration projects. Most 
of the bilateral research projects are contained in 
the Posiva/SKB (Sweden) collaboration, which was 
enhanced particulary in the betonite and copper 
corrosion research.
The most signiﬁcant multilateral projects 
are the integrated projects NF-PRO (Near Field 
Processes) ja ESRED (Engineering Studies and 
Demonstrations of Repository Design) within the 
EU’s sixth framework programme, both launched 
in early 2004. Additionally, in early 2005 the integ-
rated project FUNMIG (Fundamental Processes 
of Radionuclide Migration) was launched in which 
Posiva and Finnish research institutes participate.
Posiva’s safety justiﬁcation case is contained 
in the report ‘Plan for Safety Case’ published in 
2005. The forthcoming safety case will consist of 
a portfolio comprising ten main reports that will 
be updated where necessary. The ﬁrst versions of 
ﬁve of them have been published. Posiva organised 
the compilation of the safety case via the SAFCA 
project set up in 2005. The company has main res-
ponsibility for the safety analysis of the feasibility 
of the KBS-3H ﬁnal disposal concept, due for publi-
cation in 2007, which assumes Olkiluoto as the re-
pository site. One of the SAFCA project objectives 
is to manage the necessary know-how in the area.
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4.3 Low and intermediate level 
waste and decommissioning
The utilities followed earlier practices in carrying 
out their intermediate and low-level waste mainte-
nance activities. No safety-related problems occur-
red in the treatment, storage and disposal of low 
and intermediate level waste. STUK’s inspection of 
the handling, storage and disposal of low and inter-
mediate level waste at both plant sites revealed no 
shortcomings requiring immediate action.
The volume of low and intermediate level was-
te onsite the Loviisa plant at the end of the 
year was 2840 m³. Volume increase from 2004 is 
163 m³. Corresponding waste accumulation at the 
Olkiluoto plant was 5425 m³ and the increase was 
765 m³. Scrapped steam reheaters are the most sig-
niﬁcant addition to the increase in waste volume. 
Approx. 47% of the waste from the Loviisa plant 
and approx. 82% of that at the Olkiluoto plant 
has been disposed of. At the Loviisa plant, cleared 
from control was mostly maintenance waste, which 
was taken to the Kymenlaakson Jäte Oy landﬁll. 
Cleared from control at the Olkiluoto plant were 
maintenance waste taken for burial at the local 
landﬁll, waste oil taken to Ekokem Oy and recyc-
lable scrap metal taken to Eurajoen Romu Oy.
The low and intermediate level waste subject 
to long-term storage at Olkiluoto mostly inclu-
des components removed from inside the reactor 
pressure vessels and they are stored in the fuel 
pools. The cutting up and disposal of steam sepa-
rators continued. At the Olkiluoto plant site, some 
large components with a relatively low radiation 
level are also stored for whose treatment a decon-
tamination chamber and a crusher have been pur-
chased. Introduced into service was a new storage 
building – a component storage – for steam rehea-
ters removed from service in 2005 and 2006.
The most important low and intermediate le-
vel waste projects at the Loviisa plant are the 
construction of a solidiﬁcation facility and the ex-
tension of the ﬁnal disposal facility. These projects 
were started in 2004 and are due for completion by 
the end of 2006. A second rock tunnel for the dis-
posal of maintenance waste was commissioned and 
the construction of a concrete vault where solidi-
ﬁed waste will be emplaced was started. After the 
ﬁnal disposal of solidiﬁed waste has been launched, 
the Loviisa plant site still has to accommodate for 
the long-term storage of highly active components 
removed from inside the reactor pressure vessels 
and for approx. 200 m³ of other waste.
The Loviisa plant has plans to develop low and 
intermediate level waste management by taking 
into use facilities for centralised treatment, activi-
ty measurement and temporary storage of waste. 
A relevant plan is nearing completion and project 
realisation will start in 2006. Gate monitoring 
equipment for vehicle activity and dose rate me-
asurement were introduced.
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5 Nuclear non-proliferation
Marko Hämäläinen, Arto Isolankila, Elina Martikka, 
Olli Okko, Jaakko Tikkinen
5.1 Safeguards of nuclear materials
5.1.1 Safeguards at Finnish nuclear facilities
STUK’s safeguards activities aim to ensure regu-
latory control of the use of nuclear energy neces-
sary to prevent nuclear proliferation. In addition, 
STUK’s task is to attend to the control pertaining 
to international agreements in the ﬁeld of nuclear 
energy signed by Finland. International safeguards 
are implemented by the IAEA and EU safeguards 
by the European Commission’s Directorate-General 
for Transport and Energy, Directorates H and I. 
IAEA safeguards are based on the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Safeguards Agreement 
(INFCIRC/193) signed by the non-nuclear-weapon 
member states of the EU, the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom) and the IAEA. EU 
safeguards are based on the Euratom Treaty and 
Commission Regulation EURATOM 302/2005, 
which replaced Commission Regulation 3227/6 of 
20 March 2005.
Insofar as nuclear power plants are concerned, 
STUK’s safeguards activities are mostly focused on 
fuel import, transport, storage, internal transfers 
and refueling. The utilities submit to STUK activi-
ty programmes, advance notiﬁcations and reports 
relevant to their nuclear materials management.
Seven inspections were carried out at Loviisa 
power plant and 17 inspections at Olkiluoto plant, 
totalling in 24 inspections at the Finnish plants. 
Euratom and the IAEA participated in 21 of them. 
STUK made three inspections at the construction 
site of the Olkiluoto ﬁnal repository with the IAEA 
participating as an observer in one of them.
In addition to nuclear power plants, minor 
amounts of nuclear materials are used at ot-
her facilities. The most signiﬁcant of these is 
FiR 1, the research reactor operated by VTT, 
where one inspection was made. It was carried 
out by STUK, the IAEA and Euratom. In addi-
tion to VTT’s FiR 1 research reactor, STUK, the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of 
Helsinki, OMG Kokkola Chemicals, the University 
of Jyväskylä, the Geological Survey of Finland and 
some other small nuclear materials holders have 
small amounts of nuclear materials in their posses-
sion. The amounts of nuclear materials at Finnish 
facilities are given in Table II and licences and 
approvals in accordance with the Nuclear Energy 
Act in Appendix 4.
An important objective of nuclear material sa-
feguards is to verify that the data on nuclear ma-
terials reported by the operators, such as burn-up 
and cooling time, are correct and complete. STUK 
veriﬁed by non-destructive methods 13 and 389 
spent fuel assemblies at Olkiluoto and Loviisa po-
wer plants respectively. For the Olkiluoto measu-
rements, the gamma burn-up veriﬁcation (GBUV) 
method was used, which is precise enough to reveal 
a missing rod, although not all levels of partial 
defect. The use of GBUV is time-consuming as it 
requires the fuel assemblies to be transferred to 
the stationary measurement device. The Loviisa 
measurements were carried out with a spent fuel 
attribute tester (SFAT). The measurement device is 
attached to the fuel transfer machine, which facili-
tates relatively rapid scanning of the fuel assemb-
lies from the top. SFAT is not suitable for strongly 
proﬁled assemblies or for fuel extension. Video 
surveillance by the IAEA had spotted a transfer 
of a partly ﬁlled transfer cask from the Loviisa 1 
reactor hall to the spent fuel storage in 2004. Since 
the transfer took place during annual maintenan-
ce, and the reactor was not yet closed and sealed, 
it brought about an anomaly within the IAEA sa-
feguards. The problem was solved by non-destruc-
tive methods in August, when the IAEA, Euratom 
and STUK measured four fuel assemblies loaded 
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Table II. Amounts of nuclear material in Finland 31 December 2005.
Location
Natural uranium 
(kg)
Enriched uranium 
(kg)
Depleted uranium 
(kg)
Plutonium
(kg)
Torium  
(kg)
Loviisan plant – 460 990 – 3 744 –
Olkiluoto 1 – 188 799 – 775 –
Olkiluoto 2 – 193 224 – 877 –
Olkiluoto / Spent fuel storage 
(KPA)
– 878 827 – 7 256 –
VTT/FiR 1 research reactor 1 511 60 < 1 – –
OMG Kokkola Chemicals 2 419 – – – –
STUK 44.7 1.4 592.4 0.003 2.5
University of Helsinki, 
laboratory of radiochemistry
40.4 0.3 20 0.003 2.5
Other facilities ~0 ~0 817 ~0 –
to and ﬁve removed from the Loviisa 1 reactor.
STUK approved Fortum’s manual for the ac-
counting and control of international transfers. 
STUK also approved three persons to safeguards 
duties for the Olkiluoto power plant. Two of them, 
for whom approval was granted in 1989, participa-
ted in new examinations due to changes that had 
taken place in the safeguards of nuclear materials. 
In addition, a new person appointed by TVO to 
safeguards duties was interviewed and approved. 
STUK further approved the responsible mana-
ger and his deputy for the Geological Survey of 
Finland (GTK).
Nineteen Euratom and 18 IAEA inspectors 
were approved to carry out inspections in Finland. 
Based on a hearing, which pertains to the inspec-
tor approval procedure, of those in possession of 
construction and operation licences for nuclear 
activities, STUK did not approve one inspector 
proposed by the IAEA and therefore, in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Decree, handed over the 
matter to the Ministry of Trade and Industry to 
decide.
In conclusion, each material balance area ope-
rated in compliance with STUK-approved manuals 
and in a way that facilitates STUK to fulﬁl the 
obligations of international agreements in the 
nuclear ﬁeld signed by Finland.
5.1.2 Activities in accordance with the 
Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540)
STUK prepared the declarations required by the 
Additional Protocol, the most important of which 
were the descriptions of the sites and of R&D per-
taining to the nuclear fuel cycle. STUK delivered 
within the given time limits directly to the IAEA 
the updates to the declarations that are Finland’s 
responsibility. The Commission provided the upda-
tes of the declarations under its responsibility and 
of those it is jointly responsible for with Finland 
to the IAEA in May and for information to STUK 
in June. In addition, Finland delivered quarter-
ly information about exportations in accordance 
with the Protocol. STUK delivered to the IAEA 
and the Commission a total of 18 declarations and 
the Commission to the IAEA four declarations 
pertaining to Finland. In September STUK rep-
lied to questions raised about the declaration by 
the IAEA. The IAEA conducted a Complementary 
Access at the Olkiluoto site in accordance with the 
Additional Protocol at two hours’ notice following a 
periodic inspection on 13 September and another 
one at 24 hours’ notice at STUK. The Commission 
participated in both Complementary Accesses.
5.1.3 Safeguards for ﬁnal disposal
The ﬁnal disposal of nuclear fuel in an under-
ground repository presents new challenges to sa-
feguards implementation since, after encapsulati-
on, the direct veriﬁcation of nuclear material will 
be impossible. The IAEA has proposed that sa-
feguards for the ﬁnal repository be implemented 
during construction already, notwithstanding the 
Commission Regulation (EURATOM) 302/2005, 
which merely states that the European Commission 
will oblige licensees to submit reports on nuclear 
material, and on the facilities handling them, not 
later than 200 days prior to the transfer of the 
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nuclear materials to new premises. Based on the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the government 
is under obligation to facilitate effective IAEA safe-
guards in Finland. Based on negotiations between 
STUK and the Ministry of Trade and Industry on 
29 September 2004, it was considered appropriate 
to oblige Posiva Oy, who are responsible for ﬁnal 
disposal and its implementation, to take care, in 
the manner of a nuclear facility, of the implementa-
tion of nuclear safeguards during the construction 
of the underground research facility (ONKALO) 
of the ﬁnal repository. This decision aims to assu-
re the IAEA of Finland’s capability to implement 
sufﬁcient safeguards and to plan national control 
and inspection procedures. On 24 May an IAEA 
representative participated in a meeting of a group 
of consultants discussing the long-term safety of 
nuclear waste management for ﬁnal disposal and 
visited the underground premises under construc-
tion. STUK and Posiva’s representatives visited the 
IAEA on 16 September to present national safe-
guards arrangements for the ﬁnal repository based 
on the Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) in 
accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and to discuss the implementation of rela-
ted co-operation with the IAEA.
As regards the ﬁnal disposal facility, STUK 
approved the Code of conduct for nuclear non-pro-
liferation in ONKALO, prepared by Posiva, which 
is equivalent to a nuclear material accounting and 
control manual and focuses on the veriﬁcation of 
construction documents and environmental moni-
toring prior to the handling and transfer of nuclear 
materials to the underground facilities. STUK 
approved a person to attend to nuclear materials 
safeguards for the ﬁnal repository.
On 8 July STUK provided the IAEA with a 
summary of the inspections made during the ﬁrst 
year of ONKALO’s construction.
5.2 Control of radioactive 
materials transport
About 20 000 radioactive packages are transported 
in Finland every year. There were no accidents or 
safety hazards involving the transport of radioa-
ctive materials in 2005. The transport of nuclear 
materials requires a licence from STUK. The con-
ditions for the licence include nuclear liability in-
surance and sufﬁcient physical protection. STUK 
approved three transport plans for the import of 
fresh fuel. The most signiﬁcant cases of nuclear 
material transport were the imports of fresh 
nuclear fuel to the Finnish nuclear power plants 
from Sweden, Spain and Russia.
The import of radioactive and nuclear materials 
is subject to a licence. No attempts on illicit import 
were detected at the Finnish border.
No illicit trafﬁcking of radioactive materials 
was detected at the border in 2001−2005. The 
highest number, 23 consignments, was turned back 
in 1997. The reason was typically radioactivity me-
asured in scrap metal. The decrease in number is 
partly due to the most signiﬁcant consignors now 
measuring the radioactivity of their scrap metal. 
On the other hand, also the number of consign-
ments of scrap metal to Finland has decreased.
Safeguards as well as the supervision and cont-
rol of nuclear material transport are described in 
more detail in the report Nuclear Safeguards in 
Finland 2005 (STUK-B-YTO 245).
5.3 The Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) prohibits all nuclear testing. The Treaty 
was opened for signing in 1996. It enters into force 
after ratiﬁcation by 44 separately designated sta-
tes. Finland ratiﬁed it in 1999. Compliance with 
the Treaty is monitored by an international obser-
vation network, which will comprise 321 monito-
ring stations. Of the stations, 80 measure radioa-
ctive particles in the atmosphere. The results are 
available for use by all member states.
A special preparatory commission, which as-
sembles in Vienna, is preparing for the Treaty’s 
coming into force. All signatory states are repre-
sented in it. The Provisional Technical Secretariat 
operates in Vienna as well.
The National Data Centre (NDC), which is 
based on the CTBT and operates in conjuncti-
on with STUK, contributed to the work of the 
Preparatory commission for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) 
in establishing a cost-effective organisation that 
is functional from the Finnish point of view. The 
NDC’s own automatic routine monitoring was in 
operation for the whole year, analysing results 
yielded by stations detecting radioactive particles 
in the atmosphere. Routine monitoring is facili-
tated by an alarm system transmitting data on 
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unusual observations to the NDC personnel. No 
abnormal activity levels were observed by the 
NDC.
The results of the analyses are fed to the LINSSI 
database. The database and its user interface were 
developed in co-operation with STUK’s Laboratory 
of Airborne Radioactivity, the Helsinki University 
of Technology and the Canadian National Data 
Centre.
The Treaty’s entire monitoring system was te-
sted. The NDC participated in the test by providing 
the results of automatic analysis and some results 
of interactive analyses. The secretariat fed the 
results yielded by the national data centres parti-
cipating in the test to the LINSSI database, which 
was distributed to all the participants. Based on 
preliminary test results, the analysis system of the 
NDC is operating well.
STUK in 2002 signed an agreement with the 
developers of the analysis programme used by the 
NDC about its handing over to the national data 
centres of other countries for use in CTBT work. 
The programme was delivered to the national data 
centre of Tunisia.
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6 Safety research
Esko Eloranta, Harri Heimbürger, Kaisa-Leena Hutri
In accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, funds 
are collected from the licensees to the State nuclear 
waste fund (VYR), to two separate assets kept se-
parate from other assets of the Fund, to ﬁnance 
nuclear safety research and nuclear waste rese-
arch. The funds available for distribution every 
year are used to research projects which, as an 
entity, support the purpose for which the funds 
are collected. Each year VYR distributes the funds 
to various research projects as proposed by the 
Minsitry of Trade and Industry. STUK submitted 
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry statements, 
as referred to in the Nuclear Energy Act, on the an-
nual plans for the national research programme on 
nuclear power plant safety (SAFIR) and on nuclear 
waste management (KYT).
Projects under SAFIR received €2.6 million and 
those under KYT approx. €1.1 million. SAFIR is 
not ﬁnanced by VYR only, its total ﬁnancing being 
approx. €5 million. Even ﬁnanciers other than VYR 
may bring along in the programme their projects 
that are in line with the programme’s content and 
objectives.
The general plan for the SAFIR research pro-
gramme is based on safety challenges identiﬁed for 
this decade, which are many due to the ageing of 
operating nuclear power plants, their modernisati-
on and the new plant project. The general research 
themes of the SAFIR research programme were fuel 
and the reactor core, the reactor circuit, the contain-
ment and process safety functions, I&C, the control 
room and information technology, organisations and 
safety management as well as risk-informed safety 
management. In the ﬁeld of reactor safety, the pro-
gramme entailed participation in several interna-
tional projects within the framework of the OECD/
NEA and the US regulatory authority the NRC. The 
research programme comprised 24 research pro-
jects. STUK’s experts participated in the reference 
and steering group activities of the SAFIR program-
mes. Information about the SAFIR programme is 
available at http://virtual.vtt.ﬁ/saﬁr.
The KYT 2002–2005 research programme con-
sisted of nuclear waste management strategic ana-
lyses and research into the long-term safety of the 
ﬁnal disposal of nuclear waste. The emphasis in the 
KYT programme is in the implementation of pro-
jects that strengthen the basis on which national 
competence in the ﬁeld of nuclear waste rests. No 
ﬁnancing is granted for research directly relating 
to projects carried out by those with a nuclear was-
te management obligation, or anyone representing 
them, and research directly required by nuclear 
waste management regulation. The research pro-
gramme period ended in 2005, with 12 research 
projects in the programme. The projects focused on 
earth sciences, technical barriers to release, migra-
tion of radioactive substances, safety analyses and 
technical solutions. The KYT 2002–2005 research 
programme was managed by a steering group who-
se chairmanship was with STUK.
According to a Ministry of Trade and Industry 
decision, the next KYT programme will cover ﬁve 
years. STUK participated in the drawing up of the 
KYT2010 framework programme prepared by the 
steering group. The annual budget of the program-
me will remain at approx. €1 million. In accordance 
with the earlier KYT programmes, the framework 
programme focused on strategic analyses of nuclear 
waste management, with nuclear non-proliferation 
as a new topic. The research programme will be ex-
tended to cover even sociological research. STUK’s 
representatives hold chairmanship in the KYT2010 
steering group and in the project’s reference group. 
Information about the KYT programme is availab-
le at http://virtual.vtt.ﬁ/kyt.
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7 Nuclear facilities regulation 
and development of regulation
Marja-Leena Järvinen, Kaisa Koskinen, Pekka Salminen, 
Arja Tanninen, Reino Virolainen
7.1 Processes and structures
STUK ascertains by inspection and other oversight 
that the prerequisites for operation, and the ope-
ration, of the licensee and their subcontractors as 
well as the systems, structures and components 
of nuclear facilities meet set safety requirements. 
STUK’s oversight is composed of document reviews 
and various types of inspections onsite or at the 
suppliers’ premises. The YVL guides presuppo-
se document review as well as inspections onsite 
or at the suppliers’ premises. In addition, STUK 
carries out its own inspection programmes during 
construction and operation, and resident inspec-
tors work at the plant site. The inspection procedu-
res are described in the quality manual for nuclear 
safety regulation. Document review, the various 
types of inspection and the related indicators are 
described in more detail below. The results of the 
review and inspections are dealt with in Chapters 
3–5 of this report.
Document review
A total of 2541 documents were submitted to 
STUK for review, 924 of which were about the 
plant under construction. The number of completed 
document reviews was 2211, including documents 
submitted in 2005, those submitted earlier and 
licences granted by STUK in accordance with the 
Nuclear Energy Act, which are listed in Appendix 
4. Average document review time was 51 days. The 
number of documents and their average review 
times in 2001–2005 are given in Fig 8. Figs 9, 10 
and 11 give the distribution of the review times of 
documents on each plant unit. Figure 8. Number of documents received and reviewed 
as well as average document review time.
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Inspections onsite and at suppliers’ premises
Safety management, main processes and procedu-
res of operation as well as the technical acceptabili-
ty of systems were looked into in inspections of the 
periodic inspection programme. The compliance of 
plant safety assessment, operation, maintenance 
and protection activities with the requirements 
of nuclear safety regulations was veriﬁed by the 
inspections. The annual inspection programme was 
brought to the attention of the licensee early in the 
year and the inspection dates were agreed upon 
with the licensee’s representatives. The inspections 
contained in the periodic inspection programme 
are given in Appendix 5.
The construction inspection programme of 
Olkiluoto 3 aims to verify that the functions requi-
red by the construction of the plant ensure high 
quality implementation in accordance with appro-
ved plans and in compliance with regulations, and 
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without endangering the plants already in operati-
on on the site. The inspection programme assesses 
and supervises the licensee’s activities to imple-
ment the plant project, the procedures pertaining 
to the plant’s construction in the various technical 
ﬁelds involved, licensee expertise and their use of 
it, the handling of safety matters, and quality ma-
nagement and control. STUK draws up a bi-annual 
plan for the Olkiluoto 3 inspections. The inspec-
tions of the periodic inspection programme during 
construction are given in Appendix 6.
Information was acquired through reports re-
quested from the utility’s representatives, person-
nel interviews, document reviews, walk rounds and 
observation of working. None of the observations 
thus made had signiﬁcant bearing on the safety of 
the plant units.
Nineteen inspections of the periodic inspecti-
on programme were planned for the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto plants. During the year, the inspection 
programme was updated such that 16 inspections 
were made at each plant.
STUK conducted 12 inspections in accordance 
with the periodic inspection programme imple-
mented during the construction of Olkiluoto 3.
A total of 683 inspections (other than inspec-
tions of the periodic or construction inspection 
programmes, which are looked into later in this 
document) onsite or at the suppliers’ premises 
were made as well as nuclear material safeguards 
inspections. An inspection comprises one or several 
partial inspections such as review of results docu-
mentation, inspection of a component or structure, 
a pressure or leakage test, a functional test or a 
commissioning inspection. Of the inspections, 278 
pertained to oversight of the plant under construc-
tion and 405 to that of the operating plants. 
Relevant documents are reviewed prior to onsite 
inspection.
The total number of inspection days onsite and 
at the component manufacturers’ premises during 
ofﬁce hours was 1781. Not only inspections per-
taining to the safety of nuclear power plants but 
also nuclear waste management and safeguards 
inspections are included. In addition, 253 inspecti-
on days outside ofﬁce hours were spent at the ope-
rating nuclear power plants, mostly during annual 
maintenance outages. The number of days spent 
on inspection has been increased by inspections 
relating to the licensing of the new nuclear power 
Figure 9. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions on the Loviisa plant units.
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Figure 10. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions on the Olkiluoto plant units 1 and 2.
Figure 11. Distribution of time spent on preparing deci-
sions on the Olkiluoto plant unit 3.
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plant. Two resident inspectors worked at Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant and one at the Loviisa plant. 
The number of inspection days during ofﬁce hours 
in 2001−2005 is given in Fig 12.
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STUK’s own operation
The development of STUK’s own operation focused 
on processes. The process chart was complemented 
as regards nuclear reactor regulation and the up-
dating of the quality manual was continued, which 
work will be given the ﬁnishing touches in early 
2006. The development objectives in nuclear non-
proliferation were regulatory control in accordance 
with the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, and nuclear 
material safeguards during the construction of the 
ﬁnal repository for spent fuel. New entries of both 
were prepared for the quality manual and their 
ﬁnal approval will take place in 2006. The most 
signiﬁcant object of development in nuclear waste 
management was the oversight of Olkiluoto’s un-
derground research facility ONKALO. A related 
plan was updated in May.
Self-assessment focused on client/interest group 
relationships. No signiﬁcant shortcomings surfaced 
but, based on client feedback, some procedures 
were made more speciﬁc.
Development of document management
A long-term document management project is 
under way at STUK. In 2003 the supplier and 
the application software were chosen. The main 
components are a portal, knowledge management, 
document management, collaboration module and 
records management. In 2004 work continued by 
a closer analysis of the STUK functions needed to 
determine in detail the system required and the 
resultant functional requirements. Extensive soft-
ware test plans were drawn up followed by mul-
tiple-phased testing. Owing to the need for further 
deﬁnition and development, which surfaced during 
testing, the system’s commissioning had to be post-
poned until 2005.
The document administration application was 
introduced to limited use. All personnel were 
trained in its use. At the same time, the deﬁnition 
of a closely related archiving and registering ad-
ministration application was initiated. Separate 
development projects were set up to deﬁne and 
implement the portal and the data retrieval servi-
ces. Current assessment is that all the aforemen-
tioned sub-applications will be commissioned by 
the end of 2007.
As development projects relating to document 
administration, the quality and quantity of the 
printing services available to STUK’s inspectors 
were improved as well as the data security of prin-
ters and laptops available for general use.
7.2 Renewal of competence 
and human resources
Development of competence in nuclear reactor re-
gulation was continued based on earlier plans. Own 
training focused on increasing knowledge of the 
features of facility design of the operating plants 
and the new plant. Newly recruited personnel were 
given basic professional training in nuclear safety 
in Finland, which was organised by STUK in co-
operation with other parties active in the nuclear 
ﬁeld.
Recruitments continued to ensure adequate 
know-how and personnel resources. Five new ex-
perts were recruited for the Department of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation. They were in the ﬁelds of con-
crete and rock construction, programmable techno-
logy, mechanical equipment and their manufac-
turing and inspection techniques, PSA as well as 
management and evaluation of organisational ope-
ration. The Ofﬁce of Nuclear Material Regulation 
underwent reshufﬂing of duties and, consequently, 
two new experts were recruited. Their tasks rela-
ted to statutory regulatory oversight (the IAEA’s 
strengthened nuclear material safeguards, inter-
national transport) and anti-terrorism activities. 
In this connection, some of the Department of 
Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation’s duties 
relating to the implementation of the CTBT could 
be reduced. Nuclear waste management expertise 
was increased by the recruitment of a safety ana-
lysis expert.
Figure 12. Number of inspection days onsite and at 
component manufacturers’ premises.
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A well-being survey was conducted among the 
STUK personnel in the spring. For the Department 
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, an improvement 
in the results was seen in almost all sectors. The 
results for the Department of Nuclear Waste and 
Materials Regulation showed some deterioration 
but were still at the average STUK level. The re-
sults of the survey were extensively discussed with 
the personnel.
7.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation inclu-
ded basic operations subject and not subject to a 
charge. Basic operations subject to a charge mostly 
comprised of the regulatory control of nuclear fa-
cilities, with their costs charged to those subject 
to control. Those basic operations not subject to a 
charge included international and domestic co-ope-
ration as well as emergency response and commu-
nications. Basic operations not subject to a charge 
are publicly funded. Overheads from rule-making 
and support functions (administration, develop-
ment projects in support of nuclear safety regu-
lation, training, maintenance and development of 
expertise, reporting and participation in nuclear 
safety research) were carried forward into the costs 
of both types of basic operation and of contracted 
services in relation to the number of working hours 
spent on each function.
The costs of the regulatory control of nuclear 
safety subject to a charge were €9.3 million. The 
total costs of nuclear safety regulation were €10.6 
million. Thus the share of activities subject to a 
charge was 88%.
The income from nuclear safety regulation was 
€9.3 million. Of this, €1.7 million and €7 million 
came from the inspection and review of Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants, respectively. In ad-
dition to the operating plant units, the income from 
the Olkiluoto plant includes regulatory control of 
the new plant unit. The regulation of Posiva Oy’s 
operations yielded €0.7 million. Figure 13 gives the 
annual income and costs of nuclear safety regulati-
on in 2001−2005.
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 9.2 person-years, 
i.e. 9.1% of the total working time of the regulato-
ry personnel. For Olkiluoto nuclear power plant’s 
operating units it was 10.6 person-years, which ac-
counts for 10.4% of total working time. In addition 
to the oversight of the operation of nuclear power 
plants, the ﬁgure includes nuclear material cont-
Figure 14. The cost of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants.
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Figure 13. Income and costs of nuclear safety 
regulation.
Figure 15. The cost of research and commissioned 
work pertaining to nuclear waste management and 
nuclear non-proliferation.
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Table III. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Basic operations subject to a charge 26.3 27.6 29.2 44.7 47.1
Basic operations not subject to a charge 7.4 6.9 6.4 5.1 7.2
Contracted services 4.4 3.8 4.9 5.1 3.3
Rule-making and support functions 28.5 27.1 28.2 22.7 27.5
Holidays and absences 16 16.2 15.9 16.9 16.9
Total 82.6 81.6 84.6 94.5 101.9
Figure 16. Working time spent on main functions.
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rol. The time spent on the inspection and review 
of Olkiluoto 3 was 23.8 person-years, i.e. 23.3% of 
total working time. The time spent on nuclear was-
te management inspection and review was 3.7 per-
son-years and that spent on the FiR 1 research 
reactor 0.07 person-years. The working time spent 
on small-scaler users of nuclear material was 0.08 
person-years.
Where necessary, STUK contracts technical 
support organisations to perform independent sa-
fety analyses and assessments for regulatory de-
cision-making. Figures 14 and 15 give the costs of 
nuclear safety research in 2001−2005. In addition 
to technical support projects, the pre-2005 ﬁgures 
show the costs of national nuclear safety research. 
The costs for 2005 mostly relate to reference ana-
lyses and independent assessments made for the 
plant unit under construction. Appendix 7 lists 
completed STUK-ﬁnanced technical support pro-
jects.
The distribution of the yearly working time of 
the nuclear regulatory personnel according to duty 
areas is given in Table III. Figure 16 presents the 
distribution of working time spent on main func-
tions in 2001−2005.
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8 Emergency preparedness
Tuulikki Sillanpää
STUK organised several training events and exer-
cises to test and develop its own emergency res-
ponse. In addition, STUK supervises the emergen-
cy preparedness of the operating organisations of 
nuclear power plants to take action in abnormal 
situations. No situations occurred that would have 
endangered the safety of the population or the en-
vironment and would have required the taking of 
protective action.
A signiﬁcant increase in the sea water level in 
the Gulf of Finland on 9 January brought about 
an emergency standby at Loviisa nuclear power 
plant. The plant sent STUK the relevant notices 
and started up the operation of its own emergency 
organisation. STUK’s own emergency organisation 
was partly summoned at STUK’s emergency cent-
re to follow the situation and communicate with 
Loviisa nuclear power plant as well as key autho-
rities and partners of co-operation. STUK issued 
press releases to domestic authorities and the me-
dia. The sea water level increase was not observed 
to have caused leaks into the plant’s rooms or other 
corresponding phenomena that would endanger 
the plant’s safety; both plant units were in normal 
operation. The event was classiﬁed as INES Level 
0. For a more detailed technical description, see 
Appendix 3.
The emergency response systems of nuclear 
power plants have been under continuous develop-
ment during plant operation and regularly tested 
in emergency exercises as part of emergency pre-
paredness training. Other related training by the 
licensees encompasses practical exercises for ra-
diation measurement teams, sampling during ac-
cidents and measurement of samples, assessment 
of accident situations and review and development 
of emergency guidelines in seminars. STUK has 
approved the emergency contingency plans of the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants and yearly reviews 
the implementation of emergency preparedness, 
including training and emergency exercises.
Two domestic emergency exercises were orga-
nised. The participants to an Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant rescue operations exercise, “OLKI 05”, 
on 8 November, were some 20 domestic authorities 
or partners in co-operation, media representatives 
and Nordic nuclear and radiation safety autho-
rities. The date and time of the exercise were not 
given in advance. Initiation of activities, inter-aut-
hority co-operation, assessment of accident situati-
on and dissemination of information to the public 
and the media were tested. The emergency plans, 
operation and management arrangements of the 
Satakunta rescue services area were tested as well. 
STUK’s emergency operations were fully activated 
in the exercise. Over 90 people from STUK partici-
pated.
The annual Loviisa power plant emergency 
exercise was on 23 November with the plant’s 
emergency organisation and part of the STUK 
emergency organisation participating. Tested were, 
among others, accident status analysis and main-
tenance as well co-operation between the power 
plant and STUK.
Fire drills are arranged annually at both power 
plants with ﬁre brigades from the plants and the 
rescue services of the surrounding municipalities 
participating. Loviisa power plant’s ﬁre drill was 
on 25 May and that of Olkiluoto power plant on 21 
and 28 November.
STUK participated in international nuclear po-
wer plant emergency exercises. Some 60 countries 
participated in the IAEA’s ConvEx 3 exercise on 
11 to 12 May. The accident country simulated was 
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Rumania. STUK received messages during the 
exercise, followed the accident status and actively 
relayed information about the accident’s progress 
and the migration of radioactive substances to 
the European Commission in accordance with the 
Commission’s RESPEC agreement on emergency 
preparedness activities.
The emergency exercise of the Russian Kola 
nuclear power plant was on 6 to 8 September. Part 
of STUK’s emergency organisation participated in 
it. STUK’s representatives followed the exercise 
as observers at Kola nuclear power plant and in 
Moscow.
The INEX 3 series of exercises organised by the 
nuclear energy organisation of the OECD countries 
focus on recovery actions in a fallout situation. In 
Finland the ﬁrst exercise was organised in two pha-
ses, on 13 January and 8 February. Part of STUK’s 
emergency organisation participated together with 
25 domestic partners in co-operation.
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9 Communications
Risto Isaksson
STUK issued four press releases on nuclear safety 
regulation. On 9 January two press releases came 
out on the emergency standby situation, and its 
ending, at Loviisa nuclear power plant, which was 
caused by an exceptionally hight water level on the 
Gulf of Finland. A press release of 14 January was 
about STUK’s statement and safety assessment to 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry on the construc-
tion licence of the new nuclear power plant. On 15 
May a press release was issued on a power failure 
that occurred at Olkiluoto 1 the previous day.
According to a press release on nuclear material 
safeguards on 4 February, no radioactive consign-
ments were stopped at the Finnish border in 2004.
The press releases were sent to the media and 
partners in co-operation and were made available 
to read at STUK’s web page. The news section of 
the STUK web pages told about the annual main-
tenances of Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power 
plants.
The press releases did not make big news but 
STUK and its personnel were visible in the media 
a couple of times in matters relating to nuclear 
safety. Towards the end of January the media took 
notice of STUK’s statement and safety assessment 
on the new nuclear power plant project. The new 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was in the headli-
nes on 17 and 18 February after the government 
granted it a construction licence. These pieces of 
news made reference to STUK’s expertise and the 
statement given.
During the summer and autumn the media fol-
lowed the progress and delay of the construction of 
Olkiluoto 3. Reference was made to STUK as the 
regulatory authority and STUK’s experts were in-
terviewed. Some of these pieces of news elaborated 
on the effect regulation has on the plant’s construc-
tion schedule. The writing style was neutral as re-
gards STUK and the importance of the Authority’s 
work and expertise was emphasised.
STUK’s expert opinion about an event that 
made the headlines in Sweden was requested in 
June. Waste packages in the Forsmark radioactive 
waste storage had got wet and elevated radiactivi-
ty levels had been measured in the seepage waters. 
Journalists contacted STUK for information in 
December after Greenpeace had made it known in 
public that illegal Russian nuclear waste shipments 
were being transported on the Gulf of Finland. In 
the same month the media told about an accident 
in a low-level radioactive waste treatment facility 
in the vicinity of the Russian Sosnovyi Bor nuclear 
power plant.
In addition to the press releases, the operation 
of and operational events at the Finnish nuclear 
power plants were accounted for in quarterly 
reports on nuclear safety, which were sent to the 
media and interest groups. The reports were put on 
the STUK web site as well.
STUK held journalists a course on the funda-
mentals of radiation and nuclear safety. The partic-
ipants visited Olkiluoto and Sosnovyi Bor nuclear 
power plants. In connection with the Sosnovyi Bor 
plant visit the course participants paid a visit to 
the Sillamäki radioactive waste dump in Estonia. 
Nineteen journalists participated in the course.
STUK-B-YTO 249
55
10 International co-operation
Juhani Hyvärinen, Kaisa Koskinen, Pentti Koutaniemi, Elina Martikka, Matti 
Ojanen, Rainer Rantala, Esko Ruokola, Pekka Salminen, Seija Suksi, Arja 
Tanninen, Kirsti Tossavainen, Olli Vilkamo
10.1 International conventions
International Convention on Nuclear Safety
The International Convention on Nuclear Safety 
obliges the ratifying States to submit every three 
years a national report on compliance with the ob-
ligations of the Convention. The reports are asses-
sed at a joint meeting of the Contracting Parties. 
The Parties assembled for a third time for a “peer 
review” meeting. Of the Convention’s 55 Parties, 50 
participated in the third meeting to review comp-
liance with the Convention. India participated as a 
newly ratifying State.
The meeting paid special attention to important 
current topics, including the challenges posed to 
safety regulation by the de-regulation of the ener-
gy market, and also information management and 
change of generation in the nuclear energy ﬁeld, 
ageing management for nuclear power plants, the 
impact of national energy strategies on develop-
ments in the nuclear ﬁeld, nuclear terrorism and 
regulation of research reactors. The meeting focus-
ed on the roles of safety infrastructure and the re-
gulatory authority. Other topics were ﬁnancial and 
human resources, a safety-ﬁrst attitude, human 
factors, safety analyses, emergency preparedness, 
radiation protection and the design, construction 
and operation of nuclear power plants.
Finland’s report (STUK-B-YTO 234) was well 
received and, judged by it and its review, no shor-
tcomings were detected that would have required 
speciﬁc additional reporting by Finland for the 
next meeting, which will assemble in 2008. Finland 
is expected to report there on i.a. the modiﬁcations 
made at Olkiluoto and Loviisa nuclear power 
plants, the re-licensing of the Loviisa plant and 
the construction of the new plant unit. In addition, 
some developing sectors of interest included the 
maintenance and development of nuclear-safety 
related know-how, ageing management for nuclear 
facilities, strengthening of safety culture, a qualiﬁ-
cation system for non-destructive testing methods 
and the development of risk-informed regulation.
The improvement of Convention-related pro-
cedures was widely discussed. Procedures were 
agreed upon that aim to improve the efﬁciency of 
the review meetings.
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent 
Fuel Management and on the Safety 
of Radioactive Waste Management
The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management requires the sumbission, 
every three years, of a report addressing the me-
asures taken to implement the obligations of the 
Convention. STUK drew up Finland’s second na-
tional report, which was submitted to the IAEA, ac-
ting as the Convention’s secretariat, in October as 
agreed (STUK-B-YTO 243). The ﬁrst corresponding 
report was made in 2003. The second report will be 
reviewed at an international review meeting of the 
Contracting Parties in Vienna in spring 2006.
10.2 Co-operation in international 
organisations and bilateral co-operation
Co-operation with the IAEA
The IAEA continued revision of its nuclear safety 
guidelines (formerly Nuclear Safety Series NUSS). 
STUK prepared for the IAEA statements on draft 
guidelines requested from Finland. It also cont-
ributed to the work of teams preparing the draft 
guidelines. A representative of STUK continued 
as chairman of the NUSSC (nuclear safety) com-
mittee. In addition, STUK’s representatives were 
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active in the WASSC (waste safety), TRANSSC 
(transport safety) and RASSC (radiation safety) 
committees.
STUK was Finland’s liaison organisation for the 
below information exchange systems for nuclear 
facilities maintained by the IAEA:
• Incident Reporting System (IRS)
• Incident Reporting System for Research Reac-
tors (IRSRR)
• International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)
• Power Reactor Information System (PRIS)
• Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System 
(NFCIS)
• Net enabled Waste Management Database 
(NEWMDB)
• Directory for Radioactively Contaminated Sites 
(DRCS)
• Illicit Trafﬁcing Database (ITDB)
• Events that have arisen during the Transport of 
Radioactive Material (EVTRAM).
The Director General of STUK was the Vice 
Chairman of the International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group INSAG. The Group provides in-
formation and advice in nuclear safety issues to 
the Director General of the IAEA and gives recom-
mendations for safety improvements in the IAEA 
member countries.
The IAEA safeguards support programme, 
launched in 1988, continued. It is ﬁnanced by the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, STUK being respon-
sible for co-ordination and project implementa-
tion. The objective is development of the IAEA’s 
veriﬁcation methods, training of inspectors and 
provision of expert assistance. The most important 
project was the organising in Finland of two trai-
ning courses relating to the implementation of the 
Additional Protocol.
In IAEA expert capacity, a STUK representati-
ve participated in the development of the nuclear 
power plant safety performance indicator system 
intended for use by nuclear safety authorities.
A STUK representative participated in IAEA 
expert capacity in a team whose task was to create 
a system for the Incident and Emergency Center 
(IEC) to process incident information submitted 
via multiple channels (NEWS, ENAC, ITDB, the 
media).
Co-operation with the OECD/NEA
STUK was represented in all of the OECD’s main 
committees dealing with radiation and nuclear sa-
fety. The main committees are as follows
• Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installa-
tions (CSNI)
• Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities 
(CNRA
• Committee on Radiation Protection and Public 
Health (CRPPH), and
• Radioactive Waste Management Committee 
(RWMC).
STUK’s Director General acted as chairman of the 
CNRA.
STUK took part in the work of the below CNRA 
and CSNI Working Groups
• Working Group on Inspection Practices (WGIP)
• Task Group on Regulatory Effectiveness Indica-
tors (/TGRE) and Task Group on Safety Perfor-
mance Indicators (Joint CNRA/CNSI/TGSPI)
• Working Group on Public Communication of 
Regulatory Organisations
• Working Group on Operating Experience 
(WGOE)
The CSNI Working Groups’ ﬁelds of activity were 
as follows
• Working Group on Operating Experience 
(WGOE)
• Working Group on Integrity of Components and 
Structures (IAGE)
• Working Group on Accident and Analysis 
(GAMA)
• Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK)
• Special Expert Group on Human and Organisa-
tional Factors (SEGHOF)
• Special Expert Group on Fuel Safety Margins 
(SEGFSM).
STUK participated in the work of the RWMC’s 
Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC).
Co-operation with the EU
Upon the request of the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, STUK participated in the work of the 
Working Party on Nuclear Safety (WPNS). Its task 
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is to formulate a comment to the Working Party 
on Atomic Questions and, further, to the Council 
of the European Union. This is a follow-up task, 
which the Council called for when aborting the 
handling of the nuclear safety package proposed by 
the European Commission. The work will continue 
until the end of 2006.
STUK contributed to regulatory co-operation 
within the EU through the Nuclear Regulators 
Working Group (NRWG) and Concertation on 
European Regulatory Tasks (CONCERT). The 
European Commission abolished both working 
groups in 2005. It has plans to establish new wor-
king groups in 2006. STUK took part in the opera-
tion of an NRWG working group on safety-critical 
software, which continues its work within the 
framework of WENRA. The group gathers views 
common to EU authorities on what is required of 
safety-critical software.
STUK contributed to the work of the advisory 
Expert Group A31 of the European Commission. 
It’s main tasks pertain to radiation protection re-
gulations.
An expert from STUK participated in the work 
of the Commission’s permanent working group on 
the transport on radioactive materials.
The renewal of the European Commission’s 
Safeguards began ﬁve years ago. A team of exter-
nal experts gave a recommendation for its reorga-
nisation. The objective was to renew the safeguards 
activities such that the effects on the Euratom 
safeguards of the EU’s enlargement and of the 
developments that have taken place in the nuclear 
ﬁeld, considering technological developments, are 
taken into account. A secondary objective was to 
make it compatible with the Commission’s nuclear 
material safeguards to better serve the IAEA’s 
strengthened safeguards. In 2005 the Commission 
presented the Member States with new safeguards 
models. An important task during Great Britain’s 
EU chairmanship was to enhance the implemen-
tation of the Euratom Safeguards New Approach. 
The matter was discussed in the Atomic Questions 
Group (AQG) of the Council of the European Union 
and at a meeting of experts in London, which was 
summoned by Great Britain. An expert from STUK 
participated in the aforementioned meetings. In 
December the AQG prepared the document “New 
Framework for Euratom Safeguards”, based on 
which reorganisation of the Commission’s nuclear 
material safeguards continues at AQG expert mee-
tings.
In the ﬁeld of nuclear material safeguards, 
STUK participated in the activities of the European 
Safeguards R&D Association (ESARDA). ESARDA’s 
task is to promote and harmonise European R&D 
in safeguards control. ESARDA offers a forum for 
an exchange of information and ideas to authori-
ties, researchers and nuclear facility operators.
STUK participated in EU-ﬁnanced Phare and 
Tacis co-operation in support of East European 
regulatory organisations and their support or-
ganisations. The co-operation covered participa-
tion in the activities of the Regulatory Assistance 
Management Group (RAMG) and in several in-
dividual projects the beneﬁciaries of which were 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Rumania, Hungary, 
Ukraine and Russia. The European Commission 
was the beneﬁciary in a couple of projects.
NKS co-operation
The 4-year research programme of NKS, Nordic co-
operation in nuclear safety, commenced in 2002. It 
is divided into two sub-areas headed by programme 
managers: reactor safety, and emergency prepared-
ness and environmental safety. STUK’s represen-
tatives participated in the programme’s sub-area 
of reactor safety and in the work of the programme 
on emergency preparedness and environmental sa-
fety. In addition, STUK has a representative in the 
NKS steering committee.
The project entity on reactor safety contains 
projects relating to Finland’s publicly ﬁnanced 
SAFIR research programme. The emergency pre-
paredness and environmental safety programme 
includes focus areas important to Finland such as 
development of information management and com-
munication during emergencies.
The entire programme content serves well co-
operation between the Nordic authorities, which is 
a permanent objective of NKS co-operation.
Bilateral co-operation
A representative from STUK was a member of the 
Reactor Safety Committee assisting the Swedish 
Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). A representa-
tive of SKI was an invited expert in the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Safety that functions in con-
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junction with STUK. Co-operation with SKI conti-
nued, with regular meetings during which current 
questions of nuclear safety regulation, waste ma-
nagement and nuclear material safeguards were 
discussed. Information exchange with the Swedish 
Radiation Safety Authority (SSI) continued as re-
gards individual occupational radiation doses to 
Finns who had worked at nuclear power plants in 
Sweden and to Swedes who had worked at Finnish 
plants.
STUK’s Director General was chairman of a 
nuclear safety committee that supports the organi-
sation conducting regulatory activities in Belgium 
and participated as a permanent member in the 
work of the advisory committee of the Lithuanian 
nuclear regulatory authority.
STUK’s co-operation with the USNRC focused 
on information exchange in nuclear safety mat-
ters of interest to both parties. A representative 
of STUK worked six months as a visiting expert 
at the USNRC. STUK participated in meetings 
on LOCA tests organised by the USNRC at the 
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL).
STUK’s representative was a member of the 
Groupe Permanent des Reacteurs (GPR), a per-
manent adviser to the French nuclear safety aut-
hority Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire (ASN). Of the 
considerable number of GPR meetings, STUK’s 
representative participated in those dealing with 
EPR plant design. The information exchange is 
bidirectional: Finland utilises French analyses to 
the approppriate extent and, at the same time, 
information about Finnish analyses and actions 
thereupon are imparted to France.
STUK co-operated with French authorities in 
the regulation of the design and construction of 
the new plant project. At meetings, information 
was exchanged about design solutions, construc-
tion status, construction oversight, environmental 
qualiﬁcation of componenets and aircraft impact 
analyses.
Co-operation between STUK and the Russian 
nuclear safety authority Federal Service for 
Ecological, Technological and Atomic Supervision 
(formerly Gosatomnadzor GAN) in nuclear mate-
rial and waste control continued, based on a co-ope-
ration arrangement signed in 1998. A speciﬁc item 
of co-operation was the development of regulatory 
guides for oversight of radioactive substances and 
sources. Representatives of Finland’s Ministry of 
Transport and Communications participated in 
discussions on the implementation of regulations 
on the transport of nuclear and radioactive mate-
rials. The guidelines on the quality control of the 
manufacturing of MOX nuclear fuel were the topic 
of a seminar in 2005. The assembling of a spent 
nuclear fuel measurement device, which was de-
signed during the project of co-operation, began at 
STUK. The Russian authority and representatives 
of Rosenergoatom familiarised themselves with the 
progress of the project during a visit to STUK.
Safeguards co-operation between STUK and 
the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation 
Ofﬁce (ASNO) continued. According to agreed prac-
tice, STUK provided ASNO with information on 
nuclear materials of Australian origin imported to 
Finland.
Other forms of co-operation
STUK participated in the work of the Western 
European Nuclear Regulators’ Association 
(WENRA). In 2000, a working group on harmoni-
sation was set up to develop a method of drawing 
up uniform nuclear safety requirements. In accor-
dance with the recommendations of the working 
group’s ﬁnal report, an extensive nuclear safety 
requirements and nuclear waste management de-
velopment project was commenced in early 2003. 
It formulated nuclear safety requirements for 17 
safety areas and the status of two areas of nuclear 
waste management in the 15 participating count-
ries. STUK contributed actively to the harmonisa-
tion project and its work meetings to put the ﬁnis-
hing touches to these European reference requi-
rements and to review member state self-assess-
ments evaluating coverage of national regulations 
against the reference level and the implementation 
of the requirements in practice. The ﬁnal report 
on the work done on nuclear safety requirements 
was completed in November. STUK participated 
in WENRA’s decommissioning and nuclear waste 
working group, which put out draft safety require-
ments for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities 
and the storage of nuclear waste.
The working group on risk asessment set up 
by the VVER Regulators Forum in 2002 held its 
last project meeting in Bratislava. The working 
group consists of national nuclear safety regula-
tors from countries operating VVER facilities. It 
compared the results of PSAs for VVER facilities, 
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the modelling and results of the loss of offsite grid 
and a small LOCA, and analysed the causes of the 
differences found. It drew up a report on the risk-
informed regulation and management of VVER 
facilities. The participants drew up a summary 
report on PSA-based modiﬁcations made to VVER 
facilities. It prepared a ﬁnal report and the results 
were presented at a VVER Regulators Forum mee-
ting in Finland. The Forum further gave it the task 
to continue the making of comparisons for other 
initital events and of looking into the causes of the 
differences found between analyses. The new pro-
ject lasts for three years. In 2004, a VVER working 
group was set up to look into the utilisation of les-
sons learned from nuclear power plant operational 
experience feedback. An I&C working group began 
work with the objective of drawing up, over the 
next three years, a report on experiences gained 
from I&C modernisation implemented by program-
mable technology.
STUK participated in the work of the Network 
of Regulators of Small Nuclear Programs (NERS). 
It is a channel via which information about the 
ways of action and experiences of colleagues wor-
king on similar-sized nuclear energy programmes 
can be exchanged. Nuclear safety authorities from 
eight European countries, Argentina, South Africa 
and Pakistan participate in the co-operation. The 
licensing of new nuclear power plants, the utilisa-
tion of operational experiences and safety analyses 
as well as quality management and safety culture 
were addressed among others.
As regards physical protection in the nuclear 
ﬁeld, STUK has participated in the work of the 
European Nuclear Security Regulators Association 
(ENSRA) and that of the Nordic Fysiskt skydd i 
Nordisk kärnteknisk verksamhet (NORDFYS).
STUK contributed to the work of the Nordic 
working group on transport (NORTRAM).
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11 The advisory committee 
on nuclear safety
Pekka Salminen
In accordance with section 56 of the Nuclear 
Energy Act (990/1987), the preliminary prepara-
tion of matters relating to the safe use of nuclear 
energy is vested with the Advisory Committee on 
Nuclear Safety. It is appointed by the Government 
and functions in conjunction with STUK. Its term 
of ofﬁce is three years. The Committee was ap-
pointed on 10 September 2003 and its term of ofﬁce 
ends on 9 September 2006.
The Committee’s Chairman was Professor 
Pentti Lautala (Tampere University of Technology) 
and its Vice-Chairman was Head of Research 
Rauno Rintamaa (VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland). The members were Professor 
Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki (Lappeenranta Technical 
University), Director Ulla Koivusaari (Pirkanmaa 
Regional Environment Centre), Development 
Director Timo Okkonen (INSPECTA OY), Senior 
Researcher Ilona Lindholm (VTT) and Branch 
Manager Runar Blomqvist (the Geological Survey 
of Finland). Professor Jukka Laaksonen, Director 
General of STUK, was a permanent expert to the 
Committee. Invited experts were Dr Antti Vuorinen 
and Director Christer Viktorsson (the Swedish 
Nuclear Power Inspectorate). Director Christer 
Viktorsson left the Committee for the IAEA.
The Committee convened nine times. It prepa-
red statements to STUK on i.a. the construction 
licence application for the new nuclear power plant 
unit and on two YVL guides under revision. The 
preparation of statements on seven other draft 
YVL guides was started. The Committee gave a sta-
tement on a draft prepared by STUK for a national 
report about the implementation of the obligations 
of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management.
The Committee followed regularly the progress 
of the construction of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit 
and operating events at the operating nuclear faci-
lities and participated, together with the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Energy, in the organising 
of the annual nuclear energy seminar. It convened 
once at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant, speci-
ﬁcally acquainting itself with the new plant unit 
under construction.
The Committee has three divisions for pre-
paratory work: a Reactor Safety Division, a 
Nuclear Waste Division as well as an Emergency 
Preparedness and Nuclear Material Division. In 
addition to the Committee members proper, dis-
tinguished experts from various ﬁelds have been 
invited to the Divisions. Four Division meetings 
were held.
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Summary of the results of STUK’s 
safety performance indicators
Background and purpose
The overall assessment of nuclear power plant 
safety by inspection and safety reviews is comple-
mented by the STUK indicator system. The system 
indicators can be used to illustrate that certain 
safety factors under scrutiny have remained at 
a desired level, or to gain insight into their pos-
sible changes and trends in the short and long 
run. Declining trends indicate a possible need to 
enhance the performance and organisational op-
eration of the plants and STUK’s regulatory effort 
in those areas. Even the effectiveness of any correc-
tive actions commenced based on indicator results 
can be monitored by means of these indicators.
No speciﬁc action or threshold limits have been 
deﬁned for the indicators. Rather, the aim is to 
recognise trends in the safety-signiﬁcant functions 
of a nuclear power plant or STUK as early as pos-
sible. The limit values set in the legislation, in the 
YVL guides and in the Technical Speciﬁcations 
(Tech Specs), as well as the target values contained 
in the objectives of the department of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation (NRR), will be applied where 
available.
STUK’s indicator system is divided into two 
principal groups: external indicators for the safety 
of nuclear facilities and internal indicators for the 
regulatory effort. External nuclear plant safety in-
dicators are divided into three principal subgroups: 
safety and quality culture; operational events; 
and structural integrity. These principal subgroups 
have a total of 14 indicator areas having 51 speciﬁc 
indicators.
Guide YTV 1.4, “Calculation, assessment and 
utilisation of the NRR indicators”, in the NRR 
Quality Manual deﬁnes the responsibilities and 
procedures for data collection and calculating in-
dicators for the NRR; and for assessing, reporting 
and utilising their values. Appendix 1 to the guide 
describes the NRR’s external indicators (indicators 
for safety of nuclear facilities), their deﬁnitions 
and data acquisition, the person responsible for 
the updating of each indicator (person in charge of 
indicator), and the person who maintains the indi-
cator system (administrator). Indicator deﬁnitions, 
graphs and results interpretation can be found at 
the NRR site on STUK’s intranet.
The STUK indicators were included in the 
revised strategy of early 2003. Of the indicators 
describing the effectiveness of STUK’s activities, 
the following apply to the NRR: occupational do-
ses, radioactive releases from nuclear facilities 
and the resultant population exposure in the vi-
cinity of the plants, safety-endangering events at 
nuclear facilities, condition of components relevant 
to the accident risk of nuclear facilities, updating 
of YVL guides, customer satisfaction and number 
of complaints. The last three indicators describe 
NRR’s own activities and are incorporated in the 
indicator area for regulatory activities. Indicators 
for plant safety, incorporated in the STUK strategy, 
have quantitative limits contained in the regula-
tions or NRR’s own objectives.
All of the nuclear plant safety indicators are 
considered to describe and measure the effective-
ness of NRR’s activities. Their values are updated 
quarterly and any deviations and their causes 
are either immediately tracked down by the res-
ponsible persons or considered more widely at 
departmental or oversight meetings. The develop-
ment trends of indicators and indicator areas are 
assessed in the annual summary. The summary is 
utilised in conjunction with other assessments and 
inspection observations in the overall assessment 
of nuclear plant safety conducted by STUK. The 
annual summary of the indicators is attached to 
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the annual report on regulatory control of nuclear 
safety submitted to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry.
Indicator results for 2005
Safety and quality culture
The indicators in this area illustrate the conditi-
on of the plant and the success of the operations 
of the various organisational units (maintenance, 
operation, radiation protection, etc.) participating 
in plant operation. Compliance with the Tech Specs 
is monitored, as well as identiﬁed needs for devia-
ting from the Tech Specs. The area also includes an 
indicator for monitoring the updating of principal 
documents after plant modiﬁcations, as well as an 
indicator for monitoring the relative ﬂuctuations 
of investments used for plant maintenance and 
renovation.
Maintenance activities were evaluated by plant 
unit concerning the yearly volume of maintenan-
ce works, the volume of preventive maintenance 
and failure repairs of Tech Spec components, and 
on the basis of the volume of repair works during 
power operation, the average time spent on failure 
repairs and the production losses caused by fai-
lures. The unavailability of systems required for 
accomplishing the critical safety functions is also 
monitored.
In Loviisa the total volume of the yearly main-
tenance works of Tech Spec components, including 
both failure repairs and preventive maintenance, 
has been increasing in the last few years. In 2005 
the volume of failure repairs was at the level achie-
ved a few years previously and is still increasing 
slightly. The volume of preventive maintenance 
was below the previous year’s volume, which was 
signiﬁcantly high. In 2005 the ratio of preven-
tive maintenance to failure repairs at Loviisa 2 
remained well below one (0.79). The volume of 
preventive maintenance at the plant is affected 
by preventive maintenance works determined by 
the length of the annual maintenance outage. The 
volume of preventive maintenance has decreased 
in the long-term as planned. Evaluation and de-
velopment of preventive maintenance will also 
continue in the future. There will be changes due 
to, for example, adopted condition monitoring me-
asurement methods.
The volume of failure repairs during power 
operation at Loviisa plant has increased slightly 
in the last few years. The marked increase in the 
number of failures since 2002 cannot be attributed 
to a single straightforward reason. One factor may 
be the revised work recording procedure. However, 
the number of failures has shown similar variation 
in the long term. The number of failures causing an 
operation restriction while isolating the component 
for repair work showed an increase in 2005.
The average repair time of Tech Spec compo-
nents has varied over the years from one day (24 
hours) to over two days (over 48 hours) at the 
Loviisa plant units. The average repair time at 
Loviisa decreased for the second successive year to 
just over 32 hours in 2005, which may indicate an 
enhanced maintenance function. Since there is no 
data available on which failure types were domi-
nant, it is not easy to draw any conclusions.
The total yearly volume of maintenance works 
of Tech Spec components at the Olkiluoto plant 
has been increasing for the past two years, which 
is partly caused by the increase in preventive 
maintenance works. The distribution of preventive 
maintenance between plant units is determined by 
the length of the annual maintenance outages. The 
volume of preventive maintenance at Olkiluoto 2 
was considerable in 2005, since turbine plant mo-
diﬁcations were carried out at the plant during the 
long annual maintenance outage. The volume of 
failure repairs decreased slightly from the previous 
year.
The volume of failures during power operation 
causing an operation restriction at the Olkiluoto 
plant has been on the increase for the past few 
years. In 2005 their number decreased markedly 
compared with the two previous years. The dec-
rease may be partially attributed to the long main-
tenance outage at Olkiluoto 2 and the repairs and 
preventive maintenance carried out during the ou-
tage. The number of failures causing an immediate 
operation restriction at Olkiluoto 2 exceeded the 
number of failures causing an operation restriction 
when isolating the component for repair work.
Over the years the average repair time of fai-
lures of Tech Spec components has varied from 
four to twelve hours at the Olkiluoto plant units. 
The average repair time at the Olkiluoto plant 
showed an increase for the second successive year, 
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standing at some 8 hours in 2005. An assessment 
of the situation would require detailed information 
on the type of failures for any conclusions to be 
drawn concerning the efﬁciency of the maintenan-
ce function. The average repair time is still short, 
however, and thus no action is necessary.
Production losses due to failures at the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto plants remained relatively small in 
2005. At Loviisa 1 production losses were slightly 
higher than in 2003 or 2004, although still low. 
Losses were caused by failures in single indepen-
dent equipment and systems that were not excep-
tional. The heaviest production loss of just under 
1% occurred at Loviisa 1, as one of the generators 
tripped out of service due to an earth fault signal 
in the stator. At Olkiluoto, production losses due 
to failures at both plant units have decreased 
considerably compared with recent years to only 
some hundredths of a per cent in 2005. This is 
a successful result, considering that the annual 
maintenance of Olkiluoto 2 included considerable 
modiﬁcations which may cause new failures in the 
initial stages of operation.
The unavailability of safety systems was follo-
wed by means of international indices provided by 
the licensees. The high pressure safety injection 
system, the auxiliary feed water system and the 
back-up diesel generators were monitored at the 
Loviisa power plant; Olkiluoto monitored the con-
tainment spray system, the auxiliary feed water 
system and the back-up diesel generators. At the 
Loviisa plant units the safety system unavailabili-
ty values decreased or remained low for all systems 
monitored. The latent failures in the auxiliary feed 
water system nevertheless emerged as events as-
signed in the middle category of risk-signiﬁcance.
Containment spray system unavailability at 
the Olkiluoto plant decreased from the previous 
year’s level at Olkiluoto 2, but increased by one 
order of magnitude at Olkiluoto 1. The unavailabi-
lity index for the auxiliary feed water system rose 
from the extremely low ﬁgures in 2004 to a normal 
low level at both plant units in Olkiluoto. Back-up 
diesel unavailability fell by almost 50% compared 
with 2004. In 2005 diesel availability corresponded 
to the long-term average. Factors contributing to 
the increase in safety system unavailability at the 
Olkiluoto plant units in 2005 are not yet known. 
Latent failures contributing to safety system una-
vailability were dominant in events assigned in the 
middle category of risk-signiﬁcance.
There were four plant conditions in non-comp-
liance with the Technical Speciﬁcations in 2005, all 
of which occurred at the Olkiluoto plant. Thus the 
number of non-compliances with the Tech Specs 
at the plant is on the increase; on the other hand, 
two of the non-compliances were long-term events, 
which were only now detected due to conscious 
action. Two non-compliances with the Tech Specs 
occurred during annual maintenance. At Olkiluoto 
1 it was noted that since the 1998 maintenance 
outage, it had been necessary to lift the reactor 
pressure vessel head above the maximum lifting 
height allowed in the Tech Specs. A non-complian-
ce with the Tech Specs also occurred in connection 
with the modiﬁcation work (REMES work) during 
the annual maintenance outage of Olkiluoto 2 as 
there was a power failure in the diesel-backed 
busbar and the back-up diesel failed to start due 
to simultaneous testing. The longer-term situati-
on concerned the failure to carry out the weekly 
schedules tests of the diesel room carbon dioxi-
de ﬁre suppression system, also since 1998. The 
fourth non-compliance with the Tech Specs occur-
red at both plant units when the intake air opening 
above the entrance to the diesel generator room 
was blocked in connection with the replacement of 
the entrance doors.
The Olkiluoto power plant found it necessary to 
deviate in a planned manner from the Tech Specs 
nine times. The number of the deviations is the 
same as the previous year. Four of the exemptions 
concerned deviations caused by plant modiﬁcations 
or renovations and two installations related to 
the construction of the new plant. The most risk-
signiﬁcant events at both plant units at Olkiluoto 
concerned the repair of the suction channels of the 
service water system carried out under exemption 
to the Tech Specs.
At the Loviisa plant there were no events in 
2005 causing the plant units to be in non-comp-
liance with the Tech Specs. The need for the Loviisa 
power plant to deviate from the Tech Specs in a 
controlled manner showed a further decline com-
pared with 2004. The seven exemptions granted 
to the Loviisa plant were, for the most part, con-
cerned with the need to deviate from the Tech 
Specs caused by modiﬁcations and renovations. At 
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Loviisa, the most risk-signiﬁcant event concerned 
the transfer of the air condenser, which was part 
of the air cooling system covering the I&C building 
test facilities and main control room at Loviisa 1; 
the transfer was carried out under an exemption 
granted by STUK. The exemptions granted did not 
warrant re-evaluation of the Tech Specs.
The indicator describing the currency of plant 
documentation shows the document revisions, 
which relate to safety-signiﬁcant or extensive mo-
diﬁcations carried out in the 2005 annual mainte-
nances of Loviisa and Olkiluoto, and which must 
be implemented before the plant is started up after 
the annual maintenance in question. After the 
plant modiﬁcations carried out in the annual main-
tenance, the plant documentation at Olkiluoto 
2 had been relatively successfully updated with 
regard to all documents that had to be updated by 
the start-up. Deﬁciencies were observed concerning 
updating of diagrams. There was no signiﬁcant 
modiﬁcation work at Olkiluoto 1 in 2005. At the 
Loviisa plant there were no signiﬁcant modiﬁca-
tions requiring monitoring.
The plant units’ safety performance indicator 
for investments in improvements and modiﬁcations 
indicates relative ﬂuctuations in investments. The 
amounts given in Euro are the utilities’ conﬁden-
tial information, and not to be published here. This 
safety performance indicator was included in the 
STUK indicator system in 2000 to indicate the po-
tential effect of deregulated electricity markets on 
investment. The ﬂuctuation in the indicator clearly 
shows the investments made in 1997–2000 in the 
plants’ power upgrades and modernisation pro-
jects. The investments of 2005 indicate the decrea-
sing trend at the Loviisa plant and the increasing 
trend at the Olkiluoto plant. The main investments 
at the Loviisa plant during the past couple of years 
have included provisions for severe reactor acci-
dents and the modernisation of the turbine. The 
most signiﬁcant current plant modiﬁcation project 
at Loviisa concerns the upgrading of the plant 
units’ I&C systems. One of the main investments 
made at the Olkiluoto plant in the past few years 
was the turbine plant upgading project, which also 
included replacement of the steam dryers.
STUK works to affect, both directly and in-
directly, the radiation doses for nuclear power 
plant workers and the calculated radiation expos-
ure for the surrounding population arising from 
releases. This involves low radioactive releases 
into the environment which remain clearly below 
the set limits. The indicators followed in the area 
of radiation protection are collective radiation ex-
posure of employees the average of the ten highest 
yearly radiation exposures and compliance with 
the YVL Guide’s calculatory threshold. Other in-
dicators followed include radioactive releases into 
the sea and the atmosphere from the plant, and the 
calculated dose due to releases to the most exposed 
individual in the vicinity of the plant.
Releases into the air and water at the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto plants remained low in 2005, as 
did the calculated radiation dose for the most ex-
posed individuals in the population surrounding 
the plants. Releases of iodine and aerosols into 
the atmosphere indicated a small increase at the 
Olkiluoto plant. Releases into the sea at Loviisa 
fell somewhat compared with the previous year 
since the plant released low-activity evaporation 
residues into the sea as controlled liquid dischar-
ges. Releases into the sea from the Olkiluoto plant 
have reduced since the plant commissioned new 
process water puriﬁcation and treatment equip-
ment.
The individual occupational doses were below 
the limits set for nuclear power plant workers at 
the Olkiluoto and Loviisa plants. The collective ra-
diation dose at the Olkiluoto plant was higher than 
in the previous years due to the long repair and 
maintenance outage at Olkiluoto 2. At Loviisa the 
collective radiation dose from the plant was lower 
than in the previous year. However, the collective 
dose remained above the calculatory reporting 
threshold conﬁned to net electric power speciﬁed 
in the Guide YVL 7.9, which was further affected 
by the dose accumulated during the long annual 
maintenance outage of Loviisa 1 in 2004.
Operational events
The indicators of this area monitor the volume and 
risk-signiﬁcance of operational events reported in 
accordance with Guide YVL 1.5. Reports are classi-
ﬁed according to the nature of events or signiﬁcan-
ce for nuclear safety, as well as immediate reasons. 
The risk indicators in the area monitor the risk-
signiﬁcance of component unavailability and to 
gain insight into the operation of the plant and the 
success of the operational experience feedback. A 
review of the area indicators jointly with the pre-
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vious area’s indicators, such as non-compliances 
with the Tech Specs, safety system unavailability, 
failures of Tech Spec components and production 
losses from failures, provides more information on 
the signiﬁcance of related planned and unplanned 
component unavailabilities.
The numbers of operational events at the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto power plants in 2005 were 
at the average level of the past few years. Nine 
events occurred at the Loviisa power plant for 
which the plant submitted an operational event 
report. Operational transients were typically due 
to disturbances in the operation of the reactor coo-
lant pumps. One event warranting a special report 
occurred at the Loviisa plant, which was related 
to the emergency standby due to high seawater le-
vels. Deﬁciencies in the operation of the Olkiluoto 
plant appear as the main causes for events war-
ranting a special report. There were six events 
warranting a special report at Olkiluoto. The plant 
also submitted six operational transient reports. 
The immediate causes of the 12 events at Olkiluoto 
focus on errors in plant operation. Only one event 
was caused by technical failure.
The effect of the unavailability of safety sys-
tems, or their subsystems, caused by component 
failures, preventive maintenance and exemptions 
from Tec Specs on annual accident risk exceeded 
the 5% target value set by STUK at both Olkiluoto 
plant units. This was partly due to planned, one-
off maintenance operations executed under an 
exemption granted by STUK, and partly to latent 
component failures in the safety systems and back-
up diesel generator system. No special action by 
STUK was required.
New safety performance indicators were intro-
duced in 2003 to represent the risk-importance of 
events. For this, the events are divided into three 
groups: 1) unavailabilities due to component fai-
lures, 2) planned unavailabilities and 3) initiating 
events. The events in each group have been further 
divided by their risk-signiﬁcance into three cate-
gories, and the indicator is the number of events 
falling into each category. The events analysed for 
2005 are considered part of normal nuclear power 
plant operation and no further measures were re-
quired from STUK.
The numbers of risk-signiﬁcant events showed 
a decrease from the previous year at both Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto. The most signiﬁcant events at both 
plants were related to modiﬁcations or renovations 
carried out under exemption from the Tech Specs. 
The most signiﬁcant event at Loviisa was the 
transfer of the air condenser, which was part of the 
air cooling system covering the control room buil-
ding test facilities and the main control room, from 
its place near the turbine hall wall to the roof of 
the turbine hall. The transfer was necessitated by 
the construction of the I&C buildings. Other events 
at Loviisa were related to latent failures in the 
secondary service water system at Loviisa 1 and 
the auxiliary feed water system at Loviisa 2. Four 
events of the highest risk category occurred at the 
Loviisa power plant; at Loviisa 1, the events were 
planned component unavailabilities and at Loviisa 
2 unavailabilities due to failures.
At Olkiluoto the most signiﬁcant events for 
both units were related to the repairs to the sucti-
on channels of the service water system under an 
exemption order from STUK. Other events at the 
Olkiluoto plant were related to latent failures in 
the containment spray system, auxiliary feed water 
system and back-up diesel generators. There were 
six events of the highest risk category at Olkiluoto, 
four of which were caused by failures and two were 
planned unavailabilities.
The number of events falling into the middle 
category of risk-signiﬁcance was higher than the 
previous year at Loviisa: thirteen events which 
were unavailabilities due to component failure. 
At Olkiluoto the number was at the level of the 
previous year: twenty-three events. The Olkiluoto 
events were mostly due to planned unavailabili-
ties, including component isolations executed un-
der exemption from the Tech Specs and preventive 
maintenance. The events were relatively evenly 
divided between the plant units.
The number of analysed events falling into the 
least risk-signiﬁcant category increased in 2004 as 
there was a shift in the reporting towards a policy 
in accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 (the unavaila-
bilities of all Tech Spec components are presented 
in monthly or quarterly reports). The number of 
events falling into this category decreased from the 
previous year at both Loviisa plant units; in 2005, 
there were a total of 166 events. The number of 
events falling into this category is on the increase 
at Olkiluoto; in 2005 there were 189 events in to-
tal. At Loviisa the events were mostly caused by 
failures, and at Olkiluoto either planned unavai-
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labilities or caused by failures. The kind of events 
analysed now were partly eliminated from the 
analysis before 2004.
No ﬁres occurred at either plant in 2005. The 
automatic ﬁre detectors were replaced at Loviisa 
in 2000 and at Olkiluoto in 2001. The numbers of 
alarms increased at both units thereafter becau-
se of more sensitive equipment and equipment 
failures. The marked reduction in the number of 
alarms at the Loviisa plant since 2003 and at the 
Olkiluoto plant since 2004 is due to pre-alarms 
no longer being included in the calculations. After 
the modiﬁcation the number of alarms caused by 
component failure decreased signiﬁcantly at both 
plants: There were no alarms caused by component 
failure at Olkiluoto in 2005, and only six alarms at 
Loviisa. The number of actual detector alarms also 
decreased at Loviisa in 2005 to only 18 alarms. At 
the Olkiluoto plant the number of actual detector 
alarms has been steadily increasing for several 
years. In 2005 the number was 74, which is twice 
as high as the level prior to the system upgra-
de. Alarms triggered by dust, smoke or humidi-
ty dominated the automatic ﬁre detector alarms 
at both plants in 2005. A signiﬁcant number of 
alarms triggered by sprinkler leakage occurred 
at Olkiluoto, which in part explains the growing 
trend of true detector alarms compared with the 
previous year.
Structural integrity
In the safety performance indicator area, the leak-
tightness of multiple barriers (fuel, primary cir-
cuit, secondary circuit, containment) is monitored. 
The objective is that leaktightness complies with 
the requirements and deteriorating trends are not 
allowed, as assessed according to STUK’s safety 
performance indicators.
Based on the 2005 indicators, the limits set on 
barriers preventing the spread of radioactive re-
leases were not exceeded. There have been no fuel 
leaks at the Loviisa plant units for years now.
Minor fuel leakages have occurred every year at 
the Olkiluoto plant units. The development of the 
leakages has been monitored during power opera-
tion, and the leaking fuel bundles have been remo-
ved from use in the annual maintenance outage 
following the leak detection. The Olkiluoto 2 reac-
tor contained leaking fuel throughout 2005. The 
leaking fuel bundle, which was discovered in late 
August 2004, was removed from the reactor during 
the 2005 annual maintenance outage. Inspection 
revealed a thin sliver of metal in the bundle, which 
had caused the original fuel damage. Four months 
later secondary damage was detected in the lower 
half of the leaking fuel rod. Towards the end of 
the operating cycle the damage expanded into a 
transverse fracture of the rod. A new fuel leak was 
detected in late July 2005 following the annual 
maintenance. Following the discovery of the fo-
reign object and fuel leak, STUK required that the 
utility assess the clean installation instructions 
and procedures related to an open reactor and pri-
mary circuit.
Primary and secondary circuit integrity is mo-
nitored by international chemistry indices used 
by the utilities or by indices developed by the 
plants, and by the concentration levels of corrosive 
impurities and corrosion products. The chemistry 
indices indicated that process chemistry control 
had been successful at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
plant units in 2005. At Loviisa 2 the high value of 
the chemistry index in 2003 and 2004 was due to 
a seawater leak in a turbine condenser, which was 
also indicated by the chloride content of the steam 
generator’s blow-down. The leak was repaired in 
the annual maintenance outage in 2004, after 
which the indicator values were restored to pre-
leak level.
No signiﬁcant changes took place in the cobalt-
60 and iron contents of the primary coolant at 
the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units, or the iron 
content of the feed water of the Loviisa secondary 
circuit or Olkiluoto primary circuit during the mo-
nitoring period.
The chemistry index value of Olkiluoto 2 in the 
third and fourth quarters, which is higher than 
the target value, is due to a sulphate concentrati-
on higher than the target value. Since the power 
increase, both Olkiluoto plant units have had the 
problem of a sulphate content exceeding the reac-
tor water target value. After the system modiﬁca-
tions which lowered the temperature of cleaning 
the condensate, the sulphate concentration has 
remained below the target level (5 µg/l) at both 
plant units, except for brief minor exceedances. 
The index values being higher than the target va-
lue in the third quarter of 2004 is suspected to be 
due to a change in the quality of the ion-exchange 
resin. Exceedances of the sulphate concentration 
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target value in 2005 were due to the running times 
of many condensate cleaning ﬁlters being long. 
Following the replacement of the ion-exchange re-
sin of the ﬁlters, sulphate concentrations fell below 
the target value and the duration of the deviation 
did not exceed the limit of four days allowed in 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s instructions.
At the Olkiluoto plant, leakages from the pri-
mary circuit are monitored by operating cycle as 
well. During the operating cycle 2004-2005, the 
volume of identiﬁed leaks in the primary circuit 
was low at both Olkiluoto plant units. The volume 
of unidentiﬁed leaks was minimal at Olkiluoto 1 
but considerably higher than before at Olkiluoto 2, 
which was mainly due to a loose ﬂange joint in one 
vacuum breaker in the blow-out system (314).
Containment integrity has remained good at 
both Olkiluoto and Loviisa. The overall as-found 
leakage of the containment outer isolation valves 
was below the set limits. The overall as-found lea-
kage of outer isolation valves at both Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto decreased from the previous year.
In leakage testing, the largest single leak at the 
Olkiluoto plant units was through the inner main 
steam valve.
In both cases the leak was caused by a broken 
internal check valve.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leaktightness test at ﬁrst attempt has re-
mained high, and both Loviisa and Olkiluoto show 
an improvement from the previous year.
The overall as-found leakage of containment 
penetrations, which, at Loviisa, includes leaktight-
ness tests of the bellows seals of the personnel air-
lock, the emergency personnel airlock, the material 
airlock, the reactor pit, inward relief valves, cable 
penetrations, live steam system and feed water 
system has decreased at Loviisa 2 and is now small 
at both plant units. The overall as-found leakage 
rate of containment penetrations, which at the 
Olkiluoto plant includes leakages in the upper and 
lower personnel airlock, the maintenance dome 
and the containment dome, has been small.
Conclusions drawn from the 
results of the 2005 indicators
The data gathered from 2005 for nuclear plant 
safety indicators did not indicate such changes in 
individual indicators, indicator areas or the three 
main areas as would have warranted an imme-
diate reaction from STUK.
The requirements set for indicators of the ef-
fectiveness of STUK’s activities were fulﬁlled as 
regards individual occupational dose, radioactive 
releases and population exposure. The collective 
radiation dose for Loviisa 1 continued to exceed 
the calculatory reporting threshold conﬁned to net 
electric power speciﬁed in Guide YVL 7.9 due to 
the collective dose accumulated during the long 
repair and maintenance outage in 2004.
The releases of radioactive substances at the 
nuclear power plants were clearly below the set 
limits. Releases into the atmosphere and into 
the sea were small at both Loviisa and Olkiluoto. 
Releases of iodine and aerosols at Olkiluoto sho-
wed a very slight increase due to fuel leaks and the 
long repair and maintenance outage at Olkiluoto 
2. Releases into the sea at Loviisa fell somewhat 
from the previous year’s levels, since the plant had 
released low-activity evaporation residues into the 
sea as controlled liquid discharges in late 2004. 
Releases into the sea from the Olkiluoto plant have 
remained small since 2000, as the plant commissi-
oned new process water puriﬁcation and treatment 
equipment. The calculatory radiation dose for the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity of Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto was of the same magnitude as in the 
previous years and considerably below the limit set 
in the Government Resolution.
The plants were mainly used according to the 
Technical Speciﬁcations. Four situations in non-
compliance with the Tech Specs occurred at the 
Olkiluoto plant; thus, the improved trend of the 
previous year was not permanent. Two of the non-
compliances were long-term events which were 
only detected at this time due to conscious action. 
All of the deviations were related to the design 
of modiﬁcations or repairs and two to testing. No 
accidents occurred at the Loviisa plant that would 
have caused non-compliance with the Tech Specs.
The Olkiluoto plant found it necessary to 
deviate in a controlled manner from the Tech 
Specs nine times. This number is the same as the 
year before. Four exemptions were concerned with 
plant modiﬁcations or renovations and two with 
installations related to the construction of the new 
plant unit. The need for the Loviisa power plant to 
deviate from the Tech Specs in a controlled manner 
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showed a further decline compared with 2004. The 
seven exemptions granted were for the most part 
concerned with the need to deviate from the Tech 
Specs caused by modiﬁcations and renovations. 
The exemptions granted did not warrant re-evalu-
ation of the Tech Specs.
The most risk-signiﬁcant events were, at both 
plants, related modiﬁcations or renovations carried 
out under exemption from the Tech Specs. Other 
signiﬁcant events concerned latent failures in the 
secondary service water system (Loviisa 1) and 
auxiliary feed water system (Loviisa 2) and, at 
Olkiluoto, with latent failures in the containment 
spray system, auxiliary feed water system and 
back-up diesel generator system. The events analy-
sed for 2005 are considered part of normal nuclear 
power plant operation and no further measures 
were required from STUK.
The effect of unavailabilities caused by signiﬁ-
cant events on annual accident risk exceeded its 
5% target value at both plant units at Olkiluoto in 
2005. No special action by STUK was required.
No events endangering nuclear safety occurred 
at the nuclear facilities. An alert situation lasting 
over six years occurred at Loviisa in early January 
due to high seawater levels, of which the plant sub-
mitted a special report. The numbers of operational 
events at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto power plants 
in 2005 were at the average level of the past few 
years. The Olkiluoto power plant submitted twelve 
event reports in 2004, while the Loviisa plant sub-
mitted ten, including events warranting a special 
report. Technical failures were the determining 
causes of events at Loviisa in 2004. Deﬁciencies 
in the operation of the Olkiluoto plant appear as 
immediate causes of the events, focusing on errors 
in plant operation. Only one event was caused by 
technical failure. Due to the nature of the events 
warranting a special report, a total of six of which 
occurred at Olkiluoto in 2005, STUK has focused 
attention on the efﬁciency of operational experien-
ce feedback at the plant and the matter has been 
discussed by the utility and STUK.
Maintenance activities were reliable in 2005 
at both Loviisa and Olkiluoto, and there were no 
signs indicating a decline in the quality of mainte-
nance. Maintenance at Olkiluoto was more proac-
tive than the year before. The total yearly volume 
of maintenance work of Tech Spec components at 
the Loviisa plant, including both failure repairs 
and preventive maintenance, increased further, 
due to a gradually increasing trend in the volume 
of failure repairs. The volume of preventive main-
tenance works was smaller than the year before. 
At Loviisa 2 the ratio of preventive maintenance to 
failure repairs was remarkably low. The volume of 
preventive maintenance is affected by preventive 
maintenance works determined on the basis of 
annual maintenance outages; no changes are indi-
cated in these operations on the basis of component 
failure. The volume of preventive maintenance has 
decreased in the long-term, as planned. Evaluation 
and development of preventive maintenance will 
also continue in the future. There will be changes 
due to adopted condition monitoring measurement 
methods. The volume of failure repairs during po-
wer operation at Loviisa 2 has increased slightly 
in the last few years. The marked increase in the 
number of failures since 2002 cannot be attributed 
to one straightforward reason. One factor may be 
the revised work recording procedure. However, the 
number of failures has shown similar variation in 
the long term. In 2005 the number of failures cau-
sing an operation restriction only when isolating 
the component for repair work showed an increase. 
Production losses due to failures remained small. 
They were caused by failures of single independent 
equipment and systems. The average repair times 
of Tech Spec components at Loviisa showed a dec-
rease for the second consecutive year, which may 
indicate an enhanced maintenance function. Since 
there is no data available on the failure types, it is 
not easy to draw any conclusions.
The total yearly volume of maintenance work of 
Tech Spec components at the Olkiluoto plant sho-
wed an increase, which is partly caused by the in-
crease in preventive maintenance operations. The 
distribution of preventive maintenance between 
plant units is determined by the length of the an-
nual maintenance outages. The volume of preven-
tive maintenance at Olkiluoto 2 was considerable 
in 2005, since turbine plant modiﬁcations were 
carried out at the plant during the long annual 
maintenance outage. The volume of failure repairs 
decreased slightly from the previous year. The 
volume of failures causing an operation restricti-
on during power operation showed a signiﬁcant 
decrease compared with the past two years. The 
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decrease may be partially attributed to the long 
maintenance outage at Olkiluoto 2 and the repairs 
and preventive maintenance carried out during 
the outage. The number of failures causing an im-
mediate operation restriction at Olkiluoto 2 excee-
ded the number of failures causing an operation 
restriction only when isolating the component for 
repair work. Production losses due to failures were 
only some hundredths of a per cent. The average 
repair time of failures in Tech Spec components at 
Olkiluoto showed an increase for the second conse-
cutive year. An assessment of the situation would 
require detailed information on the type of failures 
for any conclusions to be drawn concerning the efﬁ-
ciency of the maintenance function.
The unavailability of safety systems was follo-
wed by means of international indices provided by 
the licensees. The high pressure safety injection sys-
tem, the auxiliary feed water system and the back-
up diesel generators were monitored at the Loviisa 
power plant; Olkiluoto monitored the containment 
spray system, the auxiliary feed water system and 
the back-up diesel generators. At the Loviisa plant 
units the safety system unavailability values dec-
reased or remained low for all systems monitored. 
At the Olkiluoto plant, unavailability of the con-
tainment spray system increased at Olkiluoto 1 
and the unavailability index of the auxiliary feed 
water system showed a small increase at both plant 
units. Factors contributing to the increase in safety 
system unavailabilities at the Olkiluoto plant units 
in 2005 are not yet known. However, latent failures 
contributing to safety system unavailabilities were 
dominant in events assigned to the middle category 
of risk-signiﬁcance.
The structural integrity of multiple barriers 
containing the release of radioactive substances 
has mostly remained good. Fuel leaks have been 
rare at the Loviisa plant units in the past few yea-
rs, and no leaks occurred in 2005. Fuel leaks have 
occurred every year at the Olkiluoto plant units; a 
fuel leak at Olkiluoto 2 which began in late August 
2004 continued until the annual maintenance ou-
tage 2005. Inspections revealed a thin sliver of 
metal as the cause of the leak. Another fuel leak at 
Olkiluoto 2 was detected at the end of August 2005. 
Following the discovery of the foreign object and 
fuel leak, STUK required that the utility assess 
the clean installation instructions and procedures 
related to an open reactor and primary circuit.
In addition to the international chemistry per-
formance indices depicting water chemistry, new 
indicators were introduced in 2004 depicting im-
purities causing corrosion in the primary and 
secondary circuits as well as the level of corrosion 
products in the circuits. No signiﬁcant changes 
occurred in the indicator values in 2005. The che-
mistry indices indicated that process chemistry 
control had been successful at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto plant units in 2005. However, in the third 
and fourth quarter the sulphate concentration of 
reactor water at Olkiluoto 2 exceeded the target 
values, which is also indicated in the chemistry in-
dex. The higher sulphate concentrations were due 
to the condensate cleaning ﬁlters’ running times 
being long.
Containment integrity has remained good at 
both Olkiluoto and Loviisa. The overall as-found 
leakage of outer isolation valves at both plants dec-
reased from the previous year. In leakage testing, 
the largest single leak at the Olkiluoto plant units 
was through the inner main steam valve. In both 
cases the leak was caused by a broken internal 
check valve. The percentage of isolation valves that 
passed the leaktightness test at the ﬁrst attempt 
has remained high, and both Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
show an increase from the previous year. The ove-
rall as-found leakage of containment penetrations 
decreased at Loviisa 2, thus being small for both 
plant units at Loviisa. Due to problems in the leak-
tightness of the rubber bellows of penetrations, they 
have been replaced with metal structures. The ove-
rall as-found leakage of containment penetrations 
has remained small at the Olkiluoto plant units.
The investments of 2005 indicate an increasing 
trend at Olkiluoto, which is affected by moder-
nisation projects for the units currently in ope-
ration and preparation for a new plant project. 
Investments at Loviisa were somewhat smaller 
than the year before. The main investments at the 
Loviisa plant last year included the upgrading of 
the plant units’ I&C systems. As concerns updating 
of document revisions necessary after plant modi-
ﬁcations (entered into the register) in 2005, the si-
tuation was good for the Olkiluoto units at the time 
of plant start-up. There were no modiﬁcations that 
required monitoring at Olkiluoto 1 and the Loviisa 
power plant.
Judging by the indicators, there are deﬁciencies 
in the operational experience feedback at Olkiluoto, 
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owing to which STUK has focused attention on the 
efﬁciency of the operational experience feedback at 
the plant and discussed deviations with the utility. 
The events were due to more general operational 
deﬁciencies, which nevertheless did not cause any 
problems regarding reactor operation. Judging by 
the indicators describing failures in Tech Spec 
components and maintenance, the maintenance 
function at Olkiluoto was reliable and no signs 
were found indicating a decline in the quality of 
maintenance. Maintenance at the plant was also 
more proactive than the year before. Indicators 
describing the unavailability of the safety systems 
nevertheless showed a deterioration: unavailabi-
lity of the containment spray system increased at 
one of the plant units and the unavailability index 
of the auxiliary feed water system showed a small 
increase at both plant units at Olkiluoto. Factors 
contributing to the increase in safety system una-
vailabilities at the Olkiluoto plant units in 2005 
are not yet known to STUK. Latent failures contri-
buting to safety system unavailabilities were domi-
nant in events assigned to the middle category of 
risk-signiﬁcance. They may indicate deﬁciencies in 
the maintenance strategy or in the assessment of 
the risk-signiﬁcance of the failures. While problems 
with fuel integrity occur annually at the Olkiluoto 
plant, radiation protection, as measured by indica-
tors, has nevertheless achieved the set objectives 
and emissions have remained small.
Judging by the indicators, no serious deﬁcien-
cies were observed in the operation of the Loviisa 
plant. Operational events were mainly caused by 
technical failures. Judging by the indicators desc-
ribing failures in Tech Spec components and main-
tenance, the maintenance function at Loviisa was 
reliable and no signs were found indicating a decli-
ne in the quality of maintenance. The total yearly 
volume of maintenance work on Tech Spec compo-
nents at the Loviisa plant, including both failure 
repairs and preventive maintenance, increased 
further, due to a gradually increasing trend in the 
volume of failure repairs. The volume of preventive 
maintenance was smaller than the previous year, 
and the ratio of preventive maintenance to failure 
repair was signiﬁcantly low. The volume of preven-
tive maintenance at a plant is affected by preven-
tive maintenance operations determined on the 
basis of the duration of the annual maintenance 
outage. The volume of preventive maintenance has 
decreased in the long-term as planned. Evaluation 
and development of preventive maintenance will 
continue also in the future. The average repair 
times of Tech Spec components at Loviisa showed 
a decrease for the second consecutive year, which 
may indicate an enhanced maintenance function. 
However, it is not possible to draw any long-term 
conclusions before the types of dominant failures 
are known.
At Loviisa 1, the collective dose remained above 
the calculatory reporting threshold conﬁned to net 
electric power speciﬁed in Guide YVL 7.9, which was 
further affected by the dose accumulated during the 
unit’s long annual maintenance outage in 2004.
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Introduction to indicators and their deﬁnition
Given next in the report are the deﬁnitions, data 
acquisition, calculation responsibilities and purpo-
se of the indicators for nuclear power plant safety 
in the STUK indicator system; and indicator va-
lues updated on the basis of the 2005 data, their 
interpretation and assessment of change.
The NRR has assigned persons and units res-
ponsible for the acquisition of indicator data as 
well as for their calculation and analysis. In 2005, 
resident inspectors of the ofﬁce of safety manage-
ment (TUR) were responsible for indicators concer-
ning failures and preventive maintenance of Tech 
Spec components and safety systems availability. 
TUR was also responsible for the indicator concer-
ning production losses due to failures. The data on 
primary circuit leakages for the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant was provided by the resident inspec-
tor. The TUR inspectors gathered and assessed in-
dicators describing the quality of the maintenance 
function at the Olkiluoto plant. TUR maintained 
an operational events follow-up table and was 
responsible for indicators based on operational 
events and reports. The ofﬁce of risk assessment 
(RIS) assessed the risk-signiﬁcance of the events. 
Inspectors from the ofﬁce of power plant technolo-
gy (VLT) were responsible for indicators describing 
the functioning of the ﬁre alarm system, as well as 
the integrity of fuel and the primary circuit. The 
ofﬁce of reactor and safety systems (REA) gathered 
and calculated indicators describing containment 
leaktightness. The ofﬁce of radiation protection 
(SÄT) gathered dose and release data and the cor-
responding indicators. The ofﬁce of plant projects 
(HAN) was responsible for the follow-up of docu-
mentation updating and investment indicators. 
The nuclear power plant safety indicator system 
was maintained in the management support unit 
(YJT) and co-ordinated by the event investigation 
manager.
There were some personnel changes at TUR con-
cerning those responsible for indicators. Deﬁnitions 
of the safety indicator system or individual indica-
tors were not revised from the previous year. In 
2005, indicators describing the overall risk-signiﬁ-
cance of operational events were re-incorporated in 
the indicator area which describes the risk-signiﬁ-
cance of operational events. These indicators were 
not reported in connection with the 2004 results.
The indicators system, including graphics in 
both Finnish and in English, is maintained in an 
Excel ﬁle. The system administrator enters the 
data provided by those responsible for the indi-
cators and updates the indicator ﬁgures every 3 
months. Excel is not the most suitable tool for ma-
naging, analysing and presenting the indicators. 
Excel ﬁles are also vulnerable to user mistakes and 
system failures. Furthermore, they have not allo-
wed simultaneous access to several users (entering 
information, updating graphs, reporting). There 
was a need for tools that would allow speedier data 
input and graph updating, the use of standardized 
graphs and generating presentations and reports.
In the latter half of 2005, STUK ordered the 
INDI (INdicator DIsplay) application for indicator 
management, analysis and reporting. The agree-
ment also covers the transfer of the existing data 
for the indicators in NRR’s current system into the 
INDI database. The program will be introduced in 
connection with the updating of the ﬁrst-quarter 
indicators in 2006. Those responsible for the indi-
cators and system administration attended INDI 
user training at STUK in November 2005.
The purpose of the program is to simplify 
and verify the maintenance of indicator data at 
the NRR and speed up the quarterly updating 
and reporting of nuclear plant safety indicators. 
Indicators developed for the needs of other units in 
the future can also be entered in the program.
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Safety performance indicators
A.I Safety and quality culture
A.I.1 Failures and their repairs
A.I.1a Failures of components subject 
to the Technical Speciﬁcations
Deﬁnition
As the indicator, the number of failures cau-
sing unavailability of components deﬁned in the 
Technical Speciﬁcations (Tech Spec components) 
during power operation is followed. The failures 
are divided by plant unit into two groups: failures 
causing an immediate operation restriction and 
failures causing an operation restriction in connec-
tion with repair work.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and operational documents of the power plants.
Purpose of indicator
The indicator is used to assess plant lifetime ma-
nagement and the development of the condition of 
components.
Responsible units/persons
Safety Management (TUR),   
resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of indicator
The number of failures causing an operation rest-
riction at the Loviisa plant has increased slightly 
during the past three years. On the whole the total 
number has remained at the same level as in pre-
vious years, however. A signiﬁcant change in the 
number of failures is not identiﬁable.
Number of failures of Tech Spec components causing
unavailability during power operation,
Loviisa NPP
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 LO1 116 86 90 112 129 108 127
 LO2 91 79 120 77 125 148 150
 LO1,2 207 165 210 189 254 256 277
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The marked increase in the number of failures 
since 2002 cannot be attributed to one straight-
forward reason. One factor may be the revised 
work recording procedure. However, the number 
of failures has shown similar variation in the long 
term. While the number of failures causing an im-
mediate operation restriction is somewhat lower 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 OL1 6 13 12 16 7 27 15
 OL2 11 9 18 5 7 16 17
 OL1,2 17 22 30 21 14 43 32
Number of failures of Tech Spec components causing
immediate operation restriction, Olkiluoto NPP
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 OL1 16 9 10 16 23 23 20
 OL2 13 11 14 16 33 19 12
 OL1,2 29 20 24 32 56 42 32
Number of failures of Tech Spec components causing operation
restriction from start of a repair work, Olkiluoto NPP
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 OL1 22 22 22 32 30 50 35
 OL2 24 20 32 21 40 35 29
 OL1,2 46 42 54 53 70 85 64
Number of failures of Tech Spec components causing
unavailability during power operation,
Olkiluoto NPP
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
than in 2004, it is essentially at the same level. The 
number of failures that cause an operation restric-
tion from the start of repair work remains within 
normal variation.
The numbers of failures of Tech Spec compo-
nents during power operation that caused an im-
mediate operation restriction and the failures that 
caused a restriction while isolating the component 
at Olkiluoto were the same (32) in 2005. The num-
ber of failures decreased slightly from 2004, and 
thus the increasing trend of the previous years 
levelled off.
The number of failures causing an immediate 
operation restriction at Olkiluoto 1 was 15 and at 
Olkiluoto 2, 17. At Olkiluoto 2, the greatest number 
of failures occurred in the control valve (314V21): 
there were 4 failures altogether, caused by a single 
reason.
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A.I.1b Maintenance of components subject 
to the Technical Speciﬁcations
Deﬁnition
As the indicator, the numbers of failure repairs 
and preventive maintenance work orders for com-
ponents deﬁned in the Tech Specs are followed by 
plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the plant work order 
systems, from which all preventive maintenance 
works and failure repairs are retrieved.
Purpose of indicator
The indicator describes the volumes of failure re-
pairs and preventive maintenance and illustrates 
the condition of the plant and its maintenance 
strategy. The indicator is used to assess the main-
tenance strategy executed at the plant.
Responsible units/persons
Safety Management (TUR),   
resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of indicator
The number of failures causing an operation rest-
riction at the Loviisa plant has increased slightly 
during the past three years. On the whole the total 
number has remained at the same level as in pre-
vious years, however. A signiﬁcant change in the 
number of failures is not identiﬁable.
The marked increase in the number of failures 
since 2002 cannot be attributed to one straightfor-
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 LO1 264 241 222 263 293 238 277
 LO2 198 219 244 228 243 286 269
 LO1,2 462 460 466 491 536 524 546
Volume of annual maintenance works of
Tech Spec components, Loviisa NPP
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 LO2 92 87 122 82 127 150 150
 LO1,2 213 177 213 205 271 270 277
Number of annual failure repair works of Tech Spec components,
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ward reason. One factor may be the revised work 
recording procedure. However, the number of fai-
lures has shown similar variation in the long term. 
See A.I.1a.
The number of preventive maintenance works 
during plant operation at the Loviisa plant has 
stabilised at just over 250 per year. The unit-spe-
ciﬁc changes are also very small annually. The 
variation is probably attributable to differences in 
annual maintenance outages.
The ratio of preventive maintenance works to 
failures, which has varied between approximately 
1 and 1.5, also clearly indicates that the situation 
has stabilised.
The preventive maintenance volume of Tech 
Spec components showed an increase from 2004 
at the Olkiluoto plant compared with the volume 
of failure repairs. At Olkiluoto 1 the ratio of the 
number of preventive maintenance works to the 
number of failure repairs was 1.0 in 2005, whe-
reas at Olkiluoto 2 the ratio was well above 1.5. 
The number of preventive maintenance works at 
Olkiluoto 2 in 2005 was considerable (274), becau-
se of a long outage due to TIMO modiﬁcations (21 
days). As for Olkiluoto 1, there was a brief (7 days) 
annual maintenance outage, which showed in the 
decrease in the number of preventive maintenance 
works compared with the previous year. A corres-
ponding TIMO outage is scheduled for Olkiluoto 1 
for 2006.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 OL1 153 339 262 388 230 443 306
 OL2 199 276 337 224 324 229 427
 OL1,2 352 615 599 612 554 672 733
Volume of annual maintenance works of
Tech Spec components, Olkiluoto NPP
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 OL2 47 79 97 100 121 131 153
 OL1,2 79 143 157 234 223 321 306
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A.I.1c Repair time of components subject 
to the Technical Speciﬁcations
Deﬁnition
As the indicator, the average repair time of failures 
causing unavailability of components deﬁned in 
the Tech Specs is followed. With each repair, the 
time recorded is the time of unavailability. It is cal-
culated from the detection of the failure to the end 
of repair work, if the failure causes an immediate 
operation restriction. If the component is operable 
until the beginning of repair, only the time of the 
repair work is taken into account.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and maintenance and operational documents of the 
power plants.
Purpose of indicator
The indicator shows how quickly failed Tech Spec 
components are repaired in relation to the repair 
time allowed in the Tech Specs.
The indicator is used to assess the maintenance 
strategy, resources and effectiveness of the plants.
Responsible units/persons
Safety Management (TUR),   
resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
In certain cases individual instances of long-term 
operation restriction work may distort the image of 
average repair times. The following two examples 
occurred in 2005:
The following repairs were carried out in the 
ﬁrst quarter (I/05): maintenance of water pressure 
control valve VF24S037, work order no. 381961A, 
repair time 499.7 h; and, during the same isolation, 
maintenance of valve VF24S040, work order no. 
381961B, repair time 499.7 h. If these repair times 
are excluded on the basis that the repairs are not 
signiﬁcant (allowed repair time 21 days), the ave-
rage repair time of the remaining works is 20.2 h 
(928/46).
Work related to hydrogen measurements carried 
out during the second quarter (II/05): investigation 
and inspection of the failure in measurement 
XW38A01, work order no. 383387A, repair time 
437.1 h and inspection of measurement XW38A02, 
work order no. 387707A, repair time 482.4 h. Work 
was also carried out on the seawater pump of the 
containment external spray water system: inspec-
tion of pump and piping VU02D01, work order no. 
388808A, repair time 359.2 h. If these repair times 
are excluded on the basis that the repairs are not 
signiﬁcant (allowed repair time 21 days), the ave-
rage repair time of the remaining works is 21.1 h 
(737/35).
Interpretation of indicator
In 2005 the average repair time at the Loviisa 
plant decreased somewhat from 2004. Over the 
years the average repair time has settled at bet-
ween 30 and 43 hours, and a more detailed analy-
sis of the repair times in 2005 is not necessary.
The average repair time is currently some 32 
hours per failure, compared with some 40 hours in 
2004. The change in level (see A.I.1.a and b) after 
2002 is also reﬂected in repair times.
From 1999 to 2005 the average repair times 
for Tech Spec components at the Olkiluoto plant 
units have varied between four and twelve hours; 
the past three years have shown a rising trend. In 
2005 the average repair times exceeded the level 
for 2004.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 LO1 34.00 35.90 35.90 36.90 29.40 23.60 24.26
 LO2 49.00 27.60 31.20 28.60 55.60 50.90 39.13
 LO1,2 42.85 31.85 33.18 33.51 41.67 39.74 32.31
Average of real repair times of Tech Spec component failures,
Loviisa NPP
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 OL1 7.77 11.64 12.35 4.44 5.08 5.54 6.84
 OL2 4.92 7.85 10.55 10.38 4.12 6.07 9.42
 OL1,2 6.35 9.75 11.45 7.41 4.60 5.81 8.13
Average of real repair times of Tech Spec component failures,
Olkiluoto NPP
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A.I.1d Common cause failures
Deﬁnition
As the indicator, the number of common cause fai-
lures of components or systems deﬁned in the Tech 
Specs is followed.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the reports 
by the utilities of works causing an operation rest-
riction.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the quality of maintenance.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Jukka Kupila
Interpretation of indicator
At the Loviisa plant no realised common cause 
failures were detected in systems deﬁned in Tech 
Spec in 2005.
At the Olkiluoto plant no realised common 
cause failures were detected in systems deﬁned in 
Tech Spec in 2005.
In connection with calculating the indicator, 
two back-up diesel generators were discovered to 
be inoperable simultaneously at the Olkiluoto po-
wer plant. This, however, was not a common cause 
failure: one of the back-up diesels was isolated for 
periodic maintenance. Later, in connection with a 
periodic test conducted for the second redundancy, 
a triggering error was discovered in the diesel, 
which was interpreted to have been latent for half 
the test period. The simultaneous unavailability 
took place on 11 January 2005 between 5:11 and 
18:50.
In the previous year, two back-up diesels were 
also discovered to be simultaneously inoperable. 
One of the back-up diesels was isolated to repair 
the failure detected in the periodic test. Later, in 
connection with a periodic test conducted for the 
second redundancy, a triggering error was disco-
vered in the diesel, which was interpreted to have 
been latent for half the test period. The simulta-
neous unavailability took place on 7 April 2004 
between 7:55 and 13:15.
2002 2003 2004 2005
 Olkiluoto 1 1 0 0
Number of common cause failures (CCF) of  Tech Spec
components or systems, Olkiluoto NPP
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
A.I.1e Common cause failures preventing operation 
and A.I.1f Potential common cause failures
These indicators are currently under development. 
The latest results are for 2003 and thus not inclu-
ded in this report.
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A.I.1g Production loss due to failures
Deﬁnition
Loss of power production caused by failures in rela-
tion to rated power (gross).
Source of data
Annual and quarterly reports submitted by utili-
ties.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the signiﬁcance of failures from the point 
of view of production.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Tomi Koskiniemi
Interpretation of indicator
Production losses due to failures at the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto plant units have been small. The Loviisa 
2 indicator value for 1997, which is an anomaly, 
was caused by an approx. 7-day-long shutdown 
to repair a leakage of the primary circuit, and the 
2003 anomaly was caused by work to replace the 
stator of a plant unit generator, which took 41 
days, causing a 2.6% production loss.
In 2005 production losses per quarter have 
shown random variation at both the Loviisa and 
Olkiluoto plants. The relatively heavier producti-
on loss of just under 1% occurred at Loviisa 1, as 
one of the generators tripped out of service due to 
an earth fault signal in the stator. Generally the 
failures have occurred in separate, independent 
components and systems.
A comparison of production losses due to failu-
res in 2005 with previous years reveals that, at the 
Loviisa plant, production losses at Loviisa 1 have 
increased minimally compared with 2003 and 2004 
and remain low. At Loviisa 2, losses have decreased 
clearly to the levels of 1996 and 2000, achieving 
the values for Loviisa 1.
At Olkiluoto, production losses due to failures 
have decreased considerably from previous years 
for both plants. The ﬁgures correspond to the peak 
values in 2000. This may be regarded as a success-
ful achievement, especially as the annual main-
tenance of Olkiluoto 2 in 2005 included extensive 
modiﬁcations.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 LO1 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.70 0.70 0.10 0.25 0.27
 LO2 0.10 2.00 0.80 0.40 0.20 1.20 1.30 2.60 0.25 0.15
Loss of power production due to failures,
Loviisa NPP
0.0 %
0.5 %
1.0 %
1.5 %
2.0 %
2.5 %
3.0 %
I/04 II/04 III/04 IV/04 I/05 II/05 III/05 IV/05
 LO1 0.00 0.61 0.09 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.01
 LO2 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.03 0.71 0.01
Loss of power production due to failures in 2004–2005,
Loviisa NPP
0.0 %
0.2 %
0.4 %
0.6 %
0.8 %
1.0 %
1.2 %
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 OL1 1.10 1.10 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.01 0.60 0.20 0.78 0.02
 OL2 1.50 0.20 0.50 0.10 0.03 0.50 0.70 0.40 1.20 0.05 
Loss of power production due to failures,
Olkiluoto NPP
0.0 %
0.5 %
1.0 %
1.5 %
2.0 %
2.5 %
3.0 %
I/04 II/04 III/04 IV/04 I/05 II/05 III/05 IV/05
 OL1 2.32 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00
  OL2 0.00 1.48 3.38 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.04
Loss of power production due to failures in 2004–2005,
Olkiluoto NPP
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A.I.2 Exemptions and deviations from 
the Technical Speciﬁcations
Deﬁnition
The number of non-compliances with the Tech 
Specs as well as the number of exemptions granted 
by STUK.
Source of data
Data for the indicators are collected from applica-
tions for exemption and from event reports.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the utilities’ activities in accordance with 
the Tech Specs: compliance with the Tech Specs 
and identiﬁed situations during which it is neces-
sary to deviate from them, of which conclusions 
can be made as regards the appropriateness of the 
Tech Specs.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Tomi Koskiniemi
Interpretation of indicator
The non-compliances with the Tech Specs, a total of 
4 in 2005, all occurred at the Olkiluoto plant. Two 
of the non-compliances are long-time events which 
were only now discovered due to conscious action.
The non-compliances with the Tech Specs in 
the second quarter concerned the following events 
which occurred during annual maintenance: excee-
ding allowed lifting height of the reactor pressure 
vessel head at Olkiluoto 1, which occurred in the 
period 1998–2004, and a power failure in the die-
sel-backed busbar caused by the Olkiluoto 2 switch 
and the simultaneous failure of the D-sub diesel to 
start in 2005.
The non-compliances with the Tech Specs iden-
tiﬁed in the third quarter were due to the air 
intake opening of one diesel becoming blocked 
when the entrance door to the diesel building was 
replaced, as well as the failure to perform periodic 
weekly testing of the carbon dioxide ﬁre suppres-
sion system alarm in the diesel facilities in the 
period 1998–2005.
No non-compliances with the Tech Specs occur-
red at the Loviisa plant in 2005.
The number of granted exemptions from the 
Tech Specs (a total of 16) remained at the previous 
year’s level at both plants: Olkiluoto has shown an 
upward trend (9 exemptions), which is largely due 
to plant modernisation and installations related to 
the construction of Olkiluoto 3. As the construction 
of OL3 progresses, it can be expected that at least a 
similar number of exemptions will be required also 
in the future.
At Loviisa the number of exemptions has shown 
a clearly descending trend in the past years, reach-
ing a reasonably good level in 2004 (9 exemptions), 
as well as in 2005 (7 exemptions). In general, 
more exemptions are required in Loviisa than in 
Olkiluoto, as the plant systems have been largely 
designed as two redundant (cf. four redundancy of 
Olkiluoto), for which reason repairs or modiﬁca-
tions during operation almost always require an 
exemption.
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
12 12 7 13 6 5 6 6 3 5 5 6 8 7 9 9
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 2 3 7 8 1 4
Number of deviations from the Tech Spec, Olkiluoto NPP
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
 Exemptions       Deviations
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
17 25 9 19 29 20 11 12 10 6 6 3 13 21 9 7
1 2 1 0 1 1 1 3 2 6 5 3 3 1 2 0
Number of deviations from the Tech Spec, Loviisa NPP
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
 Exemptions       Deviations
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A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the unavailability of safety sys-
tems is followed by plant unit. The systems fol-
lowed at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant are: the 
containment spray system (322), the auxiliary feed 
water system (327) and the back-up diesel genera-
tors (651-656). Those followed at Loviisa nuclear 
power plant are: the high pressure safety injection 
system (TJ), auxiliary feed water system (RL92/93, 
RL94/97) and back-up diesel generator (EY).
Essentially, the ratio of a system’s unavailabi-
lity hours and its required availability hours are 
calculated as the indicator. Unavailability hours 
are the combined unavailability of redundant sub-
systems divided by the number of subsystems. It 
does not indicate the simultaneous unavailability 
of several subsystems. Sub-system unavailability 
hours include the time required for planned main-
tenance of components and unavailability due to 
failures. The latter includes, in addition to the time 
spent on repairs, the estimated unavailability time 
prior to failure detection. If a failure is assessed to 
have occurred in a previous successful test, and is 
assessed to have escaped detection, the time bet-
ween periodic tests is added to the unavailability 
time. If a failure has occurred between tests such 
that its date of occurrence is unknown, half of the 
time period between tests is added to the unavaila-
bility time. Whenever the occurrence of the failure 
can be identiﬁed as an operational, maintenance, 
testing or other event, the time between the event 
and the fault detection is added to the unavailabi-
lity time.
Annual plant criticality hours are the availabi-
lity requirement for the 322, 327, TJ and RL sys-
tems, and the requirement for diesels is continuous 
– i.e. annual operating hours.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 LO1 0.20 4.80 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.05
 LO2 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.09 
Unavailability of high pressure safety injection system (TJ),
Loviisa NPP
0.0 %
1.0 %
2.0 %
3.0 %
4.0 %
5.0 %
Unavailability of auxiliary feed water system (RL92/93, RL94/97),
Loviisa NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 LO1 0.50 2.80 0.12 3.60 10.40 3.20 0.81 3.09 0.98 1.96 0.03
 LO2 0.70 0.60 0.10 3.60 2.40 3.30 0.80 3.34 0.61 1.17 0.53 
0 %
2 %
4 %
6 %
8 %
10 %
12 %
Unavailability of emergency diesel generators (EY),
Loviisa NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 LO1 1.50 0.70 0.21 2.20 2.00 0.20 1.06 1.58 2.24 0.49 0.33
 LO2 1.10 0.20 0.21 2.20 2.00 0.20 1.06 1.58 2.24 0.49 0.33 
1.0 %
2.0 %
3.0 %
4.0 %
0.0 %
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Source of data
The data for the indicators is collected from the 
utilities. Licensee representatives submit the ne-
cessary data to the relevant person in charge in 
STUK.
Purpose of indicator
To indicate the unavailability of safety systems; 
the condition and status of safety systems and 
their development can be monitored by means of 
the indicator.
Responsible units/persons
Safety Management (TUR),   
resident inspectors
Pauli Kopiloff (Loviisa nuclear power plant)
Jarmo Konsi (Olkiluoto nuclear power plant)
Interpretation of indicator
The unavailability of the safety systems chosen for 
the indicator system has been acceptably low.
At the Loviisa plant units, the unavailability of 
safety systems has decreased or remained very low 
for all monitored systems (TJ, RL92-97, EY) in the 
past few years. The increase in the unavailability 
of diesel systems in the period 2001–2003 was lar-
gely due to spray system diesel EY05 having been 
erroneously included in the indicator.
At the Olkiluoto plant the total unavailability 
of the containment spray system has increased 
slightly; on the other hand, the distribution of una-
vailabilities between plant units has been contrary 
to the distribution in the previous year.
The unavailability of the auxiliary feed water 
system at Olkiluoto plant units has increased sig-
niﬁcantly compared with the practically non-exis-
tent level of 2004. The value is on a par with 2003.
Diesel unavailability seems to have fallen by 
almost 50% compared with 2004. In 2005 diesel 
availability probably corresponds to the long-term 
average.
Unavailability of shut-down cooling system (321) or
containment spray system (322),
Olkiluoto NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 OL1 0.20 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.15
 OL2 0.10 0.06 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.85 0.10
  321   322
0.0 %
0.2 %
0.4 %
0.6 %
0.8 %
1.0 %
1.2 %
Unavailability of auxiliary feed water system (327),
Olkiluoto NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 OL1 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 16.00 0.40 0.03 1.10 2.00 0.01 2.00
 OL2 0.10 0.02 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.01 2.71 0.01 1.10
0 %
2 %
4 %
6 %
8 %
10 %
12 %
14 %
16 %
Unavailability of emergency diesel generators (651…656),
Olkiluoto NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 OL1 0.40 0.04 0.90 0.25 2.10 1.50 0.80 1.14 0.05 1.10 0.57
 OL2 0.40 0.04 0.90 0.25 2.10 1.50 0.80 1.14 0.05 1.10 0.57
0.0 %
1.0 %
2.0 %
3.0 %
4.0 %
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A.I.4 Occupational radiation doses
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, collective radiation exposure by 
plant site and plant unit is followed, as well as the 
average of the ten highest yearly radiation expos-
ures.
Source of data
The data on collective radiation exposure is ob-
tained from quarterly and annual reports. The data 
on individual radiation doses is obtained from the 
national dose register.
Purpose of indicator
The indicators are used to control the radiation ex-
posure of employees. In addition, compliance with 
the YVL Guide’s calculatory threshold for one plant 
unit’s collective dose averaged over two successive 
years is followed. The threshold value, 2.5 manSv 
per one gigawatt of net electrical power, means a 
radiation dose of 1.22 manSv for one Loviisa plant 
unit and 2.10 manSv for one Olkiluoto plant unit. 
The collective radiation doses describe the success 
of the plant’s ALARA programme. The average of 
the ten highest doses indicates how close to the 
20 mSv dose limit the individual occupational do-
ses at the plants are, at the same time indicating 
the effectiveness of the plant’s radiation protection 
unit.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT)
Suvi Ristonmaa
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Collective occupational radiation dose (manSv),
Loviisa NPP
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
I/04 II/04 III/04 IV/04 I/05 II/05 III/05 IV/05
 LO 0.0150 0.0320 2.4053 0.0039 0.0027 0.0022 0.7300 0.0060
Collective dose (manSv) quarterly in 2004–2005,
Loviisa NPP
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average of the ten highest doses (mSv),
Loviisa NPP
0
5
10
15
20
25
I/04 II/04 III/04 IV/04 I/05 II/05 III/05 IV/05
 LO 0.68 1.65 14.85 2.20 1.59 1.60 9.80 0.40
Average of the ten highest doses (mSv) in 2004–2005,
Loviisa NPP
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Loviisa 1 and 2
Collective dose per 1 GW of net electrical capacity averaged
over two succesive years
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
m
an
Sv
/G
W
Reporting threshold 2.5 manSv/GW according to the Guide YVL 7.9
 Loviisa 1  Loviisa 2
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Interpretation of indicator
Most doses are incurred in work done during ou-
tages; thus outage duration and the amount of 
work having signiﬁcance in radiation protection 
affects the yearly radiation doses. The collective 
occupational radiation dose at the Olkiluoto plant 
was higher than in previous years, particularly 
as a result of the annual maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 2, which was exceptionally extensive in 
terms of personnel resources and workload.
The radiation doses for the workers at nuclear 
power plants are below the personal dose limits. 
The Radiation Decree (1512/1991) stipulates that 
the effective dose for a worker from radiation work 
may not exceed the 20 mSv/year average over any 
period of ﬁve years or 50 mSv in any one year.
If at one plant unit the collective occupational 
radiation dose average over two successive years 
exceeds 2.5 manSv per one GW of net electrical 
power, the utility is to report the causes of this to 
STUK, and any measures possibly required to imp-
rove radiation safety (Guide YVL 7.9). The repor-
ting threshold was exceeded at the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant. This was particularly due to the col-
lective occupational radiation dose (1.93 manSv) 
accumulated during the long annual maintenance 
outage of Loviisa 1. The power plant has reported 
the causes of the event and the necessary action to 
be taken for the improvement of radiation safety 
to STUK.
Olkiluoto 1 and 2
Collective dose per 1 GW of net electrical capacityaveraged
over two succesive years
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
m
an
Sv
/G
W
Reporting threshold 2.5 manSv/GW according to the Guide YVL 7.9
 Olkiluoto 1  Olkiluoto 2
I/04 II/04 III/04 IV/04 I/05 II/05 III/05 IV/05
 OL 0.045 1.35 0.0564 0.0085 0.007 2.159 0.052 0.027
Collective dose (manSv) quarterly in 2004–2005,
Olkiluoto NPP
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Collective occupational radiation dose (manSv),
Olkiluoto NPP
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
I/04 II/04 III/04 IV/04 I/05 II/05 III/05 IV/05
 OL 1.15 6.26 1.98 3.86 2.83 9.89 2.31 0.93
Average of the ten highest doses (mSv) in 2004–2005,
Olkiluoto NPP
0
5
10
15
20
25
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average of the ten highest doses (mSv),
Olkiluoto NPP
0
5
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15
20
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A.I.5 Radioactive releases
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, radioactive releases into the sea 
and the atmosphere (TBq) from the plant are follo-
wed, as well as the calculated dose due to releases 
to the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the 
plant.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the quar-
terly and annual reports of the utilities. STUK’s 
Research and Environmental Surveillance 
Department (TKO) calculates the dose for the most 
exposed person in the plant vicinity and submits it 
to the person in charge of this indicator.
Purpose of indicator
To monitor the amount and trend of radioactive re-
leases and assess factors having a bearing on any 
changes in them.
Responsible unit/person
Radiation protection (SÄT), Suvi Ristonmaa   
(release data)
Research and Environmental Surveillance (TKO), 
Environment of nuclear power plants (YVL)
Seppo Klemola (dose calculation)
Interpretation of indicator 
(releases into the atmosphere)
Radioactive releases into the environment from the 
Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants were 
small. They are well below the set limits.
Gaseous ﬁssion products, noble gases and io-
dine isotopes originate in leaking fuel rods, in the 
minute amounts of uranium left on the outer sur-
faces on fuel cladding during fuel fabrication, and 
in reactor surface contamination from earlier fuel 
leaks. At both Loviisa and Olkiluoto the numbers 
of fuel leaks have been very small. The indicators 
A.III.1 describe fuel integrity. The noble gas relea-
ses from the Loviisa plant are dominated by argon-
41, an activation product of argon-40, found in the 
airspace between the reactor pressure vessel and 
the biological shield. Aerosol nuclides (including 
activated corrosion products) are released during 
maintenance work.
The releases of noble gas activities and aerosols 
released from both plants were of the same mag-
nitude as in the preceding years. At the Loviisa 
plant, releases of iodine activities were smaller 
than in the preceding years.
Noble gas releases (Bq 87Krekv),
Loviisa NPP
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1.0E+17
1.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
1.0E+13
1.0E+14
1.0E+15
1.0E+16  Annual limit 2.20E+16 Bq
Iodine isotope releases to atmosphere (Bq131Iekv),
Loviisa NPP
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1.0E+03
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
 Annual limit 2.20E+11 Bq
1.0E+07
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
   below detection limit
Aerosol releases to atmosphere (Bq),
Loviisa NPP
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+07
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
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Interpretation of indicator 
(releases into the sea)
Releases into the sea from the Loviisa power plant 
were slightly smaller than in the previous year. 
The power plant discharged low-activity evaporati-
on residues into the sea as planned in 2004.
Releases into the sea from the Olkiluoto plant 
have reduced since the plant commissioned new 
process water puriﬁcation and treatment equip-
ment.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
The calculated dose (µSv) of the most exposed individual in
the environment of Loviisa NPP
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
The calculated dose (µSv) of the most exposed individual
in the environment of Olkiluoto NPP
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
Aerosol releases to atmosphere (Bq),
Olkiluoto NPP
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+07
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
Gamma activity of liquid effluents (Bq),
Loviisa NPP
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
 Annual limit 8.90E+11 Bq
1.0E+07
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+13
Noble gas releases (Bq 87Krekv),
Olkiluoto NPP
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1.0E+17
1.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
1.0E+13
1.0E+14
1.0E+15
1.0E+16
 Annual limit 1.77E+16 Bq
   below detection limit
Iodine isotope releases to atmosphere  (Bq131Iekv),
Olkiluoto NPP
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1.0E+03
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
 Annual limit 1.14E+11 Bq
1.0E+07
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
   below detection limit
Vuosiannosraja 100 μSv
Gamma activity of liquid effluents (Bq),
Olkiluoto NPP
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
1.0E+10
1.0E+11
1.0E+12
Annual limit 2.96E+11 Bq
1.0E+07
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+13
Interpretation of indicator (calculated 
dose due to radioactive releases)
The calculated radiation dose for the most exposed 
individual in the vicinity of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant was of the same magnitude as in the 
previous year. In Loviisa the dose was smaller than 
in the previous year. The 2004 dose was affected by 
the controlled discharge of low-activity evaporation 
residues into the sea.
The calculated doses of the most exposed indi-
vidual in the vicinity of both plants are less than 
0.1% of the 100 microSv limit established in the 
Government Resolution (395/1991).
Vuosiannosraja 100 μSv
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A.I.6 Keeping plant documentation current
Deﬁnition
This indicator area follows the need to update 
documents due to plant modiﬁcations and their 
realisation by the start-up following the next an-
nual maintenance. The documents to be followed-
up are: the Technical Speciﬁcations, the Final 
Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), safety classiﬁca-
tion documents and diagrams, PSA documenta-
tion, operation and maintenance procedures, and 
process ﬂow-charts. The ratio of the number of 
implemented document revisions to the number of 
identiﬁed document revisions is followed.
Source of data
The data for the indicator calculation is obtained 
from STUK’s plant modiﬁcations register.
Purpose of indicator
To follow plant quality management and the abili-
ty to maintain plant documentation.
Responsible unit/person
Plant projects (HAN)
Tapani Virolainen
Interpretation of indicator
Identiﬁcation of document amendments and revisi-
ons pertaining to modiﬁcations at the Loviisa plant 
is mostly by pre-inspection documents and training 
notices. In addition, a list of necessary changes to 
the operating manual maintained at the Loviisa 
plant is used in the identiﬁcation of amendments 
and revisions. The indicator for the Olkiluoto plant 
is based on the modiﬁcation project control system 
(PH2), which includes control forms (AV forms) 
describing the need to update modiﬁcation docu-
ments and their realisation. In addition, STUK 
reviews the realisation of document amendments 
and revisions (Tech Specs, the operating manual 
and PI diagrams) in the main control rooms of both 
plants.
At the Loviisa plant there were no signiﬁcant 
modiﬁcations that required monitoring using the 
plant modiﬁcations register.
As regards the Olkiluoto plant, the indicator is 
based on the identiﬁed needs for document upda-
ting related to modiﬁcations implemented during 
annual maintenance R205 of the Olkiluoto 2 unit 
and their realisation (need for updating/imple-
mented). There were no signiﬁcant modiﬁcations 
conducted at Olkiluoto 1 in 2005.
On the basis of a random inspection it was 
noted that most of the document revisions ne-
cessitated by modiﬁcations in the main control 
room during the annual maintenance R205 had 
been carried out. The ignored changes in the Tech 
Specs (periodic test 683-5 which can no longer be 
conducted due to REMES modiﬁcations) can be 
regarded as not safety-signiﬁcant. The calculated 
indicator indicates that as in previous years, docu-
ment updates were reasonably successful.
On the basis of the presented documents it can 
be noted as a new practice that document revisions 
required by individual modiﬁcation activities have 
now been documented at the plant on a project-
speciﬁc basis. The presented lists of revisions to 
instructions link an individual revision to a given 
modiﬁcation assignment.
TVO should pay attention to the PI diagram 
updating routines in connection with annual main-
tenance. At plant start-up, there should be ﬁnal, 
approved PI diagrams in the control room.
Keeping plant documentation current
2000–2001 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005
 Loviisa 72 % 81 % 96 % 86 % –
 Olkiluoto 75 % 77 % 86 % 100 % 90 %
0 %
20 %
40 %
60 %
80 %
100 %
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A.I.7 Investments in facilities
Deﬁnition
Investments in plant maintenance and modiﬁca-
tions in current value of money adjusted by the 
building cost index.
Source of data
The licensee submits the necessary data directly to 
the person responsible for the indicator.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the amount of investments in plant main-
tenance and their ﬂuctuations.
Responsible unit/person
Plant projects (HAN)
Tapani Virolainen
Interpretation of indicator
The indicator shows the relative ﬂuctuation of in-
vestments. Sums in Euro are business information 
of the companies involved, not to be published here. 
Furthermore, the scales of the investment and mo-
dernisation ﬁgures of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
power plants are not comparable.
The ﬂuctuation in the indicator clearly shows 
the investments made in 1997–2000 in the plants’ 
power upgrades and modernisation projects. The 
investments of 2004–2005 are above average at 
both the Loviisa and the Olkiluoto plant. Since 
2004, the calculation of the indicator value for 
Loviisa has changed; major periodic preventive 
maintenance and QC inspections related to annual 
maintenance are now regarded as investments. 
This change is due to the introduction of IFRS 
reporting.
The following investments were made at the 
Loviisa power plant in 2005: upgrading of the main-
tenance and material management systems and 
modernisation of the laboratory building. Progress 
was also made in work related to the liquid waste 
solidiﬁcation facility, a new ﬁre station and I&C 
system upgrading. The plant units’ safety injection 
pumps will be replaced within the next few years, 
which already incurred expenses for 2005. Other 
major investments included generator stator rep-
lacements, initiation of fuel rack modernisation, 
repair of screws in the reactor core baskets and 
replacement of personnel monitors.
The principal investments at the Olkiluoto po-
wer plant in 2005 concerned the turbine plant 
modernisation project, which also included replace-
ment of the high pressure turbine, steam reheaters, 
turbine automation and switchgear equipment at 
Olkiluoto 2. The steam dryer of the plant unit was 
also replaced in the project. Construction of a gas 
turbine plant also began at Olkiluoto.
Maintenance investments and renovations, Loviisa NPP
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Maintenance investments and renovations, Olkiluoto NPP
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A.II Operational events
A.II.1 Number of events
Deﬁnition
As indicators, the numbers of events reported in 
accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 (events warranting 
a special report, reactor scrams and operational 
transients) are followed.
Source of data
The data for the indicators is obtained from STUK’s 
document administration system (YTD) and/or the 
events follow-up table kept by TUR.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the number of events important for sa-
fety.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Jukka Kupila
Interpretation of indicator
Loviisa
No reactor scrams occurred at the Loviisa plant 
units in 2005. There was one event warranting a 
special report, related to the emergency standby 
caused by high seawater levels. Nine events occur-
red at the Loviisa power plant in 2005 for which 
the plant submitted an operational event report to 
STUK.
The number of special and operational event 
reports does not warrant special attention. 
Operational transients were typically due to dis-
turbances in the operation of the reactor coolant 
pumps.
Number of Special Reports,
Loviisa NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
LO1 4 4 2 2 3 5 3 3 0 0 1
LO2 1 0 3 0 4 2 1 0 1 3 0
LO1,2 5 4 5 2 7 7 4 3 1 3 1
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Number of reactor scrams, Loviisa NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.67 0.67 0.33 0.17 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.17 0.17
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 LO2
 3-year average
Number of operational transient reports, Loviisa NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
LO1 1 7 5 4 1 11 5 3 2 6 6
LO2 10 9 8 4 5 8 10 4 3 3 3
LO1,2 11 16 13 8 6 19 15 7 5 9 9
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Olkiluoto
No reactor scrams occurred at the Olkiluoto plant 
units in 2005. However, deﬁciencies have occurred 
in the general operation of the plant, which emerge 
as the main causes for events warranting a special 
report. There were six such events at Olkiluoto 
in 2005. While events warranting an operational 
event report were also mainly due to more general 
deﬁciencies in plant operation, they have not as 
such caused problems with reactor operation. Six 
events occurred at the Olkiluoto power plant in 
2005 for which the plant submitted an operational 
event report to STUK.
The number of special and operational event re-
ports does not warrant special attention. Because 
of the type of the events warranting a special re-
port, STUK has focused attention on the efﬁciency 
of TVO’s operational experience feedback and dis-
cussed the matter with TVO.
Number of Special Reports,
Olkiluoto NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
OL1 3 2 0 2 2 2 1 4 7 2 3
OL2 2 1 1 0 2 1 3 3 1 0 3
OL1,2 5 3 1 2 4 3 4 7 8 2 6
0
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6
7
8
Number of operational transient reports, Olkiluoto NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
OL1 1 6 4 4 3 1 3 3 0 3 5
OL2 6 2 3 2 1 2 0 2 8 3 1
OL1,2 7 8 7 6 4 3 3 5 8 6 6
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Number of reactor scrams, Olkiluoto NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2 4 3 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
3 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1.5 2 2.67 2.33 1.67 0.83 0.67 0.5 0.67 0.5 0.33
0
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 OL2
 3-year average
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A.II.2 Risk-signiﬁcance of events
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the risk-signiﬁcance of events 
caused by component unavailability is followed. As 
the risk measure, an increase in the Conditional 
Core Damage Probability (CCDP) associated 
with each event is employed. Events are divi-
ded into three groups: 1) unavailabilities due to 
component failures, 2) planned unavailabilities 
and 3) initiating events. In addition, events are 
grouped into three categories according to their 
risk-signiﬁcance (CCDP): the most risk-signiﬁcant 
events (CCDP≥1E–7), other signiﬁcant events (1E–
8≤CCDP<1E–7) and other events (CCDP<1E–8). 
The indicator is the number of events in each ca-
tegory.
Unavailabilities caused by work for which 
STUK has granted exemption are in group 2. 
Possible non-compliances with the Tech Specs are 
in group 1, if they can be utilised for this indicator. 
Non-compliances with the Tech Specs are dealt 
with under indicator A.I.2.
N.B.! Calculations for the Loviisa plant are 
based on an internal-initiating-event model, ma-
king them indicative only of trends.
Source of data
Data for the calculation of the indicators are col-
lected from utility reports and applications for 
exemptions.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the risk-signiﬁcance of component un-
availabilities and to assess risk-signiﬁcant initia-
ting events and planned unavailabilities. Special 
attention is paid to recurring events, CCFs, simul-
taneously occurring failures and human error. In 
addition, an objective in event analysis is to syste-
matically identify signs indicating  deterioration of 
organisational and safety culture.
Responsible unit/person
Risk assessment (RIS), Ari Julin (PSA computati-
on)
Safety Management (TUR) (failure data)
Interpretation of indicator
Loviisa
The most signiﬁcant event at Loviisa 1 was the 
transfer of the air condenser (12UV25B004), which 
was part of the air cooling system covering the 
equipment facilities in the control room building 
and the main control room, from its place near the 
turbine hall wall to the roof of the turbine hall. 
The transfer was necessitated by the construction 
of the I&C buildings. The transfer was carried out 
under an exemption granted by STUK (A272/182).
Other signiﬁcant failures concerned latent fai-
lures in the secondary service water system (VF; 
Loviisa 1) and auxiliary feed water system (RL92; 
Loviisa 2).
The number of analysed events falling into 
the least risk-signiﬁcant category (CCDP<1E-8) 
has increased because there has been a shift in 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005
Most risk-significant events
CCDP ≥ 1E-7 (Total number of events)
0
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the reporting towards a policy in accordance with 
Guide YVL 1.5 (the unavailability of all Tech Spec 
components are presented in monthly or quarterly 
reports). This is shown in the enclosed ﬁgures. The 
kind of events analysed now were partly elimina-
ted from the analysis in previous years.
The analysed events are considered part of nor-
mal nuclear power plant operation and no further 
measures were required from STUK.
 Initiating events
 Planned
unavailabilities
 Component
failures
2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005
Most risk-significant events
CCDP ≥ 1E-7 (Total number of events)
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Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Loviisa NPP.
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 LO1 2.78 2.66 1.54 5.09 2.30 7.39 5.96 7.20 11.21 9.20 3.15
 LO2 5.83 2.17 3.80 1.87 6.80 8.23 12.39 3.30 10.90 3.70 4.14
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Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Olkiluoto NPP.
Persentage of the average annual core damage risk.
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 OL1 3.09 2.17 1.05 0.65 2.47 30.30 5.28 10.90 4.68 5.10 9.64
 OL2 2.44 5.46 1.14 0.72 2.26 42.50 7.17 3.50 7.39 8.60 10.95
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Olkiluoto
The most signiﬁcant events at both plant units 
concerned the repairs of suction channels (712) 
carried out under an exemption granted by STUK 
(C272/140). The risk-signiﬁcance of these repairs 
has increased from the estimate presented in the 
exemption application due to previously unidenti-
ﬁed risk factors modelled in PSA.
Other signiﬁcant events were related to latent 
failures in the containment spray system (322), 
auxiliary feed water system (327) and back-up die-
sel generator system (653).
The number of analysed events falling into 
the least risk-signiﬁcant category (CCDP<1E-8) 
has increased because there has been a shift in 
the reporting towards a policy in accordance with 
Guide YVL 1.5 (the unavailability of all Tech Spec 
components are presented in monthly or quarterly 
reports). This is shown in the enclosed ﬁgures. The 
kind of events analysed now were partly elimina-
ted from the analysis in previous years.
The analysed events are considered part of nor-
mal nuclear power plant operation and no further 
measures were required from STUK.
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Risk-signiﬁcance indicators included 
in STUK’s permanent objectives
Incorporated in the indicators for the effectiveness 
of STUK’s activities is the following objective that 
considers the condition of components having a 
bearing on the accident risk of nuclear facilities: 
“The condition of the nuclear power plant compo-
nents is such that the accident risk is reduced or 
remains unchanged.”
Deﬁnition
As indicators, the PSA-computed risk-signiﬁcance 
of operational events is followed and each indicator 
is the combined total risk contribution of unavai-
lability to the annual core damage risk . The are-
as under scrutiny include exemptions to the Tech 
Specs, Tech Spec component failures, preventive 
maintenance of Tech Spec components and other 
planned isolations. STUK has set as its internal 
objective that the indicator value remains below 
5%.
Source of data
Data for the calculation of the indicators are col-
lected from utility reports and applications for 
exemptions.
Purpose of indicator
The indicator follows the risk-signiﬁcance of Tech 
Spec component unavailabilities and monitors 
the duration of planned isolations and preventive 
maintenances.
Responsible unit/person
Risk analysis (RIS), Ari Julin (PSA analyses)
Safety Management (TUR) (failure data)
Interpretation of indicator
The effect of unavailabilities caused by component 
failures, preventive maintenance and deviations 
from operation and maintenance procedures on an-
nual accident risk exceeded the 5% target value 
set by STUK at both Olkiluoto plant units in 2005. 
This was partly due to planned, one-off mainte-
nance works executed under exemption granted 
by STUK, and partly to latent component failures 
in the safety system and back-up diesel generator 
system. No special action by STUK was required.
Risk calculation is based on conservative as-
sumptions and simpliﬁcations to facilitate analy-
ses, which materially reduces the usability of the 
results in trend monitoring. If the risk signiﬁcance 
on average remains at the target level from year to 
year, there is no need to focus special attention on 
the annual ﬂuctuation.
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A.II.3 Direct causes of events
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the direct causes of events re-
ported in accordance with Guide YVL 1.5 are follo-
wed. The event causes are divided into technical fai-
lures and erroneous operational and maintenance 
actions (non-technical, human errors).
Source of data
Data for the indicators are collected from special 
reports, scram reports and operational transient 
reports, and are entered on an event follow-up tab-
le maintained by TUR.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the division of the causes of reported 
events into technical and non-technical. “Non-
technical causes” denote failures caused by erro-
neous operational and maintenance actions. The 
indicator may be descriptive of an organisation’s 
operation.
Responsible unit/person
Safety Management (TUR)
Jukka Kupila
Interpretation of indicator
The immediate causes of the nine events reported 
by the Loviisa power plant in 2005 focus on techni-
cal failures (9). Only one event was classiﬁed to 
be due to human error. The Loviisa power plant 
included several events in its internal operational 
event reporting. For this reason the ratio may show 
some distortion.
The immediate causes of the 12 events at 
Olkiluoto focus on errors in plant operation (11). 
Only one event was caused by technical failure. 
This development is being monitored and related 
supervisory actions have been carried out concer-
ning the events.
The ratio of technical failures to human errors 
has varied greatly during the past few years. In 
2004 technical failures were the determining cau-
ses of events at both plants.
 Technical
 Human
Direct causes of events, Loviisa NPP
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A.II.4 Number of ﬁre alarms
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the numbers of ﬁre alarms and 
actual ﬁres are followed.
Source of data
The data for the indicators is collected from the 
utilities. The licensees submit the data needed for 
the indicator to the person responsible for the indi-
cator at STUK.
Purpose of indicator
To follow the effectiveness of ﬁre protection at the 
nuclear power plants.
Responsible unit/person
Power Plant Technology (VLT)
Heikki Saarikoski
Interpretation of indicator
No actual ﬁres occurred in the plant area at either 
operating plant, spent fuel storage or intermediate 
and low-level waste storage. Alarms triggered by 
dust, smoke or humidity dominated the automatic 
ﬁre detector alarms at both plants in 2005. A sig-
niﬁcant number of alarms triggered by sprinkler 
leakage occurred at Olkiluoto, which in part ex-
plains the growing trend of true detector alarms 
compared with the previous year.
The automatic ﬁre detectors were upgraded at 
Loviisa in 2000 and at Olkiluoto in 2001. The num-
bers of alarms increased at both units after that 
because of more sensitive equipment and equip-
ment failures.
The distinct reduction in alarms at the Loviisa 
plant since 2003 and at the Olkiluoto plant since 
2004 is due to pre-alarms no longer being included 
in the calculations; an individual detector examines 
the air quality and gives a pre-warning before the 
actual ﬁre alarm. After the modiﬁcation the num-
ber of alarms caused by equipment failures dec-
reased signiﬁcantly at both plants: There were no 
alarms caused by component failure at Olkiluoto in 
2005, and only six alarms at Loviisa. The number 
of true detector alarms also decreased at Loviisa in 
2005 to only 18 alarms. At the Olkiluoto plant the 
number of true detector alarms has been steadily 
increasing for several years. In 2005 the number 
was 74, which is twice as high as the level prior to 
the system upgrade.
Number of fire alarms, Loviisa NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
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A.III Structural integrity
A.III.1 Fuel integrity
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the parameters below are follo-
wed by plant unit:
• the maximum activity concentration of the pri-
mary coolant (Loviisa: as I-131 equivalent; Ol-
kiluoto: I-131 only) and the peak value of ma-
ximum activity concentration in even, steady-
state operation (Loviisa: the sum of the iodine 
isotope activity concentrations in hot standby, 
start-up state or power operation; Olkiluoto: 
I-131 activity in power operation). The maxi-
mum values are compared with the Tech Spec 
limit in a graphical presentation;
• the maximum activity concentration of I-131 
during depressurisation while entering shut-
down or after reactor scram; and
• the number of leaking fuel rod bundles removed 
from the reactor.
Source of data
The licensees submit the indicator values directly 
to the person responsible for the indicator at STUK. 
The maximum activity levels are also available in 
the quarterly reports submitted by the utilities.
Purpose of indicator
The indicators describe fuel integrity and the fuel 
leakage volume during the operating cycle. The in-
dicators for the shutdown situations also describe 
the success of the shutdown concerning radiation 
protection.
Responsible unit/person
Power Plant Technology (VLT)
Kirsti Tossavainen
Interpretation of indicator (primary 
coolant activity, Loviisa)
There were no fuel leaks at the Loviisa plant units 
in the operating cycle 2004–2005 and the activity 
concentration of the primary coolant remained un-
changed. In addition to the activity concentration 
calculated as I-131 equivalents, the sum of the 
activity concentrations of different iodine isotopes 
of the primary coolant is followed at the Loviisa 
plant. According to the Tech Specs, the sum activity 
Primary coolant maximum activity concentrations in 
power operation, Loviisa
Primary coolant maximum activity concentrations 
during shutdown, Loviisa
Fuel integrity: Iodine maximum activity concentration level
of primary coolant (131eq kBq/m3),
Loviisa NPP
I/04 II/04 III/04 IV/04 I/05 II/05 III/05 IV/05
 Lo1 4.90E+02 5.30E+02 5.00E+02 4.00E+02 4.92E+02 5.2E+02 1.10E+03 3.80E+02
 Lo2 5.00E+02 6.00E+02 6.00E+02 4.20E+02 5.17E+02 5.6E+02 1.10E+03 4.30E+02
1.0E+01
1.0E+02
1.0E+03
1.0E+04
1.0E+00
Fuel integrity: Iodine maximum activity concentration level of
primary coolant (131ekv. kBq/m
3),
Loviisa NPP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1.0E+01
1.0E+02
1.0E+03
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+00
   Loviisa 1    Loviisa 2
Fuel integrity: Iodine maximum activity concentration of
primary coolant (kBq/m3) in power operation, Loviisa NPP
[sum of iodine isotope activity concentrations]
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
1.0E+01
1.0E+02
1.0E+03
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+00
   Loviisa 1    Loviisa 2
1.0E+07
1.0E+08
1.0E+09
Tech Spec limit 100 GBq/m3
2002 2003 2004 2005
Fuel integrity: Iodine maximum activity concentration of
primary coolant (131eq kBq/m3) during shutdown,
Loviisa NPP
I II III IV I II III IV
2004 2005
1.0E+02
1.0E+04
1.0E+06
1.0E+00
   Lo1 annual maintenance outage    Lo1 other stoppage  Lo1 reactor scram
 Lo2 annual maintenance outage  Lo2 other stoppage  Lo2 reactor scram
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may not exceed a value of 1.0E+8 kBq/m³. At both 
plant units the sum activities have been around 
0.1% of the Tech Specs limit.
The I-131 activity concentration of the primary 
coolant when plant units are being shut down and 
during reactor scrams has been followed as the 
STUK indicator since 2002. No signiﬁcant chan-
ges have occurred in the iodine activity concent-
rations when plant units are being shut down at 
the Loviisa plant, because there have been no fuel 
leaks at the plant units since 1999. 
Interpretation of indicator (primary 
coolant activity, Olkiluoto)
The activity concentration of Olkiluoto 1 primary 
coolant remained unchanged in 2005, and the acti-
vity level continued to decrease after the fuel leak 
which occurred in the operating cycle 2003−2004.
The Olkiluoto 2 reactor contained leaking fuel 
throughout 2005, as a result of which the I-131 
activity concentration of the primary coolant re-
mained above normal. The leak was discovered on 
30 August 2004 and the leaking fuel bundle was re-
moved from the reactor during the annual mainte-
nance outage. Following the outage, a new fuel leak 
was discovered on 25 July 2005 (quarterly report 
3/2005: Based on laboratory analyses, the leak was 
estimated to have begun on 23 July 2005).
As a result of the 2004 leak, the Np-23 activity 
concentration of the coolant began to increase in 
January 2005, which indicated build-up of secon-
dary damage in the cladding. Before the annual 
maintenance outage, uranium corresponding to 
two fuel pellets reached the coolant water through 
the secondary damage. The maximum value of the 
I-131 activity concentration of the primary coolant 
was 3,100 kBq/m³, which is approximately 0.14 % 
of the Tech Specs limit. The leaking fuel had been 
localised to the coverage area of control rod L70 in 
October 2004. The rod was part of a four-rod opera-
ting group, whose position in the reactor was 80%. 
The power load on the fuel cladding during opera-
tion was reduced by operating control rod L70 and 
its symmetry rod at 76% for the rest of the cycle. 
Furthermore, L70 operations were minimised by 
means of sequence planning and the fortnightly 2% 
movement tests on the control rods were suspen-
ded on March 2005. A report on the fuel leak is also 
included in Appendix 3 to the Annual Report.
At the beginning of the operating cycle 
Primary coolant maximum activity concentrations in 
power operation, Olkiluoto
Primary coolant maximum activity concentrations 
during shutdown, Olkiluoto
Fuel integrity: Iodine maximum activity concentration of
primary coolant (131eq kBq/m3),
Olkiluoto NPP
I II III IV I II III IV
1.0E+02
1.0E+04
1.0E+00
1.0E+06
2004 2005
   OL1 annual maintaenance outage    OL1 other stoppage  OL1 reactor scram
 OL2 annual maintaenance outage  OL2 other stoppage  OL2 reactor scram
Fuel integrity: Iodine maximum activity concentration level
of primary coolant (131eq kBq/m3),
Olkiluoto NPP
I/04 II/04 III/04 IV/04 I/05 II/05 III/05 IV/05
 OL1 8.20E+01 7.80E+01 5.40E+01 5.40E+01 5.50E+01 5.80E+01 3.60E+01 3.70E+01
 OL2 5.80E+01 5.70E+01 4.20E+01 1.49E+03 2.40E+03 2.02E+03 9.50E+02 3.00E+03
1.0E+01
1.0E+02
1.0E+03
1.0E+04
1.0E+00
Fuel integrity: Iodine maximum activity concentration level
of primary coolant (131eq kBq/m3),
Olkiluoto NPP
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
1.0E+01
1.0E+02
1.0E+03
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+00
   Olkiluoto 1    Olkiluoto 2
1.0E+07
 Tech Spec limit 2.2 MBq/kg
2002 2003 2004 2005
Fuel integrity: Iodine maximum activity concentration level
of primary coolant (131eq kBq/m3),
Olkiluoto NPP
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1.0E+01
1.0E+02
1.0E+03
1.0E+04
1.0E+05
1.0E+06
1.0E+00
   Olkiluoto 1    Olkiluoto 2
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2005−2006, the activity concentration of the pri-
mary coolant was approximately 800 kBq/m³. The 
new fuel leak detected on 25 July 2005 did not 
immediately cause an increase in the activity of 
the primary coolant. The activity level remained 
almost unchanged until mid-November, when pe-
riodic tests requiring reduced power were carried 
out and the I-131 activity concentration rose to 
6,520 kBq/m³, which was the maximum value in 
2005 and approximately 0.3% of the Tech Specs 
limit. It is not certain whether the increase in acti-
vity was due to the power reduction. Having reach-
ed its maximum value, the activity concentration 
stabilised at a level of 300 kBq/m³. The fuel leak 
did not cause any uranium contamination in the 
reactor core in 2005. As a result of the 2004 fuel 
leak the uranium contamination of the fuel leak is 
2 g of uranium.
The increases in coolant activity caused by 
fuel leaks in 2003 at Olkiluoto 1 and in 2002 at 
Olkiluoto 2 are shown as notably larger I-131 ac-
tivity concentrations while shutting down plant 
units for annual maintenance outages. In the other 
reactor shutdowns the coolant I-131 activity con-
centrations have not been exceptional.
Interpretation of indicator (number 
of leaking fuel rod bundles)
At Olkiluoto 2, a leaking fuel bundle was removed 
from the reactor during the annual maintenance 
outage. The leak had been discovered on 30 August 
2004. An inspection revealed a thin sliver of metal 
in the bundle, which chafed against the corner rod 
in the bundle and caused the original damage to 
the cladding. Four months later secondary dama-
ge was detected in the lower half of the leaking 
fuel rod. Towards the end of the operating cycle 
the damage expanded into a transverse fracture 
of the rod. The integrity of all fuel bundles used in 
the reactor during the operating cycle 2004−2005 
was inspected during the maintenance outage. No 
other leaking bundles were discovered. A fuel leak 
was discovered at Olkiluoto 2 on 25 July 2005. The 
leaking bundle will be removed from the reactor in 
the 2005 annual maintenance outage at the latest. 
No leaking fuel rod bundles were discovered at 
Olkiluoto 1 during the operating cycle 2004−2005.
Fuel leakages have been uncommon at the 
Loviisa plant units since 1995. The large number 
of fuel leakages at Loviisa 2 in 1995 was caused 
by corrosion products accumulating in the fuel rod 
bundles after decontamination of the primary cir-
cuit surfaces in the 1994 annual maintenance outa-
ge. Crud gradually attaching to the fuel rod bundles 
and their spacer grids reduced coolant ﬂow and 
brought about vibration in the bundles. Fuel rod da-
mage resulted from spacer grids touching the rods.
Fuel leakages have occurred almost every year 
at the Olkiluoto plant units. They have been small 
and the leaking fuel bundles have been removed in 
annual maintenance outages following leak detec-
tion.
Number of leaking fuel bundles,
Loviisa NPP
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A.III.2 Primary circuit integrity
Deﬁnition
The water chemistry indicators are
• chemistry performance indices used by the uti-
lities, depicting the effectiveness of water che-
mistry control in the secondary circuits of PWRs 
and in the reactor circuits of BWRs. The indica-
tor for Olkiluoto is the international index used 
by the plant. The indicator for Loviisa is a new 
index developed and introduced at the plant in 
2004 parallel to the international index. The 
new index describes the water chemistry condi-
tions in the secondary circuit at Loviisa with a 
higher degree of sensitivity than the correspon-
ding international index for WER plants. This 
new index observes corrosive factors and the 
concentrations of corrosion products in steam 
generator blow-down and feed water. For steam 
generator blow-down, the calculation includes 
the chloride, sulphate and sodium concentra-
tions and acid conductivity; for feed water, it 
includes the iron, copper and oxygen concent-
rations. The chemistry index of the Olkiluoto 
plant is affected by the chloride and sulphate 
concentrations of the reactor water and the iron 
concentration in the feed water. The indices for 
both plants only cover the aforementioned va-
lues during power operation.
• the maximum chloride concentration of the 
steam generator blow-down (Loviisa) and the 
reactor water (Olkiluoto) during operation com-
pared with the Tech Spec limit in the monito-
ring period. At the Olkiluoto plant the maxi-
mum sulphate concentration of reactor water 
on even, steady-state operation is followed as 
well.
• corrosion products released from the surfaces 
of the reactor circuit and the secondary circuit 
into the coolant: For the Loviisa plant, the 
iron concentration of the primary coolant solid 
material and the secondary circuit feed water 
(maximum values of the monitoring period) are 
followed. For the Olkiluoto plant, the iron con-
centration of reactor water (maximum value of 
the monitoring period) is followed. In addition, 
the maximum Co-60 activity concentration of 
the reactor coolant while bringing the plant to a 
cold shutdown or after a reactor scram is follo-
wed for both plants.
The indices below are used to follow identiﬁed 
and unidentiﬁed primary circuit leakages at the 
Olkiluoto plant units:
• total volume (m³) of identiﬁed (from contain-
ment to collection tank 352 T1 of the controlled 
leakage drain system) and unidentiﬁed (total 
volume of leakages into the sump of the control-
led ﬂoor drainage system, 345 T33) containment 
internal leakages during the operating cycle, 
and
• highest containment internal leakage volume 
during the year in relation to the allowed lea-
kage volume in the Tech Specs (outﬂow water 
volume of water condensing in the air coolers of 
the containment cooling system 725/Tech Specs 
limit).
Source of data
The licensees submit indicators describing water 
chemistry control to the respective responsible per-
son at STUK. The concentration levels of corrosive 
substances and corrosion products are obtained 
from quarterly reports submitted by licensees.
The licensee submits data on primary circuit 
leakages at the Olkiluoto power plant to the res-
ponsible person at STUK.
Purpose of indicator
To monitor and control primary and secondary cir-
cuit integrity. The monitoring is done by indices 
depicting water chemistry control and by chosen 
corrosive impurities and corrosion products.
Indicators for primary circuit leakages are used 
to monitor and control primary circuit integrity.
Responsible units/persons
Power Plant Technology (VLT), Kirsti Tossavainen 
(chemistry indices)
Safety Management (TUR), Jarmo Konsi   
(primary circuit leakages)
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Water chemistry conditions, Loviisa
Interpretation of indicators
Chemistry index
No deviating chemistry index values were reported 
by either plant unit at Loviisa in 2005. The high 
values of the index at Loviisa 2 in previous years 
were due to a seawater leak in the condenser of 
the other turbine (50), which began in 2002 and 
was repaired during the 2004 annual maintenance 
outage.
Iron content of secondary circuit feed water
The iron content of the feed water has been follo-
wed in the STUK indicators since 2002. No signi-
ﬁcant changes have taken place in the indicator 
values. At Loviisa 1 the iron concentration was 
higher than normal in the second quarter of 2004. 
This was due to a reactor scram that occurred on 
29 June 2004, causing impurities to be released 
from the surfaces of the secondary circuit. No other 
signiﬁcant changes have taken place in the indica-
tor values.
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products;
Maximum iron concentration in the feed water (µg/l)
(RL30 / RL70), Loviisa NPP
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
15
0
 Loviisa 1  Loviisa 2
5
10
20
25
30
2002 2003 2004 2005
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosive impurities;
Maximum chloride concentration of a steam generator
blow-down (µg/kg), Loviisa NPP
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Integrity of the secondary circuit:
Chemistry index, Loviisa NPP
I/3 II/3 III/3 IV/3 I/4 II/4 III/4 IV/4 I/5 II/5 III/5 IV/5
 LO1 1.46 1.10 1.17 1.02 1.01 1.11 1.91 1.06 1.23 1.05 1.25 1.01
 LO2 1.07 1.19 2.07 2.77 4.25 4.37 6.65 1.13 1.00 1.00 1.22 1.02
0
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2
3
4
5
6
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Integrity of the secondary circuit: Chemistry index,
Loviisa NPP
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 LO1 2.22 1.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.45 1.19 1.18 1.11
  LO2 1.91 1.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.36 1.76 3.93 1.05
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
The maximum chloride contents of 
steam generator blow-down
As the STUK indicator, the maximum chloride con-
centrations of steam generator blow-down (the gre-
atest value of the chloride concentrations of all six 
steam generators) have been followed since 2002. 
According to the Tech Specs, the chloride concent-
ration of steam generator blow-down may not ex-
ceed a value of 0.5 mg/kg. If the excess is minor 
(0.5–1.0 mg/kg), the plant has one week to bring 
the concentration into agreement with the Tech 
Specs. If the deviation is greater (1.0–5.0 mg/kg), 
the plant has one day to restore the concentration. 
If the deviation is even greater than that, the plant 
unit must be shut down.
There had been a seawater leak in the conden-
ser of the other turbine (50) at Loviisa 2 since 2002, 
which had caused the chloride concentration of the 
steam generator blow-down to become greater than 
normal. The leak was repaired in the annual main-
tenance outage in 2004, after which the chloride 
concentration was also restored to pre-leak level.
Iron in primary coolant
The maximum values of the iron concentration 
of the primary coolant are from situations when 
plant units have been brought to a shutdown. The 
iron content of the cooling circuit is at its peak in 
these situations because the changes in the pro-
cess circumstances release corrosion products from 
the surfaces. The indicator has been followed since 
2002, and, during the monitoring, there has not 
STUK-B-YTO 249
101
APPENDIX1 STUK’S SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS FOR NPPS IN 2005
been any trend away from the ordinary in the 
maximum values of the iron concentration of the 
primary coolant.
Integrity of primary circuit: Maximum cobalt-60 activity concentration
(kBq/m3) in primary coolant during shutdown
(outages and reactor scrams), Loviisa NPP
I II III IV I II III IV
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1.0E+03
1.0E+01
Cobalt-60 concentration in shutdown
The indicator has been followed since 2002. No 
fundamental changes have taken place in the 
Co-60 activity concentrations at either plant unit 
in Loviisa.
Integrity of primary circuit:
Chemistry index, Olkiluoto NPP
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 OL1 2.14 2.06 1.52 1.55 1.34 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00
  OL2 2.01 1.83 1.65 1.23 1.28 1.09 1.00 1.09 1.06
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Integrity of primary circuit:
Chemistry index, Olkiluoto NPP
I/3 II/3 III/3 IV/3 I/4 II/4 III/4 IV/4 I/5 II/5 III/5 IV/5
 OL1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
  OL2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.28 1.07 1.00 1.00 1.13 1.10
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
slightly greater than the target value, are due to 
sulphate concentrations which exceed the target 
value.
Chloride content in reactor 
water during operation
Chloride is a signiﬁcant factor for stress corro-
sion in stainless steel. The Tech Specs limit for the 
chloride concentration of reactor water is 0.1 ppm 
(100 µg/l), which sets restrictions on the use of the 
plant. A chloride concentration higher than the 
limit is only allowed for 330 hours a year. If the 
requirement cannot be complied with, the plant 
must be brought to a cold shutdown. The plant 
must immediately be brought to a cold shutdown if 
the chloride content of reactor water exceeds 2 ppm 
(2000 µg/l).
The chloride content during operation has usu-
ally been around one per cent of the limit set in the 
Tech Specs at both plant units. In the third quarter 
of 2004 there was a chloride content higher than 
normal at Olkiluoto 2. This was due to a leak in the 
turbine condenser, during which seawater got into 
the reactor water and the chloride content rose to 
21.3 µg/l. After leak repair the chloride content re-
turned to normal levels by the end of the year. The 
2005 values which exceeded the target values were 
due to annual maintenance outages.
Water chemistry conditions, Olkiluoto
Interpretation of indicators
Chemistry index
At Olkiluoto 1, the chemistry index remained at 
the target value (1.00) in 2005. At Olkiluoto 2, the 
third and fourth quarter target values, which are 
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosive impurities; Maximum chloride
concentration in primary coolant (µg/kg) in power operation,
Olkiluoto NPP
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
100
10
1
0
Tech Spec threshold for operation restrictions ≤ 100 µg/kg
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Integrity of primary circuit:
Corrosion products; Maximum iron concentration in primary coolant
(Fetot µg/l), Loviisa NPP
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Sulphate content in reactor water
Both Olkiluoto plant units have had the problem 
of a sulphate concentration higher than the reactor 
water target value. Under certain circumstances, 
sulphate is a signiﬁcant factor in stress corrosion. 
The sulphate in the reactor water originates in the 
sulphate released from the ion-exchange resin of 
the condensate cleaning ﬁlters. Temperature is one 
of the factors in the release of sulphate from the ﬁl-
ter resins. The temperature of the condensate ente-
ring the ﬁlters was previously set by a partial pre-
heater bypass at 60oC. Changes have been made 
at the plant units to reduce the temperature of the 
water entering the condensate cleaning ﬁlters by 
changing the place of the condensate system pre-
heater. The pre-heater was relocated to after the 
condensate cleaning ﬁlters, whereas it was earlier 
located before the ﬁlters. Thanks to the modiﬁcati-
on, the temperature of the condensate entering the 
condensate cleaning ﬁlters decreased to an average 
of 50oC. The modiﬁcation was made at Olkiluoto 2 
in 2003 and at Olkiluoto 1 in 2004.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has set a target value 
of 5 µg/l for the sulphate concentration in reactor 
water. This target value must not be exceeded. 
Since the plant modiﬁcations the sulphate con-
centration has remained below the target level at 
both plant units, excluding the exceedances occur-
ring at Olkiluoto 2. The index values being higher 
than the target value in the third quarter of 2004 
is suspected to be due to a change in the quality 
of the ion-exchange resin. In 2005 the sulphate 
content exceeded the set target limit in the third 
and fourth quarters. The events were due to the 
running times of many condensate cleaning ﬁlters 
being long. Following the replacement of the ion-
exchange resin of the ﬁlters, sulphate contents 
fell below the target value and the duration of the 
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products; Maximum sulphate
concentration in primary coolant (µg/l) in power operation,
Olkiluoto NPP
I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV I II III IV
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Target value < 5 µg/l
deviation did not exceed the limit of four days allo-
wed in Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s instructions.
Iron concentration in feed water
A small amount of iron dissolves into the reactor 
water from the components in the reactor circuit. 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy has set a target value of 1 
µg/l for the iron concentration in the water supplied 
to the reactor, which may not be exceeded during 
plant operation. This target value was exceeded 
during the second quarter of 2005. The exceptional 
value was due to the annual maintenance comp-
leted on the day before sampling. The impurity 
contents of the reactor water are higher during 
annual maintenance than during operation. The 
action threshold set in Teollisuuden Voima Oy’s 
instructions for the content has been 2 µg/l. There 
have not been any other instances of the target va-
lue being exceeded during the indicator monitoring 
by STUK, which began in 2002.
Integrity of primary circuit: Corrosion products;
Maximum iron concentration in reactor feed water (µg/l),
Olkiluoto NPP
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Integrity of primary circuit: Maximum cobalt-60 activity concentration
(kBq/m3) in primary coolant during shutdown
(outages and reactor scrams), Olkiluoto NPP
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  OL1 annual maintenance outage    OL1 other stoppage  OL1 reactor scram
 OL2 annual maintenance outage  OL2 other stoppage  OL2 reactor scram
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Cobalt-60 concentration in shutdown
As the STUK indicator, the Co-60 activity concent-
ration when bringing plant units to cold shutdown 
has been followed since 2002. Radioactive cobalt-60 
isotope is generated as an activation product of ma-
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Identified leakages of primary circuit (352T1, m3),
Olkiluoto NPP
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 OL1, identified leakages        OL2, identified leakages
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terials containing cobalt in components within the 
reactor circuit. Co-60 isotope is a signiﬁcant source 
of radiation exposure at nuclear power plants. In 
the STUK indicator system the activity concent-
ration of Co-60 isotope while bringing the plant to 
cold shutdown is used to describe the amount of 
corrosion products released from the surfaces of 
the reactor circuit, and the success of the shutdown 
procedures.
No fundamental changes have taken place in 
the Co-60 activity concentrations at either plant 
unit in Olkiluoto.
Primary circuit leakages, Olkiluoto
Interpretation of indicator
Leaks identiﬁed in the operating cycle 2004–2005 
were 3,300 m³ (OL1) and 2,741 m³ (OL2). There 
were no fundamental changes compared with 
2004.
In the operating cycle 2004–2005 the volume 
of unidentiﬁed leaks was very small, 1.14 m³. 
Unidentified leakages of primary circuit (345T33,m3),
Olkiluoto NPP
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The maximum unidentified leakage in ratio to the Tech Spec limit,
Olkiluoto NPP
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At Olkiluoto 2, however, the volume was much 
larger, 53 m³. At Olkiluoto 2, the leakage volume 
was mainly due to a loosened ﬂange joint of one 
vacuum breaker in the system (314) as 9 bolts had 
stripped their threads and only three more were 
still in place, although also loose.
In the operating cycle 2004–2005 the ratio of 
the greatest containment internal leakage volume 
to the allowed leakage volume in the Tech Specs 
was low for both plant units: 0.23% at Olkiluoto 1 
and 0.35% at Olkiluoto 2.
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A.III.3 Containment integrity
Deﬁnition
As the indicators, the parameters below are follo-
wed:
• overall as-found leakage of outer isolation val-
ves compared with the highest allowed overall 
leakage of the outer isolation valves
• percentage of isolation valves tested during the 
year in question at each plant unit that passed 
the leakage test at ﬁrst attempt (i.e. as-found 
leakage smaller than acceptance criteria of val-
ve and no consecutive exceeding of the so-called 
attention criteria of a valve without repair)
• combined leakage rate of containment penet-
rations and airlocks in relation to their highest 
allowed overall leakage at each plant unit. The 
combined leakage rate at Olkiluoto includes 
leakages in personnel airlocks, the maintenan-
ce dome and the containment dome. In Loviisa 
the combined leakage rate is comprised of the 
leakage test results from personnel airlocks, 
the material airlock, the cable penetrations of 
inspection equipment, the containment main-
tenance ventilation systems (TL23), the main 
steam piping (RA) and the feed water system 
(RL) penetrations; the seals of blind-ﬂanged pe-
netrations of ice-ﬁlling pipes are also included.
Source of data
Data is extracted from the utilities’ leaktightness 
test reports submitted by the licensee to STUK for 
information within three months of the completion 
of annual maintenance. STUK calculates the ove-
rall as-found leakages, since the reports give total 
leakages as they are at the end of an annual main-
tenance outage (i.e. after completion of repairs and 
re-testing).
Purpose of indicator
To follow the integrity of the containment isolation 
valves, penetrations and air locks.
Responsible unit/person
Reactor and Safety Systems (REA),
Päivi Salo
Interpretation of indicator
Loviisa
The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation val-
ves at both plant units has decreased. The percen-
tage of isolation valves that passed the leaktight-
ness test at the ﬁrst attempt has remained high.
The overall as-found leakage of containment 
penetrations, which, at Loviisa, includes leaktight-
ness tests of the personnel airlock, the emergency 
personnel airlock, the material airlock, the reactor 
pit, inward relief valves, cable penetrations and 
the bellows seals has decreased at Loviisa 2 and is 
small at both plant units.
The integrity of the Loviisa containment buil-
ding has remained good. Due to problems in the 
leaktightness of the rubber bellows of penetrations 
they have been replaced with metal structures.
The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves compared with the
highest allowed overall leakage of outer isolation valves, Loviisa NPP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
LO1 0.09 0.67 1.93 5.54 0.90 0.52 0.30 2.15 0.45 0.39 0.71 1.10 0.38
 LO2 0.14 0.41 0.31 1.31 0.10 0.53 0.85 0.40 0.58 0.49 0.46 0.54 0.36
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Isolation valves passing the leakage test at the first attempt,
Loviisa NPP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
LO1 98 97 96 95 97 98 98 95 98 99 99 95 97 
 LO2 100 99 99 98 99 98 98 100 99 97 99 97 96
90 %
92 %
94 %
96 %
98 %
100 %
Combined leak rate of containment penetrations and air locks
compared to the leak limit, Loviisa NPP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
LO1 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.08 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.02 
 LO2 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.17 0.28 0.03
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
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Olkiluoto
The overall as-found leakage of the Olkiluoto 1 ou-
ter isolation valves was, as in previous years, below 
the limit set in the Tech Specs. Approx. 30% comes 
from leaks in two isolation valves in the scram 
system (354). Approx. 8% comes from leaks in one 
valve in feed water system (312). In leakage tes-
ting, the largest leak was through the inner main 
steam valve (311V4). The reason for the leak was a 
broken internal check valve.
The overall as-found leakage of the Olkiluoto 2 
outer isolation valves was below the limit set in 
the Tech Specs. 57.8% comes from leaks in two 
isolation valves in the scram system (354) and 
approx. 17% from a leak in one valve in the feed 
water system (321). In leakage testing, the largest 
single leak was through the inner main steam val-
ve (311V2). The reason for the leak was a broken 
internal check valve.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leaktightness test at ﬁrst attempt has re-
mained stable.
The overall as-found leakage rate of contain-
ment penetrations, in which TVO includes leaka-
ges in the upper and lower personnel airlock, the 
maintenance dome and the containment dome, has 
remained small.
The overall as-found leakage of outer isolation valves compared with the
highest allowed overall leakage of outer isolation valves, Olkiluoto NPP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
OL1 1.79 1.03 1.28 2.08 1.30 1.04 0.52 0.25 0.19 0.58 0.50 0.80 0.47
 OL2 1.60 4.50 1.88 1.40 1.79 0.49 0.62 1.03 1.12 0.74 1.69 1.26 0.45
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
Combined leak rate of containment penetrations and air locks
compared to the leak limit, Olkiluoto NPP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
OL1 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
OL2 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
Isolation valves passing the leakage test at the first attempt,
Olkiluoto NPP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
OL1 96 98 98 98 99 98 99  99 99 98 98 95 96  
OL2 94 94 96 98 97 97 97 96 98 99 98 97 97 
90 %
92 %
94 %
96 %
98 %
100 %
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Tapani Eurasto, Soile Metso, Janne Nevalainen, Hannu Ollikkala, Rainer Rantala, 
Heikki Saarikoski, Päivi Salo, Heimo Takala, Tapani Virolainen
Loviisa nuclear power plant
The emergency operating 
procedures were revised
The emergency operating procedures of Loviisa 
nuclear power plant were revised in the HOKE 
project, launched in 2000. The project encompassed 
the drawing up of diagnosis procedures for tran-
sients and emergencies arising from primary and 
secondary leaks, procedures for operators and the 
safety engineer as well as action sheets for onsite 
measures. Some old procedures have been deleted 
and the rest have been revised as appropriate i.a. 
as regards transition between old and new proce-
dures.
In accordance with the new procedures, nuclear 
power plant operators follow their own separate 
procedures and initiate the necessary actions in 
their ﬁelds of responsibility in the event of an 
emergency or a transient. The shift manager co-or-
dinates these actions and reviews the main actions 
and parameters using his own procedures. The 
safety engineer in parallel with the operators inde-
pendently oversees safety functions using separate 
procedures to ensure that plant behaviour is as 
planned.
The revised procedures consist of guidelines 
and instructions presented as ﬂow charts. The 
guidelines deﬁne strategy and give grounds for op-
erator actions during emergencies and transients. 
It serves as a basis for actual control room proce-
dures containing operator procedures. The guide-
lines are used for training purposes as well.
The revised control room procedures of the 
Loviisa plant are based on French nuclear power 
plant procedures. The project’s French experts 
also participated in the validation and veriﬁca-
tion of the procedures and their background ma-
terial in co-operation with the plant’s own per-
sonnel. Validation ascertains authenticity of the 
procedures i.a. by comparison with the plant and 
by simulator tests. Veriﬁcation authenticates i.a. 
correlation and functioning of the new procedures 
with other plant procedures. The project included 
training given to the control room personnel of the 
Loviisa plant in the use of the new procedures. Due 
to the revision’s signiﬁcance, both structurally and 
contents-wise, STUK required that shift supervi-
sors and operators working in the control room 
have given shift-speciﬁc proof of workmanship 
prior to the introduction into use of the revised 
procedures.
STUK in December 2005 authorised the intro-
duction into service of the revised emergency op-
erating procedures, which is due at Loviisa power 
plant in early 2006.
Olkiluoto power plant
Sealing changes in the expansion joints of 
the containment building intermediate level 
and the transportation shaft at Olkiluoto 2
The sealings of the expansion joints of the 
containment building intermediate level and the 
transportation shaft were replaced in the annual 
maintenance outage. The intermediate level sepa-
rates the upper drywell and wetwell. Systems con-
taining high pressure water and steam are housed 
in the upper drywell. The wetwell is the water-
ﬁlled part of the containment to which steam dis-
charging from the reactor is channelled during 
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accidents. The sealing, installed in the expansion 
joint between the reinforced-concrete intermediate 
level and the containment building, is required to 
withstand dislocations, pressure differences and 
heat loads during accidents. The transportation 
shaft between the containment upper and lower 
drywell is rigidly attached to the concrete casing 
at both ends. A construction joint is ﬁtted to it to 
accommodate for thermal and other constrained 
motion. The different sections of the containment 
building are shown in Figure L2.1.
The original rubber sealings of the expansion 
joints have exceeded their design service life. In ad-
dition, the original design did not consider severe 
accident conditions, which makes the sealing of the 
intermediate level expansion joint and that of the 
transportation shaft a hazard to the pressure sup-
pression function.
A new intermediate level expansion joint seal-
ing was installed on top of the old operational seal-
ing. Old transport shaft sealing was removed and 
a new one was installed in the existing ﬂange. The 
new sealing material withstands severe accident 
conditions better that the old one. Post-installation 
leakage tests showed the trasportation shaft to be 
leaktight. The leaktightness of the new intermedi-
ate level sealing was satisfactory and is intended 
to be improved.
Containment sampling system 
modiﬁcation at Olkiluoto 2
The sampling system at Olkiluoto 2 was improved 
to facilitate gas sampling in the containment gas 
space during an accident. The evaluation of ra-
dionuclide concentrations in the containment gas 
space must be possible by sampling, or some other 
method, even during severe accidents. A sample 
can be used to assess a release time and the neces-
sary protective measures .
The new system samples gas from the gas space 
of the containment upper drywell by a sampling 
tube connected to the containment ﬁltered venting 
system (see Figure L2.1). It determines the concen-
tration of noble gases and iodine in the contain-
ment gas space. The volumes of aerosols released 
cannot be determined but they are rather effective-
ly adsorbed onto the system’s ﬁlter. Measurements 
enable the evaluation of the magnitude and en-
vironmental impact of a possible release through 
the ﬁlters of the ﬁltered venting system during a 
severe accident.
The sampling system is normally in stand-by 
mode and requires no electrical power to function. 
Gas sampled from the system is analysed in the 
laboratory. The system complements and backs up 
other monitoring systems as well as the radiation 
monitoring system for rooms, which is coupled to 
the battery-backed system. The sampling system 
was installed in the 2005 annual maintenance 
but has not yet been introduced into service owing 
to malfunctions in the angle transmissions of its 
valves.
Feed water distributors were 
reinstalled at Olkiluoto 2
In the 2005 annual maintenance outage at 
Olkiluoto 2, new feedwater distributors, repaired in 
the winter of 2005, were reinstalled in place of the 
old ones. The new distributors were ﬁrst installed 
in the 2003 outage but were replaced with the old 
ones in the 2004 annual maintenance outage, since 
cracks had been found in them (see Annual Report 
2004).
Figure L2.1. A diagrammatic plan of the Olkiluoto 1 and 
2 containment buildings.
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The new distributors are designed to handle 
feed water ﬂow after a power uprating and their 
design takes into account the thermal stresses to 
which the emergency cooling system riser pipes, 
located inside the reactor pressure vessel, are sub-
jected. The riser pipes are located directly where 
the feed water distributors are. A thermal stress 
hazard arises when cold feed water mixes with the 
hot water returning from the steam separators. 
The new distributors are intended to bring the ﬂow 
mixing point further away from metal surfaces and 
to thus restrict riser pipe thermal stress.
No cracks were detected in the new feed water 
distributors replaced at Olkiluoto 1 in 2004. The 
distributors of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 are due for inspec-
tion in future outages.
The steam dryer was replaced at Olkiluoto 2
The steam dryer was replaced in the 2005 an-
nual maintenance outage at Olkiluoto 2. The mois-
ture content of the reactor–to–turbine steam at 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 increased after a power uprating 
in 1998. The moisture content was approx. 0.1% 
before the power uprating. After it, the annual 
average moisture content has been 0.27−0.33% at 
Olkiluoto 1 and 0.31−0.34% at Olkiluoto 2. The 
moisture in steam has not been ascertained to have 
increased erosion-corrosion in turbine systems. 
The steam from the reactor at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 is 
channelled direct to the turbine plant. Thus, along 
with the moisture, radioactive substances dissolved 
in water are transported to the turbine plant, caus-
ing elevated radiation levels there. The dose rates 
measured at the turbine plant have been 2–10 fold 
compared with those measured before the power 
uprating. An increase in the steam moisture con-
tent essentially increases occupational doses when 
working with or around systems having to do with 
steam. Collective occupational doses at Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 have been below the limit established by 
STUK (see chapter 3.2.4).
Teollisuuden Voima Oy ordered new steam dry-
ers to reduce the steam moisture content. The more 
effective design of their dryer panels aims at reduc-
ing steam moisture below 0.1%. The new dryer was 
installed at Olkiluoto 2 in the 2005 annual mainte-
nance outage and will be installed at Olkiluoto 1 in 
the 2006 annual maintenance outage.
The Olkiluoto 2 steam dryer was completed 
and delivered in January 2005. Its packaging had 
broken in transit, however, letting in snow and im-
purities. In the receiving inspection i.a. machining 
chips left inside the dryer during manufacturing 
were found. Before moving it to the reactor hall, 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy submitted the dryer to 
thorough cleansing. At the same time investigation 
and corrective action was initiated to avoid similar 
problems with the Olkiluoto 1 dryer.
A steam moisture content of 0.009% was meas-
ured after the annual maintenance with Olkiluoto 2 
operating at full power. With continued operation, 
the moisture values have been 0.007%.
A high pressure turbine and steam 
reheaters were replaced at Olkiluoto 2
A high pressure turbine and steam reheaters 
were replaced at the 2005 annual maintenance of 
Olkiluoto 2 to increase the turbine power output 
and reduce the moisture content of steam. The 
efﬁciency of the high pressure turbine had signiﬁ-
cantly deteriorated in consequence of modiﬁcations 
made over the years, one of which was the removal 
of two blading stages. The power uprates accom-
plished in 1998 had increased the loading on the 
reheaters. Some of their tubes have been plugged, 
which has restricted their service life.
The utility replaced one-stage steam reheat-
ing with two-stage steam reheating to improve 
turbine efﬁciency. With two-stage steam reheating, 
a new high pressure turbine extraction point was 
required to lead steam to the ﬁrst-stage piping 
group of the new two-stage reheater. Live steam is 
directed from the reactor to the other reheater pip-
ing group. The high pressure turbine blading were 
improved, which increased the turbine output.
Turbine plant automation system 
renewal at Olkiluoto 2
In the annual maintenance outage, a new auto-
mation system was installed in the Olkiluoto 2 
turbine plant control system. One reason was the 
need to switch from analogue to programmable 
technology. The other major reason was that spare 
parts procurement for the old system was getting 
difﬁcult. In addition, the modiﬁcations made in the 
turbine plant process in 2005, and those planned 
for 2006, required some additional modiﬁcations to 
the automation system. The new system facilitates 
component maintenance. Another system renewal 
objective is increased reliability and reduced sus-
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ceptibility to malfunctions. The new system was 
pre-installed at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 in the 2004 an-
nual maintenance.
The new automation system is implemented by 
programmable technology. This allows an increased 
number of process status measurements. As re-
gards turbine automation, it facilitates for turbine 
operators more versatile information management, 
process control at operating work stations, trend 
monitoring and setting of safety limits. Safety 
limit settings enable turbine operator reaction to 
even minor process changes. The control desk for 
the turbine side in the control room was replaced 
with a safety systems control desk and a turbine 
systems control and monitoring desk and the con-
trol room was ﬁtted with a giant screen display. 
In addition, the process computer system capacity 
had to be upgraded in connection with the control 
system renewal to handle the large volume of data 
yielded by the turbine automation.
The turbine plant automation system renewal 
made it possible, for the ﬁrst time at a Finnish nu-
clear power plant, to control some processes from 
the control room via the operating work station 
system. The processes thus controlled are of minor 
safety importance.
The automation interface was introduced at the 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 training simulator in September 
2004, which made possible the training of operat-
ing personnel in its use.
Modernisation of Olkiluoto 2’s 
medium voltage switchgears 
In the 2005 annual maintenance outage at 
Olkiluoto 2, the 6.6 kV medium voltage switch-
gears of the internal power supply system, which 
distributes most of the internal electrical power 
required by the unit, were modernised. This was 
done mainly because of the ageing of the original 
switchgears, the reduced availability of spare parts 
and to bring the switchgears up to modern require-
ments. During this REMES project, a total of over 
60 medium voltage switchgear cubicles were mod-
ernised. The project included several signiﬁcant 
modiﬁcations and replacements as regards i.a. the 
control, relay protection and auxiliary voltage sys-
tems, cabling and structural work.
The modernisation improved the availability, 
protection, control and resistance to malfunctions 
of the switchgears. The same modiﬁcations are due 
for implementation at Olkiluoto 1 in 2006.
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APPENDIX 3 Signiﬁcant operational events
Tapani Eurasto, Jukka Kupila, Risto Sairanen, Jorma Sandberg,  
Rainer Rantala, Kirsti Tossavainen
Loviisa nuclear power plant
A signiﬁcant seawater level increase 
and a consequent emergency standby 
at Loviisa nuclear power plant
The seawater level at the Loviisa plant reached 
+1.4 m at 4.35 hrs on 9 January 2005. In accord-
ance with the plant’s emergency operating proce-
dures, a special situation was declared onsite and 
monitoring was stepped up. At 7.39 hrs the water 
level reached +1.60 m. An emergency standby was 
declared at the plant in accordance with the emer-
gency operating procedures and the plant’s emer-
gency organisation was summoned. At 11.55 hrs 
the water level reached its maximum value of 
+1.73 m. Flood monitoring was implemented. No 
ﬂooding of the plant, or other phenomena endan-
gering the plant’s safety, were observed and both 
plant units operated as usual. The plant notiﬁed 
STUK of the special situation and the emergency 
standby whereafter STUK activated its own emer-
gency organisation.
At 13.00 hrs the seawater level had decreased 
below the emergency standby limit of +1.60 m. The 
emergency standby was called off at 14.00 hrs and 
the special situation at 19.00 hrs.
The design basis seawater level for the Loviisa 
plant is +2.0 m. Signiﬁcant ﬂooding would only 
occur if +2.5 m were exceeded with simultaneous 
heavy sea swells. Had the seawater level exceeded 
+1.75 m at Loviisa 1 and +1.8 m at Loviisa 2, the 
units should have been placed in a shutdown state, 
as required by the emergency operating procedures. 
Minor revisions of instructions as well as plant 
modiﬁcations have been carried out at the plant 
due to the event i.a. in order to harmonise the 
operation of different organisational units and to 
ascertain the operation of the drainage pumps of 
the plant’s groundwater wells. The instructions, 
intervention limits and actions relating to a high 
seawater level have also been assessed. According 
to a utility assessment, the emergency operating 
procedures are not deﬁcient. STUK will look fur-
ther into the matter in 2006.
The seawater level along the entire Finnish 
south coast rose exceptionally high on 9 January 
2005, with a relatively marked exceeding of previ-
ous maximum values by 15–30 cm. This was due 
to a heavy wind in the Baltic, water level oscilla-
tion across the Baltic basin caused by ﬂuctuating 
airpressure and the large volume of water in the 
Baltic brought about by winds in the North Sea in 
the long term.
The safety level of the plant units was not signif-
icantly reduced by the exceptionally hight sea water 
level. The event was classiﬁed INES Level 0.
At the Olkiluoto power plant the seawater level 
increase was signiﬁcantly less than in Loviisa and 
no measures needed to be taken.
A primary–to–secondary leak at Loviisa 2
Towards the end of 2004 it was discovered that pri-
mary circuit water enters the secondary circuit via 
one steam generator at Loviisa 2. The leak is very 
small and does not affect the radiation safety of the 
plant or the environment.
In the tubes of the plant unit’s six steam gen-
erators circulates primary circuit water of approx. 
300 degrees that vaporizes secondary circuit water 
into steam that is conveyed to turbines. Ejectors 
remove air and uncondensed gas from the turbine 
condenser and blow them to the atmosphere. In 
case of a primary–to–secondary leak, radioactive 
substances could escape to the atmosphere along 
with gas exiting the condenser and to the sea via 
secondary circuit drainage. During normal opera-
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tion with no leaks, the secondary circuit contains 
no radioactive substances.
The leak was detected by laboratory measure-
ments in October–November 2004 when a small 
amount of the isotope of arsenic-76, originating in 
primary circuit water, was found in main ejector air 
monitoring samples. The arsenic concentration was 
higher in December than before. In December the 
leak was conﬁrmed by measurements according to 
which the tritium concentration in the Loviisa 2 
secondary circuit exceeded that in Loviisa 1. The 
tritium, too, originates in primary circuit water. 
The leak point was located in a steam generator 
and was estimated at a few tens of millilitres per 
hour. The Technical Speciﬁcations allow a two-litre 
leak per hour before repair measures are to be 
taken. In case of a small leak, progress monitoring 
sufﬁces.
Location of the leak point was attempted in the 
2005 annual maintenance but this failed due to 
the leak’s small size. The secondary side was pres-
surised to 6 bar to monitor air bubbles rising from 
the steam generator collector. The method has been 
used at other Loviisa type plants i.e. VVER-440 
plants. Bubbles caused by the leak went unnoticed 
i.a. because gas that had become dissolved in water 
formed bubbles as well. The utility is looking into 
improvements in leak location methods.
Since 2002, there has been a primary-to-second-
ary leak in an other steam generator of the plant 
unit. It is considerably smaller than the one de-
tected in 2004. Its locating has been unsuccessful 
due to its small size.
Releases from the Loviisa secondary circuit 
into the atmosphere are monitored by continu-
ous activity monitors in the turbine plant steam 
lines and the main ejector exhaust lines and by 
laboratory analyses. In addition, secondary circuit 
activity measurements monitor water releases via 
the drainage system to the sea caused by second-
ary circuit leaks. Further, releases are evaluated, 
where necessary, by computational methods based 
on the activity concentration of primary-to-second-
ary leaks.
The heat transfer tubes of two steam generators 
at the Loviisa plant units are inspected by eddy 
current every two years i.e. all heat transfer tubes 
are inspected every six years. Almost 40 tubes have 
been plugged based on the inspections. The ﬁgure 
is small compared with other PWRs. Whenever pos-
sible, defective tubes are plugged before a through-
wall ﬂaw develops. The tubes’ dimensioning allows 
for a relatively extensive through-wall defect be-
fore break. This concept of LBB implies that the 
margin to pipe rupture is adequate at the time of 
leak detection.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Fuel cladding leaks at Olkiluoto 2 
The leak detected on 30 August 2004
A leaking fuel rod was detected at Olkiluoto 2 
on 30 August 2004. The ﬁrst indication of a leak 
came from a turbine condenser exhaust gas activ-
ity measurement. The leak was conﬁrmed by a 
laboratory measurement of a coolant sample taken 
the same day. A small pin-hole leak was concluded 
based on the measurements.
Fuel rods are thin metal tubes ﬁlled with ura-
nium dioxide pellets. The fuel rod structure is 
shown in Fig L3.1. The gas tight cladding prevents 
radioactive ﬁssion products escaping from fuel to 
coolant. Activity concentrations in the reactor-to-
turbine steam lines and condensate exhaust gas 
lines are monitored by continuous measurements 
providing the quickest indication of a fuel leak. 
In addition, the amounts of gaseous radioactive 
substances, and those dissolved in the coolant, are 
monitored by regular laboratory measurements.
Leak development was monitored for the entire 
operating cycle. The activity concentration released 
through the leak increased slowly ﬁrst. The neptu-
nium-239 activity concentration in the coolant be-
gan to increase in January 2005, indicating a clad-
ding secondary leak. A secondary leak is formed 
when coolant enters the rod through the original 
leak, causing fuel cladding embrittlement from 
the inside. A secondary leak is usually larger than 
the original. Uranium from fuel pellets may enter 
coolant through the secondary leak. The ﬁrst signs 
of this were obtained on 20 January 2005. Prior 
to the annual maintenance, a maximum of 12 g of 
uranium, equivalent to two fuel pellets, leached to 
the coolant via the secondary leak.
The leaking fuel assembly was localised on 16 
October 2004. The load to the fuel cladding was 
reduced by limiting manoeuvring of the control 
rod located close to the assembly. The failed fuel 
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assembly was removed from the reactor in the 
2005 annual maintenance outage. On inspection, 
a thin metal strip was found in the assembly. The 
original failure was caused by the wear of the strip 
against the fuel assembly’s corner rod cladding. 
Four months after this, a secondary cladding fail-
ure occurred at the lower end of the leaking fuel 
rod. It developed into a full transverse rupture 
towards the end of the fuel cycle
During the maintenance outage, Teollisuuden 
Voima Oy inspected all fuel assemblies that had 
been in the reactor during the 2004−2005 operating 
cycle for leaktightness and found no other leaking 
assemblies. The fuel leak did not have much bear-
ing on the plant radiation levels and occupational 
doses incurred during the annual maintenance. 
Radioactive releases into the environment from 
the leak were insigniﬁcant and have no bearing on 
environmental radiation.
The event was classiﬁed INES Level 0.
The leak detected on 23 July 2005
Another fuel cladding leak was detected at 
Olkiluoto 2 on 23 July 2005. Based on continuous 
activity measurements of the turbine condenser 
exhaust gas, it was concluded to be a minor fuel 
leak. It has remained small and there has been 
no interaction between the coolant and uranium 
pellets. The leak is monitored i.a. by means of the 
reactor water iodine-131 activity concentration. By 
the end of 2005 the iodine-131 concentration was 
approx. three parts per thousand of the limit value 
at most, the exceeding of which restricts the opera-
tion of the reactor.
The utility follows leak progression by continu-
ous activity measurements and laboratory meas-
urements. The leaking assembly will be removed 
from the reactor not later than in the 2006 annual 
maintenance outage.
The event was classiﬁed INES Level 0.
Figure L3.1. A diagrammatic drawing of an Olkiluoto 2 
fuel assembly.
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Maximum lifting hight for 
reactor pressure vessel head was 
exceeded at Olkiluoto 1 and 2
The reactor pressure vessel head has been lifted in 
non-conformance with the Technical Speciﬁcations 
(Tech Specs) at Olkiluoto 1 and 2. Since the annual 
maintenances of 1998, the normal lifting route has 
been unavailable due to steam separators removed 
from service being stored in the fuel pools. The 
RPV head has been lifted up to approx. 7.5 m in or-
der to safely move it above and over the old steam 
separator. However, the Tech Specs deﬁnes approx. 
5.7 m as the highest allowable lifting height. This 
ascertains reactor and fuel integrity in case the 
RPV head dropped on top of the open reactor dur-
ing lifting.
Teollisuuden Voima Oy found out about the 
non-conformity during crane driver training on 29 
April 2005 when the Tech Specs conditions relat-
ing to lifting were discussed. The utility thereafter 
applied STUK’s approval for a manner of lifting 
that is in non-conformity with the Tech Specs. In 
the application, the safety signiﬁcance of the in-
creased lifting height had been assessed as regards 
the possible dropping of the RPV head. According 
to the new analyses presented in the application, 
the non-conformity did not jeopardise structural 
integrity. STUK approved it but required that ear-
lier deviations from the Tech Specs be clariﬁed and 
reported.
The event was classiﬁed INES Level 0.
The old Olkiluoto 2 steam separator was scrapped 
prior to the 2005 annual maintenance outage and 
the scrapping of the old Olkiluoto 1 steam sepa-
rator was begun in September 2005; the work is 
estimated to be completed February 2006. This be-
ing the case, the original lifting height need not be 
deviated from anymore during RPV head lifts.
A setting error in electrical power 
supply circuit breakers shared 
by the Olkiluoto plant units
During the Olkiluoto 2 annual maintenance, on 9 
May 2005, a setting error was detected in the relay 
protection of the electrical power supply circuit 
breakers shared by Olkiluoto 1 and 2, which could 
have brought about disturbances in the power sup-
ply connections between the units in case of need. 
Electric cable connections have been established 
between the diesel-backed 660 V switchgears of 
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 to feed diesel-backed electrical 
power from one unit to the other, if necessary. If 
the need arises, the cable connections are used to 
replace one unit’s failed back-up diesel generator 
with the other unit’s operational diesel generator. 
The cable connections are equipped with eight 
identical supply circuit breakers to implement 
electrical power supply.
During the Olkiluoto 2 annual maintenance, 
medium voltage switchgear modernisations (the 
REMES project) were carried out requiring tem-
porary electric systems connections to be set up. 
These utilised the supply circuit breakers of the 
electrical power supply connections between the 
plant units. During the taking into service of a 
temporary connection it was detected that two 
supply circuit breakers of the electrical power sup-
ply connections between the plant units opened. 
During problem shooting it was found out that the 
short-circuit protection set values of the circuit 
breakers in question were incorrect and lacked the 
0.1 second design time delay. Later analyses estab-
lished incorrect short-circuit protection in all eight 
circuit breakers.
The analyses give reason to suspect that this 
has been a latent defect since the circuit break-
ers in question were installed in 1989. Due to the 
temporary nature of the connections the event had 
little impact on the safety of the plant units. In 
case of a real need, however, the incorrect circuit 
breaker protection set values could have caused 
disturbances in the electrical power supply connec-
tions. The event was classiﬁed INES Level 1.
Due to the event, Teollisuuden Voima Oy 
checked the set values of all cirucit breakers and 
replaced incorrect values with design values. In ad-
dition, the utility has ascertained the appropriate-
ness of the preventive maintenance and relay test-
ing programmes for equivalent circuit breakers.
A power failure at Olkiluoto 2 during 
the annual maintenance outage
During the annual maintenance of Olkiluoto 2, on 
11 May 2005, a power failure occurred that stopped 
the operation of some plant unit components en-
suring nuclear safety, such as pumps ensuring 
decay heat removal during the outage, until the 
back-up diesel generators started up. The power 
failure brought about i.a. lighting, ventilation and 
lift malfunctions.
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In connection with temporary coupling arrange-
ments made during modiﬁcations carried out dur-
ing the annual maintenance, one offsite 110 kV 
grid supply circuit breaker opened in consequence 
of an incorrectly planned isolation of the control 
cables of a supply circuit breaker. The circuit 
breaker’s opening caused loss of voltage in two of 
the plant unit’s four diesel-backed internal power 
supply sub-systems. A diesel generator backing 
up the operation of one sub-system started up im-
mediately, supplying reserve electrical power as 
designed. Another sub-system’s diesel generator 
failed to start automatically, however, since it had 
undergone simultaneous relay protection testing 
preventing automatic actuation and engagement. 
The diesel generator was started manually but the 
closing of its switch failed due to the incorrectly 
planned isolation of the switch control circuit. 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy analysed the event’s causes 
and re-energised the sub-system in about half an 
hour after the power failure.
The event did not endanger nuclear fuel cooling 
or cause any other dangerous situations. Several 
human errors were related to it, however, which 
could have resulted in a signiﬁcantly longer power 
failure. It was also an indication of shortcomings in 
the work planning of systems important to safety 
and was thus classiﬁed INES Level 1.
The power failure was due to an electrical 
couplings isolation error made during electrical 
systems modiﬁcations. Due to the event, the utility 
discontinued the work in question and reviewed 
the plans for the safety couplings of the modiﬁca-
tions and veriﬁed the timetables. In addition, im-
provements were planned in the co-ordination of 
the testing of systems important to safety.
Back-up diesel generator air intake 
opening was closed at Olkiluoto 2
In connection with the replacement of outer doors 
at the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units, an air intake 
opening above the outer doors of the diesel gen-
erator room was covered to shut out concrete dust 
from an air duct. The closing of a diesel engine’s 
intake air opening would not have made the engine 
totally inoperational but it did reduce the likeli-
ness of its successful starting.
Both Olkiluoto plant units have four back-up 
diesel generators that automatically start to sup-
ply the electrical power required by the plant units 
in a situation where a plant unit’s off- and onsite 
power supplies have been lost. The diesel genera-
tors are housed in separate rooms. The Tech Specs 
require that each plant unit has available at least 
two operational diesel generators plus their auxil-
iary systems. The outer doors of the power plant’s 
buildings and those of the back-up diesel generator 
rooms are due for replacement. The diesel engine 
combustion air intake opening and its air ducts are 
right above the diesel generator room doors.
At Olkiluoto 1, one diesel generator room door 
was replaced on 17 to 21 March 2005. During the 
work it was found out that the frame of the new 
door exceeds in height the opening for the old door. 
On both sides of the air intake opening, some of the 
concrete wall above the door had to be removed and 
the latticework of the opening reshaped to ﬁt in the 
frame of the new door. The concrete was removed 
using an angle grinder. The air intake opening was 
covered with a plywood board for the duration of 
the operation to prevent dust entering it. It was al-
lowed to be in place only when the concrete was be-
ing cut. It was to be removed on exit from the place 
of work or in case a diesel engine starts while the 
work was being done. The board was blocking the 
air intake opening for approx. two hours.
At Olkiluoto 2, diesel generator room doors 
were replaced as of 15 July and 13 September 2005 
on, employing the same procedure. When replacing 
the latter door, attention was paid to the plywood 
board covering the air intake opening. It was re-
moved and work was continued without it.
In consequence of the event, work methods were 
changed to make it unnecessary to cover the open-
ing. In addition, the utility revised the work permit 
procedure for door replacement work.
The event was classiﬁed INES Level 0.
Alarm testing of the carbon-dioxide ﬁre 
suppression system for diesel generator 
rooms was not done at Olkiluoto 1 and 2
The alarm testing of the carbon-dioxide ﬁre sup-
pression system for the diesel generator rooms has 
not been done once a week as required in the Tech 
Specs.
The system is intended for the automatic or 
manual suppression of a possible ﬁre in the waste 
building or the back-up diesel generator rooms. 
The system is also intended to prevent a ﬁre from 
spreading to rooms in the vicinity of an object of 
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ignition. The system is basically comprised of a 
5000 kg subcooled CO2 tank, with separate CO2 
lines to the back-up diesel generators, the bitumen 
handling facilities as well as the waste storage. 
The system is always available. If a ﬁre, considered 
beyond the capacity of a portable ﬁre extinguisher, 
is detected in one of the diesel generator rooms, the 
ventilation system is shut down and CO2 , actuated 
by a manual switch device, is discharged to the 
room. In other objects of ignition the system func-
tions automatically and guided by its own detec-
tors, or by manual trip.
Towards the end of 1998, CO2 tank weight 
measurements made by an unreliable mechanical 
crank arm method were replaced by measurements 
made by electronic equipment. The tank’s weight 
lower limit alarm became difﬁcult to test. Control 
was changed: instead of periodic alarm testing 
every seven days, receipt of the alarm signal at the 
central control room is ascertained in connection 
with quarterly test actuations. The Tech Specs’ re-
quirement for the periodic testing frequency, or the 
need to revise the Tech Specs, were not recognised. 
However, the volume of carbon dioxide in the tank 
has been controlled in connection with the weekly 
inspection required in the Tech Specs by writing 
down the reading yielded by an electronic scales.
Due to the event, the utility updated the Tech 
Specs and reviewed document uniformity.
The event was classiﬁed INES Level 1 due to 
the occurrence of previous events where the need 
to review the Tech Specs had not been recognised 
(see i.a. Annual Reports 2000, 2002 and 2003).
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APPENDIX 4 Licences in accordance with 
the Nuclear Energy Act in 2005
• C81/2, 14 Feb 2005 Teollisuuden Voima Oy  
Transfer of a 9.4 m³ batch of waste oil cleared 
from regulatory control from Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant to Ekokem Oy for use as saw chain 
oil. Valid until 31 December 2005.
• A214/68, 18 Feb 2005 Fortum Power and Heat Oy 
Export to Germany of documentation on the 
I&C system of Loviisa power plant. Valid until 
30 June 2006. 
• C3163/2, 22 Feb 2005 Teollisuuden Voima Oy  
Permission to handle and store contaminated 
components in the building situated at the 
western side end of the MAJ storage building 
(components storage). Valid until 31 December 
2018.
• Y214/99, 11 Apr 2005 TUMO OY  
The possession, storage, handling and use of a 
15 g batch of thorium nitrate does not require a 
licence in accordance with the Nuclear Energy 
Act but a notiﬁcation of the activity shall be 
given in accordance with section 17 of the Nu-
clear Energy Decree. 
• D81/1, 3 May 2005 Teollisuuden Voima Oy  
Transfer of a 50 m³ batch of waste oil cleared 
from regulatory control from Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant to Ekokem Oy for use as saw chain 
oil. Valid until 31 December 2005. 
• A214/71, 20 May 2005 and A214/72, 20 May 2005 
Fortum Power and Heat Oy  
Amendment to the conditions of the licences 
A214/50A and A214/50B to import nuclear fuel 
containing Russian and Kazakhstan origin ura-
nium, 19 February 2004. 
• D214/9, 22. Sep 2005, Teollisuuden Voima Oy  
Import from Sweden of control rods made of 
zirconium alloy for use as spare parts. Two rods 
with a total max. of 4 kg of zirconium. Valid un-
til 30 June 2005.
• C214/262, 31 Oct 2005, Teollisuuden Voima Oy  
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from Sweden. Max. 
10 100 kg of uranium with a U-235 enrichment 
not exceeding 5%. Provided with the Euratom 
obligation code “P”. Valid until 31 December 
2006.
• C214/263, 9 Nov 2005, Teollisuuden Voima Oy  
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from Spain. Max. 
7650 kg of uranium with a U-235 enrichment 
not exceeding 5%. Provided with the Euratom 
obligation code “C”. Valid until 31 December 
2006.
• C214/264, 9 Nov 2005, Teollisuuden Voima Oy  
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from Spain. Max. 
13 650 kg of uranium with a U-235 enrichment 
not exceeding 5%. Provided with the Euratom 
obligation code “S”. Valid until 31 December 
2006.
• C821/81, 21 Dec 2005 Teollisuuden Voima Oy  
Transfer of two batches of waste oil, 8.4 m³ and 
7.7 m³, cleared from regulatory control from 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant to Ekokem Oy for 
use as saw chain oil. Valid until 31 December 
2006.
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APPENDIX 5 STUK’s periodic inspection programme
Basic programme
Inspections in 2005
Loviisa nuclear power 
plant
Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant
A. Safety management
B. Main functions
B.1. Assessment and improvement of safety x x
B.2. Operation x
B.3. Plant maintenance and ageing management x
C. Inspections by functional unit and ﬁeld of competence
C.1. Plant safety functions x
C.2. Electrical and I&C systems x
C.3. Mechanical engineering * x x
C.4. Structures and buildings x x
C.5. PSA and safety management x x
C.6. Document and information management
C.7. Chemistry x x
C.8. Nuclear waste * x x
C.9. Radiation protection x x
C.10. Fire protection x x
C.11. Emergency preparedness x x
C.12. Physical protection x
C.13. Training / Human resources and training x
C.14. Quality assurance x x
* An inspection is comprised of multiple subinspections
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APPENDIX 6 STUK’s periodic inspection 
programme during construction
Inspections in 2005
Main functions
Project quality management (two inspections in 2005) x
Project management and resources x
Safety issues x
Project management and realisation, document management x
Work processes
Training of operational personnel x
Quality assurance of construction x
Utilisation of PSA x
Radiation safety x
Inspection procedures x
Inspection of:
• I&C design x
• Main components design and inspection x
To be inspected in connection with the periodic inspection programme
Emergency preparedness x
Physical protection
Fire protection x
Nuclear waste
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APPENDIX 7 STUK-ﬁnanced technical 
support projects completed in 2005
Nuclear power plants
Technical support for regulatory 
decision-making
FIN5 – STUK’s safety review during construction 
licence phase. Independent comparative analysis 
in order to analyse the reactor circuit behaviour 
during accident situations; VTT Processes
FIN5 – STUK’s safety review during construction 
licence phase. Independent comparative analysis 
in order to analyse behaviour of the containment 
during accident situations; VTT Processes 
FIN5 – STUK’s safety review during construction 
licence phase. Independent comparative analysis of 
severe accidents; VTT Processes 
OL3 – Review of the design phase PSA; VTT 
Industrial Systems
OL3 – Radiation doses to the surrounding popula-
tion; Review of computer based systems for predic-
tion of radiation doses in emergency situations; 
VTT Processes
ASTRID-calculation tool; development of the pro-
gramme; VTT Energy
Evaluation of conceptual designs of I&C systems 
for nuclear power plants; VTT Industrial Systems
OL3 – Assessment of the ﬁre safety; FRNC-cables; 
VTT Building and Transport
OL3 – Analysis of Aircraft Crashes; VTT Industrial 
Systems
OL3 – Review of design documents for the fuel 
building (UFA) and safeguards buildings (UHJ/
UJK), Insinööritoimisto Pontek Oy
OL3 – Corrosion resistance of the steel liner em-
bedded in concrete structures; VTT Building and 
Transport
OL3 – STUK-GRS-04: Development and review 
of criteria for external hazards specially aircraft 
impact and ﬁre; Gesellschaft für Anlagen- und 
Reaktorsicherheit (GRS) mbH
OL3 – Review of design documents for the reactor 
building base slab; Insinööritoimisto Pontek Oy
OL3 – Water chemistry of the primary circuit; con-
sultation; VTT Industrial Systems
OL3 – Review of design documents for the contain-
ment building; VTT Building and Transport
OL3 – Concrete structures; Review of design docu-
ments for the anchoring and steel parts embedded 
in concrete; VTT Building and Transport
APROS 3D -ohjelma; Diplomityö: FANP-PKL-
koelaitteiston mallintaminen; VTT Prosessit
OL3 – Conceptual design of earthing, lightning pro-
tection, EMC, cabling and HEMP/HPEM systems; 
Expert opinions; Nemko Product Services Oy
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OL3 – Thermal loads of the reactor pit structural 
concrete in a severe accident. VTT Processes 
Loviisa power plant, Final disposal repository of 
solidiﬁed waste, Review of the structural design; 
VTT Building and Transport
OL3 – Review of the 3D-Nonlinear Finite Element 
Analysis; VTT Building and Transport 
Consulting assignments of OL3- primary circuit 
strength analysis, manufacturing technology and 
construction plans, VTT Industrial Systems 
OL3 – Requirements for coatings of nuclear power 
plant containment; VTT Building and Transport
OL3 – Review of design documents for the con-
crete structures inside reactor building steel liner; 
Insinööritoimisto Pontek Oy
Loviisa power plant, design of the new automa-
tion buildings; review of structural design; VTT 
Building and Transport
Impact of meteorological phenomena on nuclear 
power plant safety. Participation in a seminar on 
meteorological phenomena and other environmen-
tal conditions; Finnish Meteorological Institute. 
Effects of a 12-hour shift system on the work of NPP 
operators; University of Helsinki / Department of 
Psychology 
OL3 – Review of the speciﬁcation for seismic qual-
iﬁcation of electrical and I&C components; VTT 
Building and Transport 
Volley test facility, facility upgrading and ex-
periments with the new facility. Lappeenranta 
University of Technology 
IZNA-4 literature survey, Annual report + 2 spe-
cial reports, Advanced Nuclear Technology Inter-
national
Nuclear waste management
Technical support for regulatory 
decision-making
National expert group for the safeguards of ﬁnal 
disposal (LOSKA); Application of geophysical ra-
dar method for safeguards monitoring at Olkiluoto 
spent fuel disposal site; JP Fintact Oy
Regulatory control of Posiva’s site conﬁrmation 
investigations at Olkiluoto; Siivola 2005; private 
consultants
Safety of nuclear waste management; 2004; 
Alternative, transparent tools for uncertainty ana-
lysis in safety assessment and for decision making; 
Comissáo Nacional de Energia Nuclear
